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REAL RESPECT: A REJECTION OF RICHARD MILLER’S 
PATRIOTIC BIAS IN TAX-FINANCED AID 
 
Gerbrand Hoogvliet 
Abstract    This paper analyzes Richard W. Miller's argument for 
favoring compatriots in the allocation of tax-financed aid. It argues 
that Miller‘s patriotic bias is derived via an incorrect framing of 
the problem. It furthermore contends that Miller‘s notion of equal 
respect is too uninformative to ground such a patriotic bias. A 
better definition of respect in terms of human rights is offered. This 
definition is more informative but fails to uphold the stringent bias 
Miller argues for. 
 
National borders occupy a curious position in political 
philosophy and ethics. Their existence and location is often the 
result of mere historical accident. Yet, despite this arbitrary nature, 
the nation states defined by these borders are often chosen as the 
primary actors in theories of international relations. Similarly in 
ethics, there is a tension between the fact that citizenship seems 
morally arbitrary, insofar as it is usually bestowed upon persons at 
birth, and on the other hand the moral obligations that participation 
in a particular society seem to give rise to. In the context of global 
poverty national borders take on another moral dimension since 
they often, as Michael Blake puts it, ―divide not simply one 
jurisdiction from another, but the rich from the poor as well‖1. 
                                                 
1
 Michael Blake, ―Distributive justice, state coercion, and autonomy‖, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, no. 3 (2001), 257. 
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Given the grim facts of poverty in many parts of the world, the 
question of whether wealthier nations are morally allowed to favor 
their own citizens over foreigners in dire need becomes an 
important one. 
 Richard Miller, in his contribution to the anthology The 
Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, entitled ―Cosmopolitan 
Respect and Patriotic Concern‖, provides a universalist defense of 
such a favoritism. He argues that on the basis of the principle of 
equal respect for all persons we are in fact obligated to prioritize 
our compatriots when it comes to tax-financed aid. He argues that 
a violation of such a patriotic bias would entail disrespectful 
treatment of our fellow citizens and would lead to an excessive 
loss of social trust. Given that breaking the principle of equal 
respect is wrong, violation of the patriotic bias is also wrong. We 
are thus morally obligated to prioritize compatriots in the 
administration of such aid. 
 In this paper I will argue against the position put forward 
by Richard Miller. I will begin with an exposition of his argument. 
For the benefit of the reader I will also provide a brief explanation 
of concepts found in John Rawls‘s Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, that are important to a proper understanding of 
Miller‘s position. I will then provide my own critique, focusing 
firstly on what I hold to be an improper framing of the issue, 
followed by a more fundamental criticism of the notion of equal 
respect used by Miller. I will show his definition of equal respect 
to be uninformative and anemic and will proceed to redefine this 
concept in a more substantial way by appealing to the 
philosophical literature on human rights. 
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Miller 
 In his paper, Miller aims to provide ―a universalist 
justification of the patriotic bias in aid.‖2  Universalism here refers 
to a position similar to cosmopolitanism, which takes human 
beings as ‗the relevant unit of moral concern‘. It is mainly defined 
in contrast to what Miller calls particularism, which is a view 
maintained by philosophers such as David Miller and Michael 
Sandel, who ascribe intrinsic value to communities of persons such 
as nations. For particularists, the defense of patriotism is usually 
based on some notion that it benefits the community or the nation 
state. Since Richard Miller rejects a view of nations as intrinsically 
valuable he cannot make a similar claim. In fact, because he adopts 
the universalist view of all persons as having equal moral value, he 
commits himself to the use of universal principle that applies to all 
persons. This principle is that of equal respect. 
 In order to establish a patriotic bias, however, he first has to 
identify what such a bias consists of. He points out that the 
patriotic bias is really a combination of two biases: an attention 
bias and a budgetary bias. To establish the attention bias he has to 
prove that we are justified and indeed obligated to pay more 
attention to the needs of our compatriots than to the needs of 
foreigners. The budgetary bias is then the working out of this 
attention bias in terms of assigning aid and simply means that the 
majority of our tax-financed aid is indeed spent on compatriots. He 
recognizes that he has to establish the attention bias before he can 
claim the budgetary bias. 
                                                 
2
  Richard W. Miller, ―Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern,‖ in The 
Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, ed. Gillian Brock and Harry 
Brighouse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 127. 
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Equal Respect 
 In establishing the principle of equal respect, Miller makes 
an appropriate distinction between respect and concern. Whereas 
most of the literature conflates these two terms, he defines them 
separately. Concern, for Miller, applies to personal relationships 
such as between family members, friends etc and signifies a deep 
level of caring for the well being of others. I think Miller rightly 
restricts this type of sympathy to those who we are personally 
acquainted with. As an example, he states that although he owes 
equal respect to his daughter and the girl across the street, he is not 
required to have the same level of concern for the latter. I think this 
is a sensible distinction and it clarifies the task at hand: since 
concern covers all persons that we stand in a personal relationship 
to, the principle of respect is the one that will regulate our behavior 
to strangers domestically and abroad. 
 The equal respect that we owe to strangers has two main 
parameters: 
 
1) One avoids moral wrongness just in case one 
conforms to some set of rules for living by 
which one could express equal respect for all.
3
 
 
2) A choice is wrong just in case it violates every 
set of shared rules of conduct to which 
everyone could be freely and rationally 
committed without anyone‘s violating his or 
her own self-respect.
4
 
 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 132 
4
 Ibid. 
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The phrasing of these parameters is somewhat confusing, but in a 
nutshell they provide two conditions under which equal respect is 
violated. Under the first rule, it is morally wrong to choose a 
method of administering tax-financed aid that does not show equal 
respect for all. The second parameter claims that it is wrong to 
choose a way of distributing aid in a way that some persons could 
not self-respectfully accept. To use an example, if you and I were 
to start a lawn mowing business and I suggested that, even though 
we put in the same amount of work, I should get all the money, 
then that would not be an arrangement that you could self-
respectfully accept.  
 Miller thus separates respect out into a respect outward and 
respect inward; respect for others and self-respect. Any 
administration of tax financed aid thus has to express and satisfy 
both forms of respect.  
 
Rawlsian Intermezzo 
 At this point I think it will be beneficial to elucidate some 
concepts from John Rawls that are implicit in much of Miller‘s 
further discussion. Although Miller is not defending anything like 
a Rawlsian position, much of political philosophy is steeped in the 
tradition started by Rawls and it is therefore useful to have a basic 
understanding of some of the background concepts informing this 
discussion.  
 Rawls conceives of society as ―a fair system of 
cooperation‖5 among free and equal citizens. Fairness is necessary 
                                                 
5
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 14. 
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for Rawls because one does not choose what society one is born 
into, and exiting a society is extremely difficult if not impossible. 
Society is thus unlike other forms of association such as local 
communities, schools, clubs, church congregations etc. where 
membership can be given up if one is asked to uphold rules and 
practices that one is unwilling to support. Since no such an exit 
option exists for the nation state there is a more urgent demand for 
fairness. 
 Not only is societal membership largely involuntary, it also 
exposes persons to the coercive nature of the state. For Rawls 
―political power is always coercive power applied by the state and 
its apparatus of enforcement.‖ 6 As citizens we participate in the 
creation of laws, which the state then enforces in our name. 
Justification is thus demanded both on the grounds that laws are 
enacted in our name as well as that laws are enforced upon us.  
 Given this nature of society and the demands for 
justification that it gives rise to, Rawls is particularly concerned 
with the well being of what he calls ―the least-advantaged 
members of society.‖7 It is easy to see why this is: given the 
coercive nature of the state and the near impossibility of exiting 
society, it is the worst off group that is most likely to feel trapped 
in a system that they would not voluntarily uphold. This group 
could certainly be coerced into cooperation, but the ideal of a just 
society would then have been forfeited. I take Miller‘s concerns 
about respect to also be focusing largely on this group, and for 
similar reasons. 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 40 
7
 Ibid., 43 
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Loss of Social Trust 
 Returning to Miller‘s argument, he claims that a failure to 
prioritize compatriots would entail a violation of the principle of 
equal respect. This violation comes about in two ways. First, 
without a patriotic bias, tax-financed aid is distributed in a way that 
does not express respect to all. Specifically, the least-advantaged 
members of society are not treated respectfully by their fellow 
citizens. This goes against the first parameter of equal respect that I 
stated above. The idea here seems to be that by not paying extra 
attention to the needs of disadvantaged compatriots we are treating 
them disrespectfully, which the first parameter holds to be wrong.  
 The second way in which a breach of equal respect comes 
about is through the inability of the least-advantaged group in 
society to self-respectfully accept such an allocation of tax-
financed aid. Put differently, the least well off members of society 
could not choose a use of tax-financed aid that did not prioritize 
them and at the same time maintain their self-respect. The sacrifice 
required of them would be too large, the inequalities faced too 
stark. Since an allocation is imposed on them that they could not 
self-respectfully accept, parameter 2 of equal respect is violated 
and the allocation is thus wrong. 
 It is important to note here that the priority that Miller 
requires is a very strong one:  
  
[P]riority does not totally exclude support for 
foreign aid in the presence of relevant domestic 
burdens. Still, until domestic political 
arrangements have done as much as they can [...] 
to eliminate serious burdens of domestic 
inequality of life-prospects, there should be no 
 8 
 
significant sacrifice of this goal in order to help 
disadvantaged foreigners.
8
 
 
To put the consequences of this patriotic bias in context, Miller 
presents us with three persons who present the three main 
stakeholders in the outcome of this discussion. Kevin is a corporate 
lawyer living in a rich suburb of New York. Carla lives in the 
South Bronx and earns a meager living cleaning other people‘s 
apartments. Khalid, finally, collects scrap metal and lives in a slum 
in Dacca, Bangladesh.  Miller maintains that the patriotic bias and 
its consequences can be self-respectfully accepted by all three. As 
we stated above, Carla, as a member of the least-advantaged group 
in society, can self-respectfully accept a situation in which she is 
prioritized to the extent that Miller suggests in the statement above. 
Kevin also upholds the principle of equal respect since he is 
treating Carla in a respectful manner. Khalid, according to Miller, 
can also self-respectfully accept the patriotic bias that Kevin and 
Carla adhere to since he understands that both value the social trust 
that would be lost without such a bias. Kevin and Carla are also 
assumed to be treating Khalid respectfully, although Miller does 
not go into detail as to why that would be the case.  
 Naturally such a bias is a very convenient view for rich 
societies to hold since it reduces their obligations to foreign aid 
significantly. As Thomas Nagel points out in ―The Problem of 
Global Justice‖, however, the fact that a theory is convenient 
doesn‘t make it false.9  
                                                 
8
 Miller, ―Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern‖, 134 
9
 Thomas Nagel, ―The Problem of Global Justice,‖  Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 33, no. 2 (2005): 126. 
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 There is, however, another reason to be suspicious about 
Miller‘s patriotic bias as based on the principle of equal respect. 
Note that changes in Khalid‘s level of deprivation do not change 
the bias. Miller chooses to think of him as a scrap metal collector 
in Bangladesh, but we could just as easily imagine him as living in 
a refugee camp in Chad, or working 70 hours a week in a coal 
mine in Brazil, and Miller‘s bias would remain unaffected. Also 
note that Khalid does not feature anywhere in Miller‘s argument 
prior to the establishment of the patriotic bias. The fact that 
Khalid‘s circumstances are not being taken into account at all 
makes it at the very least unlikely that he is being shown equal 
respect.  
 Deciding on the extent of a patriotic bias that is supposed to 
show equal respect to all can hardly be done without looking at the 
needs of foreigners, especially given the severity of global poverty. 
Although the facts of global poverty cannot, in and of themselves, 
decide the debate about patriotic bias, they can help pull it into 
focus. Thomas Pogge estimates that in the 15 years following the 
Cold War, 270 million people died from poverty related causes, an 
average of 18 million a year.
10
 Against the backdrop of these grim 
facts, a theory that does not take into account the needs of the 
global poor can hardly claim to express equal respect for all. 
 In the next section I will present two criticisms of Miller‘s 
argument. The first focuses on a framing issue that I think skews 
the debate and misrepresents the trade-offs involved in reallocation 
                                                 
10
 Pogge, Thomas W. M. ―From A Cosmopolitan Perspective on the Global 
Economic Order.‖ In The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, edited by 
Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, (Cambridge: Cambridge University  Press, 
2005), 92. 
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of tax-financed aid. The second criticism is far more fundamental 
and proves that the   principle of equal respect used by Miller is 
uninformative and stands in need of a better definition. I will 
consequently suggest a more informative definition grounded in 
contemporary political philosophy of human rights. 
 
Framing  
 My claim here is that Miller gets the strong bias that he 
wants by the way he frames the reallocation of tax-financed aid. In 
short, my contention is that Miller implicit assumes the amount of 
tax-financed aid to be fixed, or determined at a point prior to the 
patriotic bias discussion. By doing this, any imagined change to the 
allocation of this aid becomes a zero-sum game between Carla and 
Khalid. The amount of aid is set, so any aid to Khalid will have to 
come out of tax money reserved for Carla. This places undue 
tension on the allocation decision as we are forced to choose 
between two persons clearly in need. Certainly, in absolute terms 
Khalid is worse off than Carla, but on the other hand Carla is 
forced to participate in a society with people like Kevin, which 
raises concerns of fairness domestically. The radically unequal 
income distribution in the United States only further aids Miller‘s 
argument.  
 My point is that this is an incorrect framing of the question. 
If we are really concerned with equal respect for all, we should not 
take tax aid as given, but rather as a function of the needs of Carla 
and Khalid and what is owed to them on account of this respect. If, 
for the sake of argument, we take Kevin as the sole tax payer, then 
the tax rate imposed on him should be set at a level at which both 
Carla and Khalid can self-respectfully accept the amount of aid 
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they receive. Framing the question in this way, I think Miller may 
still be justified in claiming that more is owed to compatriots on 
account of the coercive nature of the state. However, the amount 
owed to Khalid is likely to be much higher than what he has in 
mind. Thinking about the reallocation of aid in this way also makes 
more sense if we view it from Khalid‘s perspective. He is more 
likely to think of himself as being owed some type of aid by Kevin 
rather than by Carla, since Kevin is in a position to improve 
Khalid‘s life significantly, at little cost to himself.  
 This then raises the question of how much domestic and 
foreign aid would be sufficient for the satisfaction of the principle 
of equal respect and whether Kevin could self-respectfully accept 
such a tax burden. This is where the limitations of Miller‘s account 
become clearly visible, because the definition of equal respect that 
he uses is completely uninformative on this matter. It seems to me 
that Khalid could not self-respectfully accept the bias proposed by 
Miller, but how much would foreign aid have to increase for that to 
change? And if we found this amount, how could we tell if the tax 
burden required is one that Kevin could self-respectfully accept?  
 
Equal Respect Revisited 
 The uninformative nature of the equal respect principle 
stems from the fact that Miller defines it in terms of respect. If we 
look again at the two parameters, we notice that they largely 
constitute an elucidation of the concept of equal respect. Miller 
effectively break it down into two components: respect-towards 
and self-respect. Parameters one and two deal with those 
respectively. However, the meaning and import of these 
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components remains unhappily vague as can be seen in the 
discussion at the end of the previous section. 
 I think current thought in political philosophy can provide 
us with more informative concepts of what equal respect entails. 
The one I shall focus on here is the recent work in philosophy of 
human rights, although Amarty Sen and Martha Nussbaum‘s work 
on the human capabilities approach is also a strong candidate.  
 
Human Rights as Equal Respect 
 International human rights practice is commonly seen as 
motivated by the need to protect human dignity in some form or 
other. Although this idea of dignity is rather vague, a clear 
connection can be seen with the idea of respect. What we mean by 
equal respect is that we treat other persons as having a certain 
amount of equal intrinsic value. We regard them as worthy of 
moral consideration.  
 Recent works in the philosophy of human rights have 
expounded this idea of dignity and tried to give it more substance. 
They have established strong philosophical frameworks for 
thinking about the goal and content of human rights. The account 
given by James Nickel in Making Sense of Human Rights focuses 
on vital human interests that human rights are designed to protect. 
As such, human rights can be seen as necessary conditions for 
living a minimally good life. James Griffin‘s account in On Human 
Rights envisions them as protecting a person‘s liberty, autonomy, 
and basic standard of living.
11
 Again, human rights are used to 
protect what we see as central to human life.  
                                                 
11
 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 51. 
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 I think that these accounts can help lend content to the 
concept of equal respect. Since human rights are necessary 
conditions for a minimally good life, violating them can rightly be 
seen as disrespecting the holder of that right. Human rights thus set 
a minimum standard for what equal respect for all persons requires: 
namely a guarantee not to violate human rights and a strong duty to 
help uphold and enforce them whenever one is in a position to do 
so at relatively low cost to oneself. 
 Applying this human rights definition of equal respect to 
Miller‘s account yields a very different outcome. For one, the 
patriotic bias can no longer be established by only considering the 
domestic case. Instead, equal respect demands an effort to 
guarantee the observance of human right for all persons both 
domestically and abroad.  
 Certainly I have only sketched an outline here of what such 
an approach to the allocation of tax-financed aid would entail. 
Further development of the idea of ‗human rights as a standard for 
equal respect‘ is necessary in order to work out its exact practical 
implications.  The duties of different well-off societies to help the 
global poor in having their human rights protected need to be 
coordinated and a reasonable limit needs to be placed on the 
burden that such duties can impose on these societies.  
 Nevertheless, it appears clear from the outset that any 
patriotic bias that claims to show equal respect on my definition of 
that term, would be quite different from the one argued for by 
Miller. It almost certainly calls for a greater transfer of aid from 
the per-capita rich countries to those in need. It does not preclude 
the existence of a patriotic bias in tax-financed aid, and in fact 
arguments for such a bias are probably justified. It does mean that 
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demands for equal respect will take precedence over any 
considerations of patriotic priority, as I have argued they should.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper I have shown that Richard Miller‘s argument 
for a patriotic bias rests on an uninformative definition of the 
principle of equal respect. Due to the indeterminate nature of this 
principle, it is unclear what sort of patriotic bias can be justified. 
Whether different allocations of tax-financed aid show equal 
respect for all becomes a matter of speculation and personal 
interpretations of human psychology.  
 I have argued that the philosophical human rights tradition 
can provide us with a more substantial account of what respect for 
persons entails. Recent influential works by James Nickel and 
James Griffin suggest human rights as a protection of abilities and 
interests necessary for living a minimally good life. Given the 
important nature of human rights to individuals persons, I suggest 
that equal respect entails the non-violation of these rights as well 
as a duty to protect and uphold them when one can do so at little 
cost to oneself. I note that this is merely the first step in the 
creation of such an account and that more work is needed to 
establish clearly the demands ‗human rights as a standard for equal 
respect‘ can and ought to give rise to. I do contend that any 
account based on this new definition of human rights will fail to 
establish a patriotic bias as strong as the one argued for by Richard 
Miller. 
 A last remark with regard to the question of tax-financed 
aid is in order. As Charles Beitz has noted, discussions in the field 
of global economic justice often make too much of the importance 
 15 
 
of transfer payments from tax dollars.
12
 More effective, efficient 
and lasting solutions to problems of economic inequality and 
global poverty can likely be found through the structural 
rearrangement of institutions such that they favor - or at the very 
least cease to actively disadvantage - the global poor. For the 
purpose of this paper, which was a response to Miller‘s patriotic 
bias in tax-financed aid, such questions of institutional reform were 
unfortunately not within our scope. Discussions in the field of 
global justice and cosmopolitanism can perhaps shine a light on 
fruitful solutions in that direction. 
  
                                                 
12
 Charles Beitz, ―Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice,‖ The Journal of Ethics 9, 
no. 2 (2005) 
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A DEFENSE OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION 
 
Simon Pickus 
Abstract    Public justification is a concept presented by John 
Rawls as a way to legitimize political authority and to make 
fundamental political arguments.  In essence, the principle holds 
that one should only present arguments that the opposition can 
reasonably accept, as opposed to appealing to a religious or 
political conception of the good.  This paper seeks to present a 
cogent conception of the principle of public justification. The 
strengths of the principle will be explained, and the main critiques 
of the position will be examined and defended against.  By this 
method, Rawls‘ conception of public justification can be shown to 
be a compelling and robust position. 
 
 Among the more pressing issues that have persisted 
throughout Western political and philosophical thought have been 
how political power can be rightly exercised, and how can political 
disputes between passionate parties be fairly resolved. Under what 
circumstances can the coercive power of the state be implemented 
in a way that is just and right?  Bloodlines, military might, and 
religious mandates have all been appealed to as justification for 
political authority, but these are all answers monarchs and 
emperors have given to their already cowed populaces.  
Compelling answers to these questions presented by thinkers such 
as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau emerged in the form of 
reasonable consent of the governed as a legitimizing factor for 
 19 
 
political authorities.  In the 20
th
 century, the widely-read political 
philosopher John Rawls best articulated the concept of public 
justification, a principle in which political authority can be 
considered legitimate only insofar as the reasons given for political 
action could be reasonably accepted by those who are governed.  
For this project, I will begin by giving a general overview of the 
position as conceived and presented by Rawls in his more recent 
works.  I will follow this outline of public justification by 
explaining why this view is appealing and what problems within 
political thought it solves, or at least purports to solve.  I will then 
present brief explanations of some of the more pressing objections 
to the theory, and will conclude with a refutation of these critiques.   
The Idea of Public Justification 
 For Rawls, the principle of public justification is one that 
exists within what Rawls refers to as a well-ordered society.  This 
means that, for him, any discussion of public justification 
presupposes a democratic society with a political culture that is 
pluralistic and has a commonly accepted conception of justice. In 
addition, Rawls notes that, ―Accepting this conception does not 
presuppose accepting any particular comprehensive doctrine.‖1  To 
clarify, ―comprehensive doctrine‖ is a Rawlsian term for a 
complete conception of the moral good and a thorough set of 
values.  Although these are not by necessity comprehensive, what 
is important about them is that they comprise a set of values and a 
conception of the moral good. Some examples of comprehensive 
doctrines are religious beliefs and moral philosophical codes such 
                                                 
1
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 26. 
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as utilitarianism.  Here Rawls is emphasizing that the principle of 
public justification is distinct from any one conception of the good 
or set of moral values. It does not presuppose a religion or ethical 
code, and does not need to.  As it is meant to function within a 
society that has a plurality of comprehensive doctrines that its 
citizens accept, public justification is compatible with all 
reasonable conceptions of the good.   
It is important here to note the particular meaning of 
―reasonable‖ in this context, as it is a conceptually significant term.  
For Rawls, ―…reasonable persons are ready to propose, or to 
acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to 
specify what can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation.‖2  By 
this Rawls means that to be reasonable is to act fairly and to seek 
cooperation and the resolution of disputes.  A reasonable person 
will not enter into an agreement knowing that they will later 
violate that agreement, not will they staunchly refuse any attempt 
at resolving a disagreement.  Additionally, reasonable people will 
seek to end conflicts and live peaceably, even if doing so is not 
always in complete accord with their rational self-interests.  Acting 
reasonably is, as Rawls sees it, distinct from acting rationally, 
although in no way does reasonableness preclude rationality.  It is 
very possible, however, to act rationally and unreasonably at the 
same time.  An example of this would be a person who enters a 
long-term agreement and immediately forsakes that agreement 
when they see a way to derive some advantage from it.  Another 
way to conceptualize this distinction is in the context of rational 
self-interest.  To act in accord with rational self-interest is always 
                                                 
2
 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 7. 
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rational but not always reasonable.  The example of the tragedy of 
commons demonstrates that rational self interest leads to what 
Rawls would call unreasonable behavior, because it does not 
indicate a desire for fair cooperation.  Rawls‘ conception of the 
reasonable, I find, agrees in large part with commonly held 
intuitions of what it is to act reasonably.   
 The principle of public justification, once established in the 
Rawlsian political context, is the vehicle for those with political 
disagreements to discuss and resolve their disputes in ways that are 
reasonable and acceptable to all involved.  As Rawls explains, this 
principle allows people and groups to ―…justify to one another 
their political judgments: each cooperates, politically and socially, 
with the rest on terms all can endorse as just.  This is the meaning 
of public justification.‖3  Here Rawls explains the very basic idea 
of the public justification principle.   
People within a well-ordered society, or any developed 
democratic society as we would recognize today, will inevitably 
disagree with each other and their leaders on their political and 
social policy judgments.  This alone is difficult to dispute.  There 
are many reasons, even within a well-ordered society with a shared 
conception of justice, for these disagreements, such as what Rawls 
refers to as the plurality of comprehensive doctrines.  He claims 
that, ―…a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable yet reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist…This fact 
about free societies is what I call the fact of reasonable pluralism.‖4 
Once the aforementioned disputes arise, public justification acts as 
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a mechanism for their resolution.  People and groups justify their 
political judgments by presenting arguments that their opponents 
can reasonably endorse as a means of making their views plausible 
within the worldviews of the other.  Using public justification, they 
appeal not to their conception of the good, such as, for example, 
the principle of utility or the intrinsic value and dignity of a human 
being, but rather they appeal to political values and reasons they 
both share so as to cooperatively come to a conclusion.  In this way 
political disputes can, ideally, be solved in such that all can 
reasonably accept the conclusion without having to violate their 
closely held values and beliefs.  Rawls goes on to note that, 
―Public justification proceeds from some consensus: from premises 
all parties in disagreement, assumed to be free and equal and fully 
capable of reason, may reasonably be expected to endorse.‖5   
The general aim of this principle, then, is to provide a way 
for political judgments to be justified without appeal to reasons 
that the disagreeing party would never accept.  A utilitarian could 
never convince a Kantian that a political moral dilemma can be 
solved using the principle of utility, no more than an Orthodox Jew 
could appeal to his or her religious tenets to convince a political 
opponent who is an adherent of Islam.  No matter how dearly 
someone holds their conception of the moral good, they will not be 
able to offer compelling arguments to me if I do not agree with that 
idea of the good.  They would need to find a set of criteria we both 
accept. By avoiding argument entrenched in the values of a 
comprehensive doctrine, public justification aims to avoid some of 
the persistent and pressing disagreements that have plagued 
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political discourse.  Additionally, it reinforces political cooperation 
and reasonable discourse in a way that is consistent with a 
functioning democracy. 
  One important distinction that Rawls emphasizes is that 
public justification does not have a basis in simple agreement.  
What sets public justification aside as unique is its appeal to a 
common ground of reasonable arguments based, in part, on a 
shared conception of justice that allows for important political 
disputes to be fairly solved.  Rawls himself states that, ―It is this 
last condition of reasoned reflection that, among other things, 
distinguishes public justification from mere agreement.‖6  Here 
Rawls shows the true importance of justifying political positions 
by presenting reasons anyone could reasonably accept.  It is this 
aspect of public justification that sets it apart and, as I will now 
explain, it is this aspect that makes the principle of public 
justification appealing. 
 
Why Public Justification is Compelling 
 The theory of public justification has a variety of strengths 
that make it a very compelling way to approach political discourse 
and legitimacy.  The first largely intuitive main strength of public 
justification is that it serves as an alternative to tyranny and 
oppression, and as construed here does not allow for tyranny or 
oppression of any sort.  The very nature of public justification does 
not allow for any sort totalitarian coercive rule that is imposed on 
the populace of a nation unwillingly.  This aspect of public 
justification, though simple and straightforward, is a significant 
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point in its favor. 
 A second way in which the principle of public justification 
is strongly compelling is that it provides a way to solve political 
disputes that otherwise seem too divisive or too deeply entrenched 
in moral values for either party to possibly accept the other‘s 
position.  This is particularly relevant to American politics, and 
similar systems, in which there is a political culture of such 
profoundly divided adversarial fervor that a resolution between the 
adversaries, in this case the two political parties, seems completely 
unfeasible.  Joshua Cohen, a prominent contemporary political 
philosopher, echoes this sentiment when he notes, ―The more 
immediate concerns come from the pathologically polarized state 
of political discourse in the United States.‖7  He goes on to state 
that the intention of politics is to confront and overcome important 
and pressing issues relating to people and what they value in their 
lives, which is significant because ―…public reason arguably 
provides a more promising basis than polarized disagreement for 
doing the works of politics, and…decent and inclusive political life 
is not only a profoundly important good, but a painfully fragile 
one.‖8  In essence, the principle of public justification allows us to 
do the important work of politics without being hobbled by the 
vehement political culture that currently exists in the U.S.  All that 
is required for this to work is that those engaged in political 
arguments accept that giving conceptions of the good as criteria for 
political decisions is not only unreasonable but disrespectful, as it 
is essentially a demand that political opponents defer to one‘s 
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comprehensive doctrine.  Were politicians and pundits to accept 
this burden of respect and consider the practical advantages of 
public justification, we would not be stuck in such a partisan rut.  
In this case, public justification is compelling in that it avoids this 
issue by leading the disputing parties to converse using reasons 
that the other side might reasonably accept.  At the very least, this 
principle presents the possibility of progress beyond the partisan 
impasse that some see the United States to be stuck in, and in this 
way public justification is compelling to American political 
thinkers. 
  A third reason that public justification is appealing lies in 
the distinction between rational and reasonable.  As a method for 
justifying political positions and authority, public justification as 
presented by Rawls prioritizes the reasonable over the rational.  To 
some, the appeal to discussion between reasonable people without 
emphasizing acting in strictly rational ways lies in the avoidance of 
prisoner‘s dilemma-type situations.  By this I mean that for some, 
political discourse is problematic because it can be said to be 
populated by those who act strictly in their own interests and the 
interests of their associates; people who act in ruthlessly 
calculating ways.  Public justification, on the other hand, ensures 
political discourse in which nobody is trying to trick their 
opponents, but rather encourages reasonable people to make 
genuinely persuasive arguments so as arrive at resolutions of 
political disputes.  This emphasis on reasonableness is appealing to 
some because it presents a less adversarial, more cooperative 
method of dealing with political disagreements.  As an 
environment focused on the genuine resolution of the issues in 
reasonable and productive ways, public justification is an 
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appealing principle.  
 A fourth strength of public justification is the way in which 
it provides a means for the maintenance of both legitimacy and 
stability in contractarian societies, those societies with a basis in 
some sort of founding agreement or governing document.  A very 
real issue for these societies is that in several generations that 
society will be comprised of citizens who were not party to the 
original contractarian agreement.  In a Hobbesian society, for 
example, once this point is reached, and there is no effective 
institutional way to change the society, then it is only a matter of 
time until circumstances change such that sufficient people reject 
the original contractarian agreement and the foundations of the 
society collapse.  For this reason, there will come a point at which 
the members of the society no longer see a compelling reason to 
continue to submit to the coercive powers of the state granted by 
their ancestors.  Public justification becomes appealing in this 
circumstance because it provides a plausible means for the 
contractarian society to change according to the wills of its citizens 
without a fundamental threat to its stability.  Since the society‘s 
basic institutions are now mutable according to the will of the 
current populace, general discontent with the contractarian nature 
of the state is no longer an issue.  In this way public justification is 
a compelling principle to those who adhere to contractarian 
conceptions of statehood. 
 
Objection 1: Begs the Question 
 In addition to its many compelling features, the principle of 
public justification has significant objections to contend with.  To 
begin, it is necessary to clarify the concept of public reason and its 
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interaction with public justification.  As Rawls puts it, public 
reasons are, ―…the political values covered by the political 
conception of justice (or one of a suitable family of such).‖9  In 
essence, public reasons are those we can give to justify our actions 
and positions to others within our society who therefore share our 
basic political conceptions.  As Cohen puts it, ―…the ideal of 
public reason says that in our political affairs…justification ought 
to be conducted on common ground…common ground provided 
by considerations that participants in the political relations can all 
acknowledge as reasons.‖10  Simply put, public reason is the 
vehicle of public justification; reasons that are publicly justifiable 
are discussed using public reason.  It is the form of reason we use 
to justify our political judgments to others.  In this sense a 
discussion of public reason goes hand-in-hand with one of public 
justification, and a rejection of public reason is a rejection of 
public justification.    
The first objection I will address comes from a writer 
named Bruce Brower of Tulane University.  In his article The 
Limits of Public Reason, Brower analyzes several ways in which 
Rawls can make public reason, and by extension public 
justification, compelling to those who do not accept the priority of 
the reasonable.  If I can refute any one of these, it would show that 
Rawls‘ project does not succumb to the limitations Brower 
presents.  I am choosing to address one of these lines of argument, 
in which Brower claims that the demands of public reason violate 
equal respect and can be shown to be compelling only to those that 
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already accept the ideal of the reasonable.  In other words, Brower 
argues that the case for public reason begs the question. Brower 
argues that the demands of public justification violate equal respect 
because they require people to abandon values and beliefs that are 
deeply important to them.  As he writes, ―Treating others equally 
and acting autonomously…requires us to ignore an important part 
of our character…‖11 Here Brower is arguing that in requiring that 
people not use their conception of the good to make fundamental 
political decisions Rawls is asking them to forsake something too 
important to simply discard.  Brower goes on to argue that 
proponents of public justification, ―…do ignore something 
‗constitutive‘ of our persons: that we care deeply about our 
conceptions of the good and associated justifications…The 
problem is…Rawlsian arguments will be acceptable only to those 
who have already approved the…ideal of the reasonable person.‖12 
This is the meat of the objection that Brower presents.  Rawls fails 
to show equal respect because he devalues peoples‘ constitutive 
values on the grounds that they are not publicly acceptable reasons 
to give in a political sense.  Because of this, Brower feels that 
Rawls is saying that people should not give morally-grounded 
justifications, and should rather give public justifications, which 
are more reasonable.  But, Brower claims, this requires that 
someone has already accepted the priority of the reasonable.  
Because of this, public justification is only compelling to those 
who already accept it.   
This objection is not as strong as it first appears, and it in 
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fact undermines itself.  There are two primary claims to deal with: 
the demands of public justification violate equal respect, and 
public justification is not compelling to those who have not already 
accepted it.  A fair way to analyze this objection is to consider a 
political dialogue between two people and look to see if the issues 
Brower presented indeed occur.  Abe is someone who wants to 
make political arguments based on his conception of the moral 
good.  Zeke is a proponent of public justification.  He adheres to a 
comprehensive doctrine but does not seek to ground political 
arguments in the values of that doctrine.  Abe claims that society 
should implement policy A because it is consistent with his 
comprehensive doctrine‘s view of the moral good.  Zeke says that 
that conception of the good conflicts with his own, and as such he 
cannot reasonably accept Abe‘s justification.  Zeke suggests that 
Abe appeal to shared aspects of their society‘s political culture.  
Abe responds by saying that it is disrespectful that he be asked to 
discard his comprehensive doctrine, which is very important to 
him, when making this important political argument.  This is the 
point Brower gets at.  My response is to ask what, then, is the 
alternative?  It seems as though the only way out of this impasse 
for Abe is that Zeke accept his conception of the good and 
therefore his political argument.  But this undermines any attempt 
at equal respect that Brower wants to make.  If this is what 
comprises equal respect, then Abe‘s demand of Zeke is no less 
disrespectful than Zeke‘s demand.  For people who value 
conceptions of the good and their importance as much as Brower 
does, it follows that they would then find it unfair to ask someone 
else to defer to their conception of the good, as that would be 
demanding that they disregard a personally constitutive value. 
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I respond that Brower‘s standard for equal respect is too 
high to be feasible, and that it will inevitably lead to the impasse 
mentioned above.  Given the aforementioned fact of reasonable 
pluralism, which I take to be uncontroversial in a free society, this 
impasse will occur constantly.  Public justification is compelling 
precisely because it is a mechanism for this plurality of doctrines 
to exist without anyone having to defer to another‘s conception of 
the moral good.  A more proper standard for equal respect is to 
consider each comprehensive doctrine to be as valuable as any 
other.  This standard of respect, together with the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, leads us to conclude that those who hold conceptions of 
the good to be vitally important to people would in fact find a 
reason to endorse public justification.  It provides a mechanism for 
political cooperation while maintaining everyone‘s deeply 
important values and ensuring that the standard of equal respect is 
not violated.  This conclusion in addition to the strengths of public 
justification I mentioned earlier provides a very strong basis for the 
acceptance of public justification by those who do not necessarily 
endorse Rawls‘ ideal of the reasonable. 
 
Objection 2: Self-Defeating 
   The second objection to the theory of public justification I 
will address is presented by Steven Wall in his article, Is Public 
Justification Self-Defeating?. Wall argues that public justification 
is in need of justification, and is unable to satisfactorily meet its 
own demands to justify itself to those who it would apply to.  In 
other words, Wall is arguing that public justification is not in itself 
sufficiently publicly justifiable to justify itself as a principle for 
determining the legitimacy of political authority.  Wall begins his 
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argument by defining public justification in a way that is coherent 
and continuous with the way it has been defined here.  He claims 
that among the relevant requirements for political authority to be 
publicly justifiable is what he calls the ―acceptability requirement.‖ 
Wall defines this by saying, ―…the justification must be one that 
can be reasonably accepted (or not reasonably rejected) by those to 
whom it is addressed.‖13 There is nothing problematic here. He 
goes on to discuss how we must make a distinction between a 
public justification and a correctness-based justification.  For Wall, 
a correctness-based justification is one that demonstrates that a 
conclusion is correct, whereas public justification, something that 
has already been made clear, is distinct from this.  This is 
significant for Wall because if proponents of public justification do 
not hold that political authority must be legitimized by both of the 
aforementioned justifications, then they are left to answer why 
public justification is even worth discussing.  Wall continues by 
explaining that this can be resolved by claiming that public 
justification serves to mark the outer limits of our freedom
14
, and 
as such leads to what Wall calls the ―reconciling function‖ of 
public justification, which serves to show that each person has a 
good reason, by appealing to public justification, to accept political 
authority. This function demonstrates why a correctness-based 
justification is not inherently sufficient for legitimizing political 
authority. 
 Wall argues that despite the appeal of the reconciling 
feature of public justification, it is still not an inherently correct 
                                                 
13
 Steven Wall, ―Is Public Justification Self-Defeating?‖ American Philosophical 
Quarterly 39 (2002): 385. 
14
 Ibid., 387 
 32 
 
theory of political legitimacy.  This, Wall explains, ―…is why it is 
reasonable to say that [public justification] stands in need of 
justification.‖15  In other words, since public justification does not 
claim to be correct on moral grounds, it needs to be justified by 
other means.  So, Wall asks, what sort of justification is required?  
The answer is that public justification must satisfy its own 
requirements, and for this reason the theory might be self-
defeating.  As Wall puts it, ―If [public justification] were indeed a 
self-defeating principle, then it would fail on its own terms.  This 
would give us a reason to reject it.‖16  Wall proceeds by claiming 
that supporters of public justification must now either demonstrate 
that public justification does not apply to itself, or that it does in 
fact meet its own demands.  Wall addresses the first claim and 
argues that it is untenable because it contradicts the very purpose 
of public justification.  To claim that public justification does not 
need to meet its own demands would be to say that any given 
authority is publicly justifiable but then not offer a reason to accept 
the constraints of public justifiability.  This does not get us 
anywhere.   
Wall addresses the second claim against the self-defeat of 
public justification in two ways.  In the first, Wall argues that any 
attempt to argue that public justification applies to itself because of 
values that permeate contemporary democratic societies would 
have to contend with the objection that the principle of equal 
respect is in fact not embedded in modern democratic societies.  
This results in there being at least some people in contemporary 
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society who would not reasonably accept the theory of public 
justification.  Secondly, Wall discusses how even if there did exist 
some sort of background political value that all members of a 
society shared, people would disagree as to the particular nature of 
that value.  In this case there would be so much disagreement 
about the shared value that the value would be too thin a concept to 
appeal to when giving public reasons.   
 Wall concludes his discussion of public justification by 
expressing doubt that there is any recourse for those who support 
public justification to prove that it in fact is not self-defeating.  
Additionally, he notes, political legitimacy might be a matter of 
degree, and that public justification still serves to legitimize 
political authority better than any alternatives.  He concludes by 
claiming that given that even if these might be valid options for the 
proponent of public justification, they do not refute the overall 
claim that public justification is self-defeating.  
 To begin my response to this objection, I note that Wall 
seems to give a charitable presentation of the general principle of 
public justification.  I will also concede here that since public 
justification is not a correctness-based justification, it does need to 
be justified further.  I will here accept the claim that in order to 
avoid being self-defeating, public justification must either be said 
to not apply to itself, or must itself be publicly justifiable.  I will 
refute this objection by showing that public justification is itself 
publicly justifiable.  This is because, despite Wall‘s insistence to 
the contrary, there is indeed a commonly held political conception 
of justice in contemporary democratic societies, and it is that 
conception of justice that can be appealed to in order to justify the 
theory of public justification, as well as other political claims.  
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Although there are considerable disagreements when it comes to 
moral conceptions of justice, such as how to punish criminals and 
what moral codes people ought to abide by, when it comes to 
political discourse Americans still share fundamental intuition 
about what political justice is.  By this I mean our political culture 
holds that taxation without representation, for example, is unfair 
and unjust in a political sense.  Americans expect the will of the 
people and the spirit of the constitution to be enforced as matters of 
justice and would as a group reject a leader or proposal that 
violates the basic tenets of democracy and representation.  We have 
an understanding of society as what Rawls calls ―…a fair system 
of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next.‖17  
We have a sense of basic liberties as defined by our constitution.  
This commonly-held conception of justice, broadly defined, 
functions as a baseline that publicly justifiable arguments can 
appeal to.  In other words, this shared conception of political 
justice in American political culture is a common ground that 
demonstrates that the principle of public justification can be 
applied to the United States.  I am confident that such shared 
conceptions of justice exist in similarly democratic nations.   
Here it is important again to note the distinction between 
agreement and a shared political conception of justice.  People 
agree when for whatever reason they both find an argument or idea 
appealing.  A common conception of political justice, however, 
goes beyond agreement because it is a fundamental aspect of the 
democratic political culture that members of a free society share.  
They share it not because it is in accord with their conceptions of 
                                                 
17
 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 5. 
 35 
 
the moral good, but because it is part of the political culture they 
belong to.  People who disagree on political and moral matters may 
still appeal to this shared political value and offer compelling 
arguments (i.e. public reasons) to each other.  It is from these 
public reasons that people may come to an agreement about 
political decisions or policies.  Because of this common ground I, 
or anyone else, can offer arguments in political disputes that are 
reasonable for my opponent to accept on the basis of political 
justice.   
Wall also argues that even were a shared political value to 
exist within a society, ―…it does not follow that everyone has 
reason to accept the particular interpretation of this principle that is 
needed to ground [public justification].‖18  I contend that even 
given differing interpretations of this value, the fundamental core 
of the value, such as justice, would suffice for the purposes of 
public justification.  Additionally, Rawls himself addresses this 
concern in his presentation of the idea of an overlapping 
consensus, wherein he echoes my claim.  As he writes, 
―While…all citizens affirm the same political conception of 
justice, we do not assume they do so for all the same reasons…but 
this does not prevent the political conception from being a shared 
point of view from which they can resolve questions concerning 
the constitutional essentials.‖19 As a result, public justification is in 
fact not self defeating because it can meet its own demands, and it 
can be shown that modern democratic societies do have sufficient 
shared political values for public reasons to be feasibly presented. 
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Conclusion 
 The principle of public justification, that political authority 
is legitimized and political disputes resolved by both parties 
appealing to arguments that the other side can reasonably accept, is 
to me a powerful principle.  Because it is not limited by 
conceptions of the moral good and because it can help us to escape 
the partisan rut we as Americans seem to be stuck in, public 
justification can act as a means to end long standing and seemingly 
irresolvable political disputes.  In addition, the emphasis of the 
reasonable over the rational ensures we avoid the pitfalls of 
unrelenting rational self-interest, such as those presented in the 
prisoner‘s dilemma and the tragedy of the commons.  Although 
objections are leveled against the theory, they are not sufficiently 
strong to dissuade us from accepting public justification and its 
advantages in terms of fairness, respect, and pragmatism.  In the 
end, public justification remains the most reasonable and 
compelling method for adequately resolving political disputes and 
legitimizing political authority.  I genuinely believe that this 
principle is the best way to overcome the obstacles of political 
oppression and divisiveness, in spite of people‘s desires to adhere 
only to their conceptions of the good.  Were just Americans to 
accept this principle, the contemporary political climate would 
improve tenfold, and much more genuine progress could be made. 
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HAVING CHILDREN: REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS IN THE 
FACE OF OVERPOPULATION 
 
Kianna Goodwin  
 
Abstract    Overpopulation is a serious threat to future persons‘ 
quality of life. One that I believe can only be addressed by 
adopting reproductive values that inspire justice for future 
generations. In this paper I discuss theorists whose views I argue 
support limiting the right to procreate. I believe enforcing 
reproductive responsibility is necessary to curb the problem of 
overpopulation and therefore maintain a standard quality of life for 
future generations. 
 
It‘s common to think of having kids as a personal 
opportunity to experience a unique happiness and our ability to 
make choices about procreating as a key expression of our identity 
and personal autonomy. These factors make us feel that the 
decision to have kids is a deeply individual choice and more 
importantly that there exists no ethical justification which could 
diminish this fundamental right.  
            Our world population has doubled in the last 40 years, 
which means by 2050 we could potentially have 12 billion people 
in the world. Overpopulation occurs when the rate of birth exceeds 
the rate of death. People today have the capacity to live longer 
lives than ever before, yet lack of access to clean water alone 
prematurely kills millions across the globe every year. Despite the 
countless global struggles that lead to premature death we are still 
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reproducing at a rate that surpasses our rate of death. If we were to 
fix all the world‘s problems that lead to unnecessary death we must 
still contend with the fact that we are subsisting on a planet with a 
limited ability to provide space, supply food and produce energy. 
Even if it were possible to overcome the injustices of inequality by 
radically altering the distribution of resources or achieve 
technological advancements that are more sustainable there will 
still come a point at which none of these achievements will be 
enough to support the sheer number of people that will populate 
the earth. Overpopulation is a subject we do not breach publicly for 
fear of appearing absurd or anti-freedom; however I feel it is an 
issue of major ethical concern and one that needs to be addressed 
in order to negate this impending situation.  
            Discussing overpopulation is taboo because it threatens to 
breach the fortified value we have placed on reproductive 
autonomy. But I feel that the possibility of bringing people into a 
world headed for self-destruction is a greater ethical concern than 
avoiding taboo. Overpopulation is something that threatens the 
wellbeing of future generations and taking steps to alter this 
trajectory necessarily demands sacrifices from present generations, 
namely sacrificing complete reproductive freedom. I believe 
present people remain unconvinced of this necessity because their 
current reproductive values do not foster/support concern for future 
generations. So in order to properly address this issue of 
overpopulation, which greatly threatens future generations we need 
both a change in reproductive policy as well as a change in social 
values. Success is dependent on the implementation of both to 
make a difference because it would be impossible to enforce such 
infringing policies if they didn‘t reflect actual social values. In this 
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paper I will discuss some philosophical reasons as to how we 
might justifiably limit the right to procreate in the face of 
overpopulation. I am concerned specifically with the ethics 
involved and how we are able to reconcile concern for future 
generations vs. our own desires for procreative liberty. First, I will 
establish that a state of overpopulation is in fact undesirable and a 
situation to be avoided because it has negative consequences for 
the societies where it occurs. Secondly, the defining characteristic 
of overpopulation is that it‘s a problem which worsens over time, 
so next I will argue for why present generations should feel a 
connection to future generations who will inherent a worse 
problem than the generation before. Namely, I argue that the 
connection between generations is representative of how we 
understand our procreative duties and this in turn plays out in our 
reproductive ethic and how we relate to future generations.  I will 
devote a section of the paper to deconstructing some of the 
reproductive ethics and customs we have now and examining how 
these views impact where our values lie regarding future 
generations. In the next section I will look at alternative ethics 
which carry different perspectives on procreation, therefore 
creating a different value system that I believe naturally prioritizes 
future generations. Finally I hope to make an appealing case for 
limiting procreative freedom in a way that reflects our values 
regarding having children, both present and future and provides 
them with a better quality future.  
 
How Having Too Many People Negatively Affects Everyone’s 
Quality Of Life 
In his work ―Tragedy of The Commons‖ Garrett Hardin 
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argues that there must be a restriction placed on limitless 
population growth because of existing persons‘ inability ―to bear 
the full burden of the children they have.‖ He insists that 
overpopulation is inherently a no win situation and the biggest 
mistake we make when thinking about overpopulation is our 
inability to factor in institutional sacrifice as a reputable solution. 
Population grows geometrically, i.e. exponentially and this means 
that eventually the world‘s resources are guaranteed to diminish 
because it is not possible to support an infinite population on a 
terrestrial landscape that is finite. Hardin uses the example of a 
―herder‖, who sees the common pasture as a limitless means to 
expand his herd of cows because they can graze freely and in as 
many numbers as he is capable of procuring. The herder does not 
consider this use of the pasture to negatively affect him on the 
individual-level, especially since he stands to gain so much 
personally from having a large and ever expanding herd. The 
―tragedy‖ is that everybody else has come to the same conclusion 
and so the pasture is not able to maintain itself under the strain of 
so many cows, let alone actually nourish them all. This is a simple 
analogy for the effect of large populations of self-interested people 
living in a limited world. Pollution also originates from the same 
thinking, except that instead of taking something indiscriminately 
from the commons something is indiscriminately put into the 
commons, which leads to the destruction of the original 
fruitfulness, so that we are effectively ―fouling our own nest.‖ 1 
Having a limitless population, (again, actually impossible) or at 
                                                 
1
 Hardin, Garret, ―The Tragedy of the Commons,‖ in Ethics and Population, ed. 
Michael D. Bayles, (Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Pub. Co., 1976), 9. 
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least a population double the current size would require that we 
learn to limit consumption of resources so as not to exceed the bare 
minimum needed to survive. That means if a man must eat a 
minimum of 1600 calories a day to survive/manage all his daily 
obligations then all calories consumed beyond that amount would 
be considered possibly beneficial but not necessary and therefore 
no longer part of his diet. Consuming more than this would be 
taking something beyond his share and therefore impending on 
someone else‘s ability to live. I do not think we can conceive of 
living on a planet with 20 billion people where our lives are so 
dependent on just servings for total survival. Hardin uses this 
example to emphasize that the more people we have on the planet 
the more we will be forced to downgrade from our expected 
quality of life, if we expect to continue without destroying our own 
living environment.  
But this brings up questions like: Why care what happens 
to the planet beyond my lifespan? Or about the lives of people who 
don‘t already exist now? If having 15 babies and spoiling them to 
their heart‘s content suits me and is within my power to bring 
about then why not do it? I believe these ultimately disastrous 
sentiments reflect the current vision of reproductive liberty and can 
only be addressed by first understanding and then assuming other 
interpretations of reproductive rights.  
 
Reconsidering Commonly Accepted Values Regarding 
Procreation 
Procreation is normally understood as an autonomous 
decision in two fundamental and problematic ways: as an 
autonomous bodily decision and as something related to an 
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individual‘s self-conception. Understanding procreation as simply 
an expression of a one‘s bodily autonomy and an extension of 
one‘s ownership over their physical self is inherently problematic. 
This view focuses on the right to experience one‘s body in anyway 
one pleases, including pregnancy; and furthermore that being 
pregnant is a phenomenon like any other biological process. This 
makes it seem as if the birth of a child is an extension of one‘s 
physicality in the same way that growing out one‘s hair is, i.e. as if 
the unborn child were simply a by-product of one‘s sole individual 
organs. But becoming pregnant and maintaining the intention to 
carry the child to term so that it can eventually flourish as its own 
independent organism is something that‘s different in kind, not 
degree, from any other bodily function. Yes, any child who is born 
was at some point part of its mother‘s body. But after its birth it no 
longer functions as an extension of her body and instead lives as its 
own being; again, showing that the mother‘s body does not 
continue to wholly account for this new being‘s continued 
existence. In this case pregnancy acts as the original link in the 
causal chain that will become someone‘s entire life. While the 
pregnancy should necessarily be identified as this causal link it 
also means that the biological mother cannot claim her decisions 
affect only her and her own body when pregnancy leading to birth 
necessarily means that her decisions will come to affect at least 
two persons. 
Here I think it is important to clarify a distinction made by 
Ruth F. Chadwick between begetting, bearing and rearing children 
because all of these are separate concepts silently at play when we 
talk about ―having children‖. The fact that we indiscriminately 
employ the vague term ―having children‖ inevitably leads to 
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misunderstandings. For example begetting is often a major part of 
how men conceptualize their procreative role; but if a man over 
emphasizes his role as begetter over and above his other duties 
because he has not internalized the two other roles associated with 
fatherhood then he might behave indifferently and spawn many 
illegitimate children.  The greater outcome of this self-ascribed 
definition of father is that it can leave many children without the 
proper care they deserve.  
What is important to grasp here is that each step in the 
procreative process is meaningful and necessary for creating new 
life but also potentially isolated from the other aspects involved. 
Secondly, a procreator may feel an emotional connection with any 
of the steps including: conception, gestation and labor, and the 
care/ raising of the child. It is also possible to connect with none of 
them, which is problematic for cultivating a society which 
demands accountability for their children‘s quality of life.  In the 
same vein I realize not everyone is capable of every aspect of the 
procreative process; while some cannot conceive or carry a child 
others may not be able to rear one because of some critical 
personal deficiency/hardship. The problem remains that ―having 
children‖ is an ambiguous undertaking at best. It might seem like 
this lack of clarity ―issue‖ can be solved simply by separating out 
the rights that should pertain to each role (begetting, bearing or 
rearing) but on the whole this isn‘t too far from the system we have 
now. Currently, everyone has a right to procreate and to bear 
children at their own convenience. The same goes for rearing their 
children until reasons surface that expose them as unfit to care for 
a child and their right to raise their children can be taken away. But 
someone‘s right to conceive and bear children cannot be 
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terminated. We do not feel it is within anyone‘s moral capacity to 
force sterilization on someone who has demonstrated a severe 
inability to raise their own children in a loving, stable home. 
Similarly, but less problematic is that no one can be forced to raise 
a child they have conceived. These rights are all negative rights 
that allow us to relinquish our responsibility in some regard to our 
offspring and while we do have laws in place that require us not to 
brutalize, starve or sell our children I can‘t say that we have any 
that prioritize our children‘s right to a quality life over our own 
individual freedom.  
Hopefully one can see that current procreative liberty 
operates as a very complex and far-reaching right. This is because 
the societal attitude implies that it involves anything one finds 
meaningful and fulfilling for his or her own private life. The 
problem is that what‘s considered meaningful and or personally 
beneficial to someone about reproducing is subjective and might 
include: experiencing the miracle process of labor, passing on 
one‘s genes by donating sperm or the choice to give up custody 
and terminate all parental rights. All of these examples involve 
extremely different intentions but nonetheless result in the creation 
of a new life. I think it‘s contradictory to be concerned with the 
wellbeing of existing children yet sanction all of the varied 
intentions that create new children who may end up suffering from 
difficult situations caused by those intentions. There are some 
possible intentions held by the begetters of children that directly 
lead to a lower quality of life for their child as they are assisted by 
attitudes of indifference, self-centeredness, or shortsightedness. A 
set of values that demands total procreative freedom as well as 
welfare for children is creating a hierarchy of values, which places 
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the interests of parents first and then scrambles to address the 
problems directly resulting from that hierarchy. I believe it‘s sound 
to question the intentions behind someone‘s involvement in any 
aspect of the reproductive process and more importantly to accept 
that some intentions are not justified when the impact or result of 
that decision carries such huge implications for persons 
other/beyond oneself. My point is that just because it is possible to 
separate the roles involved in procreating doesn‘t mean we should 
limit the responsibility regarding the care of children by believing 
that some roles bear no weight in the welfare of children.   
 
Why Care About People Who Do Not Exist?  
Philosopher Derek Parfit is also very concerned with doing 
the best for our children yet runs into a wall he calls ― the non-
identity problem‖ when considering choices that may affect their 
future. In a classic thought experiment we consider a woman who 
contracts an illness while pregnant, one that would cause a 
considerable deformity in the child resulting from the pregnancy. 
However, if the woman waits just three months to have a child the 
illness will be gone completely and her child will be perfectly 
normal. According to Parfit one‘s identity is necessarily rooted in 
the unique circumstances of their birth, three months later the 
circumstances would be entirely different the resulting person 
would be a product of these different circumstances and therefore a 
different person. Although at first it seems like the woman should 
wait to have the baby because it would be better for her child on 
closer inspection we realize that she is actually choosing between 
two different people and on this view we can‘t say that it would be 
better for the first child if the non-afflicted second child were born 
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instead. This realization leaves us in a bind where it would be 
better for no one either way as potential persons i.e. people who 
are not born have no concrete identity. However, Parfit does not 
want his view of identity to create an apathetic view of the future, 
and I feel that as long as we know that future people will exist, and 
they will, then we have a responsibility to them not to cause any 
harm,  ―Remoteness in time has, in itself, no more significance 
than remoteness in space. Suppose I shoot an arrow into a distant 
wood, where it wounds some person. If I should have known that 
there might be someone in this wood, I am guilty of gross 
negligence. Because this person is far away, I cannot identify the 
person who I harm but his is no excuse. Nor is it any excuse that 
this person is far away. We should make the same claims about the 
effects of people who are temporally remote.‖ 2  
Unfortunately Parfit runs into more trouble when he tries to 
reconcile the non-identity problem with utilitarian values regarding 
future persons. He calls this new problem the ―repugnant 
conclusion‖ and it stems from the idea that if we want to maximize 
happiness then if we have a population whose happiness is on 
average what we consider optimal then by adding a few extra 
people whose happiness is slightly below this the total amount of 
happiness increases from result from this addition. This ends up 
being a slippery slope where by adding more and more people we 
end up with an overlarge population whose lives are barely worth 
living. I believe these dilemmas to be counterintuitive in that they 
both assume what is important is that ―happy people‖ be born, and 
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 Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon 
Press.), 375. 
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seems to construct people as merely ―happiness machines‖. ―Just 
as a boiler is required to utilize the potential energy of coal in the 
production of steam, so sentient beings are required to convert the 
potentiality of happiness, resident in a given land area, into actual 
happiness. And just as the engineer will choose boilers with the 
maximum efficiency at converting steam into energy, Justice 
(utilitarianism) will choose sentient beings who have the maximum 
efficiency at converting resources into happiness.‖ 3 It‘s not good 
that people exist because they‘re happy but that happiness is good 
for people who exist. What the repugnant conclusion assumes and 
the theorists that I reference deny is that we have an absolute duty 
to bring happy people into existence. 
 
Alternative Viewpoints That Better Support Future 
Generations 
When it comes to procreating it is possible to have a kid 
whom you love dearly, that you can provide for, who never 
experiences random terrible tragedy, who you have a great 
relationship with, who‘s healthy, that loves their life and is a good 
person. It might be the case that all of this characterizes your 
parenting experience, or it might not be… but there is no guarantee 
either way. David Benatar
4
 is keenly aware of this and says that 
life inherently holds suffering as it necessarily involves enduring 
bodily decay and confronting mortality; there is however, no one 
who is possibly harmed by non-existence. He also believes that 
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 Bayles, Michael D. 1980. Morality and Population Policy. (University: 
University of Alabama Press.), 390. 
4
 Benatar, David. 2000. "The Wrong of Wrongful Life". American Philosophical 
Quarterly. 37 (2): 175-183. 
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there are lives so miserable that by our own standards we could 
consider them not worth living. We therefore have a responsibility 
to avoid this cruelty and to not bring about such lives. So even on 
utilitarian grounds, more is not always better. But because the 
nature of existence is at best neutral (containing both happiness 
and suffering) we have no duty to bring ―happy‖ people into 
existence either. The ―neutrality‖ of life does not imply that great 
happiness and minimal suffering and great suffering and minimal 
happiness are ultimately equal in their value but that the potential 
for either scenario to occur or the scales to tip in either direction 
remains equally possible. Even if all precautions are taken to 
ensure a happy life for someone their life will necessarily contend 
with the presence of unhappy scenarios, which means there is no 
such thing as a non-tempered, unaffected and therefore totally 
happy life. We cannot say that existence holds the potential for 
total happiness and is therefore preferable to non-existence because 
we cannot possibly produce a sliding scale that shows the point 
where life is total happiness. Therefore you cannot bring into 
existence nor account for totally happy people in the world. 
However, you may be able to discern circumstances where 
someone‘s life is total suffering and therefore not worth living. The 
best that we could hope for is that they are contentment with the 
proportions of suffering and happiness in their life. Not bringing 
such people into existence causes them zero harm, not a 
proportional amount of harm, and so this option is always justified. 
The obvious consequence of adopting this view is that procreation 
is rendered seemingly… unnecessary.  
Yet Benatar‘s view is that we may still choose to procreate 
if we wish so long as we‘re bringing into existence people whose 
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lives would be worth living. But how do we define a life worth 
living? This is where Benatar gets a lot of flack since it‘s unclear 
what decides whose life is worth living and whose is not. I think 
this is a misinterpretation of Benatar‘s intention in that it fails to 
differentiate ceasing to exist from having never existed. Benatar 
recognizes that people may have lives that started out as barely 
worth living but became lives of high quality and conversely that 
there are lives which started out worth living but are now barely 
worth continuing. Whatever the circumstance people‘s lives are 
necessarily linked to the individual suffering they‘ve experienced, 
and asking whether they wish they‘d never been born is completely 
futile. Despite whatever handicap they are faced with Benatar says 
people often view their lives through a distorted lens of attachment 
regardless of what they would say of their own circumstances 
objectively. What we are really talking about is not terminating 
existing beings but refraining from causing lives to begin that are 
not worth living; it‘s preventative. In effect, by limiting the amount 
of actual people who are harmed.  
Shiffrin further uses the concept of harm to help us see how 
exactly the role of parent is to be understood. Like myself, she makes 
it clear that what she is not trying to do is belittle the difficulty 
involved in properly carrying out parental duties, but to draw attention 
to the moral implications involved in creating a life. She is therefore 
talking about a situation involving strict liability because of the 
inherent one-sidedness of this relationship where the parent and only 
the parent chose the life of the child. Furthermore this child will 
inevitably come to suffer harm in their life, the existence of which is a 
product of the parent‘s desire to have a child. She calls this ―wrongful 
life‖. Shiffrin defines harm as it  ―primarily involves the imposition of 
 52 
 
conditions from which the person undergoing them is reasonably 
alienated or which are strongly at odds with the conditions she would 
rationally will;‖ furthermore ― harmed states may be ones that preclude 
her from removing herself from or averting such conditions.‖ 5 What is 
important to note is that harm is firstly something that the person being 
harmed did not will. Harm is not just loss or pain but anything which, 
―exerts an insistent intrusive and unpleasant presence on one‘s 
consciousness that one must just undergo and endure.‖ 6 This to me is 
a perfect description of the anxiety that is an inherent part of survival 
The analogy often used involves a rescue scenario in which it 
is necessary to break the arm of an individual in order to get them free 
of a car wreck (where the danger could potentially escalate) and save 
their life. By choosing to harm this person in the act of breaking their 
arm you have also carried out the action necessary to save them from 
harms greater than a broken arm. The relevance is that it‘s necessary 
for people to suffer some harm in existence in order to enjoy the great 
benefit of life. Shiffrin openly denies that this is an accurate parallel. 
She says a ―pure‖ benefit is not solely the removal of harm but the 
ability of the benefit to improve the overall quality of life for the 
recipient. The rescue case is not an example of a pure benefit because 
it addresses only the removal of a single greater harm, (greater injury 
or death for the victim in the accident), but does not necessarily 
disallow the existence of yet another harm to this person later in life. 
In real life procreation does act as a benefit which avoids obstructs any 
greater harm. The rescue scenario exemplifies Shiffrin‘s insistence that 
this analogy ―illegitimately trades upon a common equivocation of 
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 Shiffrin, Seana Valentine. 1999. "Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, 
and the Significance of Harm". Legal Theory. 5 (2):750 
6
 Ibid., 750 
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―benefit.‖ 7 In other words that we speak as though removing someone 
from harm is what benefits that person. In reality it does not follow 
that it is the act of doing the saving which is the moral justification for 
inflicting harm but the greater positive (beneficial) outcome that is the 
result of the saving. Conversely the beneficial act of creation doesn‘t 
allow justification for harm because the greater outcome of procreation 
is not that a greater harm is averted. It is not appropriate for us to think 
it acceptable to harm someone just to gain a benefit. Such an action 
only becomes morally innocent when we do it to remove some greater 
harm. We are certainly not justified in inflicting a minor harm for the 
prospect of a greater benefit.  
 There is another often-cited example used in attempts to 
emphasize the inherent good of life by drawing a connection 
between life and benefits which I believe is relevent. In this 
scenario the hypothetical character called ―Wealthy‖ injures 
another character, ―Unlucky‖ in an attempt to bestow benefits 
which would improve the overall quality of Unlucky‘s 
circumstances. Wealthy is a philanthropist of sorts who decides to 
charter a plane so that he may distribute his solid gold bricks 
indiscriminately by randomly throwing them overboard. One of 
these bricks falls on Unlucky and the impact injures him as one 
expects a hit from a gold brick would. Though Unlucky is caused 
significant pain from his injuries he will definitely live and the 
gold brick is his to keep. Once again the given example 
presupposes many things, including as already stated, the fact that 
it is morally justified to harm someone simply for the sake of what 
is assumed as a benefit at the time without the ―beneficiary‘s‖ 
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consent. Now, what if Wealthy included an additional 1.5 million 
dollars meant as anticipatory compensation for the injury caused 
by dropping the brick? Shiffrin and myself believe this is a false 
solution; if the compensation is ―built in‖ to the harm then it seems 
as if Wealthy is preemptively pardoning himself from any 
culpability as well as disregarding his subsequent duty to seriously 
address any and all harm done. In order to legitimately act in 
compensation for a harm then one must seriously address the harm 
itself as it stands alone. This means as separate from the delivery 
or execution of the harm i.e. certainly not exploiting any potential 
for benefit in order to justify doing the harm itself. I think the 
concept of wrongful life is inherently different from the rescue or 
financial scenarios used in thought experiments for them to be 
compared. In the case of procreation not only are we committing 
the much more serious act of creating brand new life but in this 
case we neither save nor prevent anyone from a greater harm.  
The key to understanding the wrongful life concept is being 
able to come to terms with naming all the things that are scary and 
difficult about having and raising children. No one wants his or her 
child to suffer, so then, why is it so difficult to understand that they 
will suffer? And how is it not in the nature of a parent to naturally 
assume responsibility for all that their child feels, endures, 
achieves, etc?  This theory is really not much more than a 
reflection of these basic inclinations that are intrinsic to good 
parenting. I believe this appeals to the greatest of all parental 
instinct and that is to shield one‘s child from harm. Opponents to 
wrongful life might again say that any possible horror experienced 
by a child is not cause enough for a parent to call their child‘s life 
wrongful.  I think Shiffrin would disagree and say that a parent‘s 
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instinct to protect is so severe that the failure to do so could 
potentially create such guilt that they‘d prefer their child to never 
have been born. Not because they do not value their child‘s life but 
because they acknowledge the unfairness of a child suffering who 
did not ask to be brought into this world.  
Another critique of wrongful life questions the point where 
a parent should cease to be liable for all harm experienced by their 
child. The concern for how far into lives of future people we are 
responsible for is something that concerns Parfit as well. 
Personally, I think that the point at which a parent ceases to be 
liable is relative to the initial harm incurred by the child in their 
youth. Again following Shiffrin and as well as intuition I think the 
concern is really whether the parent took proper steps prior to 
conception as well as during the child‘s early years that showed 
consideration for their future. Ideally, the child will become 
completely responsible for itself so far as they were provided the 
tools to do so by their parents. If the point at which their life 
becomes unmanageable can be traced back to an original and 
significant harm done by the parent then that parent should be held 
responsible contributing to the current situation. But again 
appealing to intuition it should follow that the older the child gets 
the murkier that trace line should be due to the growing agency 
(autonomy!) of the child. And this is true for Parfit as well; it 
would be wrong to deny the initial connection we do have to our 
children‘s future because we are not able to see forever into the 
results. The better it is seen to that children are given what they 
need to make their own decisions and inform their own actions the 
less it can be said that their lives are limited by the decisions of 
their parents. Similarly we must leave behind a quality of life that 
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reflects our own standards for our children or be responsible for 
negative quality of life they experience. Giving life is currently 
seen as a gift, something for which we should be never-endingly 
grateful for, something that is beyond reproach, we should not 
demand more of the giver. But giving life is not something that 
pardons you from your responsibilities, in fact quite the opposite, 
having children only extends your responsibility indefinitely.  
 
What Different Values Means Practically  
When we begin to grasp the kinds of values regarding 
parenting and procreation perpetuated by Benatar and Shiffrin I 
believe we are better able to accept a difficult course of action like 
limiting population. We see limiting our procreative liberty as less 
about our own limited freedom and more about doing what‘s right 
by future persons by providing them a certain quality of life. It‘s 
easy for us to accept that we have a moral duty not to force 
undesirable situations on others. We now have the ability to 
include future persons based on a strong understanding that we 
actually dictate who these people will be and therefore have just as 
much of a relationship with them.  
According to population scholar Michael Bayles, the 
greater the need for population control the more likely there will be 
a greater need for limits on freedom as well. This is referring to 
problems which are dire (immediate) and require solutions beyond 
volunteerism or family planning. For Bayle guilt plays a major role 
in our society; it influences how we feel about our own actions; 
however it does not necessarily change them. The desire not to 
harm future generations may be instilled in present generations but 
it does not curb the tragedy of the commons. That is why we will 
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eventually need policies that allow us to execute these views. He 
insists that because no specific values regarding quality of life have 
absolute priority (subjective) it‘s necessary to evaluate policies 
based on their ability to successfully accomplish objectives for 
present and future persons. This means that a policy is only 
justifiable if it actually realizes the desired effects. Bayles also 
emphasizes that some freedoms are greater or more important than 
others and that this should also dictate how we are to address 
certain population concerns. He advocates a pragmatic use of our 
perceived spectrum of freedoms. For example, it is less of an 
infringement on peoples‘ freedom to be able to have up to two 
children rather than no children. The main difficulty of 
implementing such policies, whether they be positive incentives, 
negative incentives or compulsory is to insure a level of equality 
regarding the actual effects. Neither Bayles nor myself thinks that 
it is ethical for people of lesser means to bear the greater burden of 
limiting population growth. Again what this means is a pragmatic 
approach and an emphasis on equality. I think that it‘s also 
important to emphasize that poverty does not necessarily make for 
life barely worth living. There are other values in regards to quality 
of life to be prioritized which are more universal like, mental 
stability, sobriety etc.  
Hardin states that humans intuitively feel guilt for however 
they‘ve failed ethically. But regardless of whether guilt is a 
naturally occurring response, it‘s also useless in bringing about an 
optimal desired result. Along this line I believe any person is 
capable of feeling a deep love for their child and still failing them. 
Hardin proposes what he calls ―Mutual coercion mutually agreed 
 58 
 
upon.‖ 8 He feels that coercion regularly practiced simply means 
bringing about the desired result that everyone wants but doesn‘t 
want to contribute to themselves, like taxes, and that the same can 
be said of limiting the resources/rights to reproduce infinitely. 
Responsibility Hardin says, is a product of social arrangement and 
does not occur on its own. We cannot measure, control, or affect 
how much a procreator loves their progeny but what we can do is 
take steps to ensure a basic quality of life for them so that they are 
able to pursue lives worth living. 
 
Conclusion  
By adopting reproductive ethics that inspire justice for 
future generations I believe the limits on procreative freedom 
become less burdensome for present generations. Whether 
institutionally enforced social responsibility is successful relies on 
our own personal relationship with the values we are upholding. 
Overpopulation is a threat to future persons‘ quality of life, which 
means essentially that it‘s a threat to our children and our 
children‘s children as well as to ourselves.  
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THE IRONY OF IRONISM: A CRITIQUE OF RORTY’S 
POSTMETAPHYSICAL UTOPIA 
 
Jeffrey Rivera 
 
Abstract    In Richard Rorty‘s work Contingency Irony and 
Solidarity, Rorty attempts to elucidate a mechanism for dealing 
with the public dissent likely to arise from a group of individuals 
he terms ―ironists‖. This mechanism, a strong public/private 
distinction, he hopes will allow for a self proliferating, ever 
progressing liberal utopia. This paper will reject this distinction as 
internally incoherent under its own terms, and will assert that even 
if Rorty‘s distinction is successful, it ultimately attempts to 
proliferate the type of individual we would like to avoid. 
 
 In his book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Richard 
Rorty urges us to rethink our conception of what a liberal society 
should look like, and which values it should hold and promote. 
Rorty claims that our current vision of a liberal society is one that 
is governed by the idea that cruelty, the promotion of suffering, is 
the worst thing that we as liberals do. In addition to this, Rorty 
appeals to the idea that a special kind of suffering, humiliation, for 
a liberal, is an especially bad form of cruelty. Rorty is aware 
however, that the type of individual likely to cause civil unrest and 
humiliation, the unorthodox thinker, is also a potential catalyst for 
political, cultural, scientific and philosophical progress. He is at 
once the liberal hero, an enigmatic poet who makes the world his 
own, but he must also be the villain: the egoist par excellence. 
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Recognizing the danger and importance of such individuals, Rorty 
creates a description of liberalism which might give us the best of 
both worlds; private self creation, as well as public unity and social 
cohesion. In this paper, I will argue that the mechanism that Rorty 
asserts to bridge this gap, the affirmation of a strong public/private 
distinction, will not feasibly do the work which he requires. 
Furthermore, I seek to show that even if this distinction holds up, 
the ironic liberal should not be the type of individual we would like 
to promote in a utopian society.  
 What is an ironist, and why should a liberal society protect 
the autonomy of these individuals? In order to answer this 
question, Rorty appeals to historical change as being a product of 
the evolution of language. Rorty describes the ironist as being 
indebted to a specific historical view, one that will see the strong 
poet, the thinker who re-describes and creates something new, as 
instrumental to intellectual progress. 
The ironist understands that he is born into a specific 
historical juncture. This notion can be equated more or less to the 
existential notion of facticity found in thinkers such as Heidegger 
and Kierkegaard. This is the idea that, with the inception of one‘s 
life, comes a set of specific conditions which relate to and 
characterize that being. For Rorty, the most relevant aspects of 
one‘s facticity seem to be the subject‘s relation to history, and 
specifically historical discourse, and the language games he is 
prone to play given his position within this canon. This is a 
specific contingency which all beings must depart from in order to 
become self-creators.  
The key difference between the ironist and the liberal is 
brought to light with regards to this realization. Whereas the liberal 
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is content to play the current language games and realize his self-
creation through these paradigms, the ironist views his being born 
into a specific paradigm as constraining. He feels that if he is to be 
the strong poet, one who fears his self-creation is merely a replica 
of a past self, he must create a very strong sense of his own 
identity. This cannot be done within the current paradigm because 
it places importance on specific modes of thinking. Rorty shows us 
this in his analysis of the character of specific time periods. For 
instance, if we look at thinkers whom we perceive as being 
particularly influential, we see that they do not merely find or relay 
information in light of the current views on an issue, they seek to 
re-describe the phenomenon under a new sort of view. For instance, 
Einstein‘s theory of relativity does not simply work out some 
inadequacies of Newton‘s theory, it fundamentally re-describes all 
relevant phenomena in a completely different light. It somehow 
makes us see things in a different way and therefore makes things 
new. This is the sort of re-description that the ironist sees as 
important to his self creation.  
 We might use this sort of example to point out another 
important feature of Rorty‘s theory, namely that there are specific 
historical conditions of possibility for the adoption of new 
language games. The first of these is that new descriptions of the 
world are brought about in light of past inconsistencies or 
uselessness of older language games. This might be understood in 
a similar fashion as scientific theory choice. As discourse 
progresses within a subject (slowly, as a product of small 
contingencies), problematics arise within it. For instance, Newton‘s 
theory cannot properly describe phenomena when approaching the 
speed of light. These inconsistencies are typically dealt with by the 
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introduction of ad hoc solutions. Novel re-descriptions remove 
these inconsistencies by creating a new view of the interactions of 
the phenomena at hand. 
It is important to note here that novel descriptions initially 
have no place within a the extant language game, because they are 
not truth candidates within that language game. As they are posited, 
re-descriptions are metaphorical, but have the potential to become 
truth candidates as they are adopted by language users – as those 
language users begin to interpret the world in that particular 
fashion. For Rorty, it is crucial to realize that this process of 
language adoption is not one of the language user‘s rational choice, 
but a process. Since the individual statements of novel language 
games are not truth candidates, the old and new languages are 
adopted not in light of a comparison between the novel and the 
previous descriptions of phenomenon, but by the slow shifting of 
the way particular agents see themselves and describe their world. 
Rorty recognizes that for most (for the non-ironists), the creation 
of an idiosyncratic language is non-essential to their notion of self-
creation and as such, they are not want to change their manner of 
speaking. To put it another way, non-ironists don‘t necessarily see 
themselves as, but inherently are, people who value a form of 
historical continuity. 
This valuing of continuity is also implicit in the liberal‘s 
relationship to what he calls his ―final vocabulary‖. A user‘s final 
vocabulary is constituted by those terms which he uses to relate 
himself, his desires, his goals, and values, to others. A user‘s final 
vocabulary is ―final in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth 
of these words, their user has no noncircular argumentative 
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recourse.‖1 Again, the liberal has no problem using typical 
language games to elucidate his ultimate conception of self. He 
sees the evolution of his final vocabulary as linear.  The ironist that 
Rorty describes, on the other hand, sees particular vocabularies as 
constraining to his notion of self creation, as the ironist is someone 
who cannot simply take the paradigm which was factically 
imposed upon him and proceed from there in self creation. He 
must appropriate and re-describe the past in order to make it his 
own and become a completely idiosyncratic self creation. The 
liberal is content to move forward, while the ironist wishes to 
create an entire new line. He must idiomatically create the taste by 
which he will be judged. If the ironist creates his own vocabulary, 
he has thereby created his own novel system for truth candidacy 
and therefore can see himself as authentically created.  
We might remark that this description of the ironist sounds 
very much like the picture of the ―authentic being‖ described by 
Heidegger or Satre, or Nietzche‘s ―ubermensch‖. Presumably, 
many of us would find the promotion of this type of self creator as 
questionable, as they have been traditionally linked to anti-liberal, 
(and sometime fascist) ideology.  However, Rorty offers a different 
take as to why we should wish to steer clear of the ironist type.  
Rorty describes liberals as those who think that the 
promotion of suffering as the worst thing liberals due. Further, 
Rorty describes a special sort of suffering that should be avoided 
within liberal societies: humiliation. Ostensibly, it is a special type 
of suffering for liberals because we, as liberals, are concerned with 
                                                 
1
 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1989), 73. 
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self-creation. Following his linguistic self-narrative view, Rorty‘s 
formulation of humiliation is done in terms of linguistic 
communication. Humiliation is a special sort of suffering in the 
sense that it is a forced shift in one‘s final vocabulary and therefore 
one‘s self creation becomes compromised. Because the ironist is 
ever anxious about the terms in which he describes himself as a 
result of his rejection of objective language choice, and therefore 
truth, Rorty asserts that the ironist is the sort of human being by 
nature who has no respect for the humiliation of others‘ 
vocabularies. He is therefore the villain of the liberal society, while 
at the same time being the catalyst for change and progress.  
What does it mean to humiliate someone linguistically, and 
what are the conditions of possibility for this form of cruelty? As 
we have discussed, Rorty believes that shifts in language are 
products of many small re-descriptions which lead to a shift in 
one‘s final vocabulary. These shifts in vocabularies slowly lead to 
paradigmatic language changes.  Slow language changes are 
normal and covetable, as they are based on the decisions of the 
agent (or groups of agents) and help to inform his self narrative. 
What occurs when we liberals are humiliated, Rorty asserts, is that 
our final vocabulary has been forced to shift, resulting in a major 
challenge to one‘s identity. It is important to note that the ironist is 
immune from this sort of humiliation because they are aware that 
―the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change‖ 
and they are ―always aware of the contingency and fragility of 
their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves.‖2 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 74. 
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Fortunately, Rorty seeks not to promote the ironist, but the 
liberal ironist. The liberal ironist, is an individual who holds fast to 
his ironic values privately, but shows no sign of ironic ideology 
publically. Rorty asserts that the liberal ironist can maintain this 
view because he understands that his, and everyone‘s, language is 
ultimately nothing more than a view informed by contingencies 
which an ironist must continually overcome.  To put this point in 
another fashion, the ironist understands that truth is merely a 
property of a specific language game. He sees that the language 
games we choose to play are based upon contingencies about the 
way the world is, and thus how we see the world. He also 
recognizes that these games shift over time; they are savored or 
spit out by different cultures, political factions and intellectual 
movements. In short they see language and therefore truth evolving, 
and therefore reject the ability to make objective decisions about 
the value of playing any one language game over another. Rorty 
feels that this relativistic position allows a strong enough reason 
for the ironist to affirm a public liberal standpoint, while also 
embracing a commitment to hiding his ironism in the shadows of 
his or her private life.  
It is this mechanism that will allow for his ever-evolving 
flourishing post-metaphysical utopia. Rorty claims that through the 
linguistic evolution the ironist offers, paired with a sense of 
solidarity afforded by his liberal values, we can create a stable 
liberal society full of ironists. Since each of these ironists seeks to 
break with the status quo, Rorty claims we will have more and 
more re-descriptions, and therefore more fuel for future ironists‘ 
self creation.   
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I would like to offer three criticisms here. First, such a 
liberal society has a low potential to be endorsed by the ironist, 
even if he firmly holds that the public/private distinction should be 
enforced. Secondly, the distinction causes the ironist to be an 
almost pitiable character and therefore we should not promote a 
society where ―irony is universal.‖ Lastly, the ironist by becoming 
a liberal destructs too much of what it means to be an ironist, to 
make the label ―ironic liberal‖ plausible.  
First, it seems to me that to force the ironist into affirming a 
particular political conception is antithetical to the idea of the 
ironist. Just because the ironist is ostensibly immune to humiliation 
by means of language (as his final vocabulary is ever in flux), does 
not mean that his language and desires are not limited by the 
holding particular political ideologies. In holding particular 
political doctrines, we are acting antithetical to the idea that the 
ironist is a human being who is ever in flux about his self 
description. By positing a reason to hold liberalist ideals, he is 
further constraining himself. He is more likely to be a mere replica, 
and therefore he might get the sense that his public affirmation of 
liberalism constrains his self narrative. Indeed the ironist does not 
merely mentally gratify his own idiosyncratic language, but seeks 
to use it to describe himself and his desires. If he finds his desires 
are contrary to the desires of liberalism, then he is at a loss to 
express his desires.  
In examining the justification of his liberal ideals, it seems 
to me that these ideals do not stem from the ironist‘s ironic values. 
If the justification for the agent‘s irony comes from the realization 
of the contingency of his final vocabulary, then it seems to me that 
this view cannot inform a liberal viewpoint. Since the ironist thinks 
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it is fatuous to regard his or her final vocabulary as being stable, 
why should the ironist respect the contingent values of others? It 
almost seems like the liberal ironist takes more seriously the ideals 
and values of others, while rejecting and suppressing his own. If 
this is the case, he has no reason to be a liberal, since his self-
creation is merely a secondary concern.  
Furthermore, it seems like the ironist is precisely the type 
of person who would reject the type of justification which Rorty 
believes might inform the ironist‘s decision. The justification given 
for an ironic affirmation of liberal ideals is necessarily an inter-
subjective one. If I, as an ironist, understand that each individual‘s 
views are unimportant, then I may see others as like myself and 
may seek to promote the welfare of others self creation.  This to 
me seems to be antithetical to the sort of view which the ironist 
wishes to pursue in the sense that it seems close to positing an 
objective truth about the intrinsic nature of the self. It is the truth 
that each person‘s self narrative is important to his or her self, but 
recognizes that it is the product of a plethora of contingencies. As 
such we get a tacit appeal to inter-subjective truth when we posit 
the ironist‘s defense of liberalism. This sort of truth positing 
cannot be affirmed by the ironist. 
Another seeming inconsistency within the ironist position 
is that he sees himself as somehow historically privileged. 
Although his view of history has led him to the Nietzschean 
conclusion that any truth about man is necessarily a truth about 
man for a small period of time (perhaps within a given language), 
he still has based this view on a particular conception of history. 
He sees himself as having found some sort of objective truth about 
the ebb and flow of historical paradigms. Not only has he 
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discovered the truth of this assertion, but he lives his life in 
subservience to this fact. His ever changing self narrative, his 
attitudes toward others, are dominated by this realization. This 
seems like the ironist ironically takes his beliefs a bit too seriously, 
and therefore must reject a major tenet of his ironism. 
If the ironist is such that he sees his final vocabulary as 
utterly contingent, what does it matter if he or she has put their 
stamp upon history? It is just something that will be seen as fodder 
for re-description by a future agent. Since the ironist sees his 
facticity governing himself as a bad thing, as something in the way 
of self narrative, why would he want to join in creating a 
potentially entangling factical paradigm for future agents to live 
within? Of course, this fact is unavoidable. If the changing of 
language is a result of many small contingencies, then of course 
every agent who uses a language could possibly (and unbeknownst 
to that agent) contribute to a change in the predominant 
paradigmatic language. Therefore, the intention of the ironist must 
be misplaced. If there is no way of knowing what particular states 
of affairs our thoughts might manifest as a result of discourse, it 
should not be desirable that one language be put in place of 
another. 
This criticism lends itself to the idea of the private 
containment of ironism. Since language for Rorty is a causal 
mechanism, it seems unlikely that private irony can be contained. 
We have no certainty over which statements might or might not 
influence other agents‘ self descriptions. Therefore the affirmation 
of a distinction between public and private asserted is obtuse. For 
instance, as a philosopher, I continually read other philosophers, 
and in doing such an action, simply reading a book, my final 
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vocabulary is under the threat of being affected. Any proposition, 
unbeknownst to me, might be some sort of secret key for 
deconstructing my entire vocabulary.  
This point is echoed in Charles Taylor‘s ―Ethics of 
Authenticity‖. In his own attempt to bring authenticity into the 
liberal sphere, Taylor rejects the premise that authenticity is a 
purely self-created notion. Our familial, social and political 
relationships are instrumental in our personal pursuit of 
authenticity. Taylor recognizes that the culture of authenticity 
within liberal societies is one where the value of self-choice is 
paramount. However, the reality of the situation is that when we 
make choices, we don‘t simply value the choice, we value 
specifically what we choose to defend and its relationship to our 
daily lives. ―On the intimate level, we can see how much an 
original identity needs and is vulnerable to the recognition given or 
withheld by significant others.‖3  Basically, the self creating 
individual cannot atomistically enjoy self creation. He cannot keep 
it private. He must use the external world to validate his language. 
The liberal ironist of course, in his anxiety over the potential 
contamination of the public via his ideals, does not have this option 
open to him. We see that atomism necessarily undermines ironism, 
as that ironism has no means of expressing itself and therefore the 
ironist has no way of seeing his language as useful.  
To say that we must in fact revere the public/private 
distinction in order to protect ironists seems obtuse. Past political 
and intellectual cultures have been far more repressive with 
regards to autonomy. This did not stop any of the past ironists from 
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 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Harvard University Press, 1992) 49. 
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having their work influence future historical paradigms. If the 
ironist has such a strong grasp upon history, how does he need 
protection? This seems to me to raise the suspicion that Rorty is 
not actually concerned with a wariness of the public‘s self 
description being undermined by the ironist, but a protection of the 
ironist from external forces. For if the ironist is such that he is 
disposed to regard his self created vocabulary as ever in flux, what 
reason should the ironist have to be wary of political institutions 
possibly dominating his ends? 
Let us look further at my claim that the ironist cannot 
possibly stop himself from the threat of contaminating public 
liberalism. The sources which cause a language user to adopt 
certain ways of looking at problems, creating his own meaning, 
cannot be intrinsic to the self.  Self creation is entirely a process 
which is co-formed with and projected upon external forces. If one 
wants to reject that any force outside of the self should be used as a 
tool for self creation, then one rejects any possibility of self-
creation. If we are unaware of how languages shape or might shape 
our future language, then how can the ironist save his own final 
vocabulary? Isn‘t his final vocabulary continually barraged by 
external language games? On top of this, the ironist is already 
skittish about his ever changing final vocabularies and self 
perceptions. Given this picture of an ironist, it seems unlikely that 
he might avert the possibility of (even unintentional) humiliation at 
the hands of other language users. What is left for Rorty‘s liberal 
ironist but an ever anxious, hermetic existence? 
However, this is not the kind of life we live. Political and 
social concerns are implicit in the idea of self creation. We do not 
live in some kind of personal vacuum of our own intuitions. Our 
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relationship to others and the world (perhaps also history), is 
important to our definition of self and without these we cannot be 
the ever changing self determiners that Rorty wishes us to be. 
Without conditions of significance, reasons to care about 
something or other, we simply have no criterion with which to 
make choices valuable to us. If we are to accept Rorty‘s paradigm 
of self choice, for your life‘s story to remain untainted, we would 
of course (if possible) have infinite control over our final 
vocabularies, we would reduce the possibility of humiliation. But 
what kind of life would the ironist enjoy? His self narrative would 
consist of pure self created fantasy. It would be trivial without an 
external public to project his ideals upon. Ironically, by having 
infinite power for self assertion and value creation, the ironist 
would have removed his possibility of having such a power.    
The idea that an ironist can live in this way, is of course 
ridiculous. It seems that what Rorty is concerned with is not in 
fact, the firm distinction between public and private spheres, but of 
the protection of the individual‘s self narrative against societal 
commandeering. The purpose of positing the public/private 
distinction in the first place, was an attempt at the reduction of 
humiliation and cruelty: the worst thing liberals do. But it was 
posited in order to protect the general public against the ironist. 
However, what it looks like is that the ironist himself is the one 
which is being protected by the distinction. Since self creation and 
therefore irony, cannot possibly be privatized, anyone and 
everyone is subject to the humiliation of the ironist, (including 
other ironists). In short, there is no guarantee that private irony will 
not ―contaminate‖ the public notion of liberalism: the aversion to 
suffering. In affirming the public private distinction Rorty is not 
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saving the public from the ironist, but the ironist from public 
interference.  
The ironist is also put in a peculiar psychological 
disposition with regard to his work. As we‘ve noted, the ironist is 
such that he regards the relative unimportance of his self creation 
as the basis for his public liberalism. It is hard to see how the 
ironist can see his views as being important to the progression of 
history, but yet as unimportant to others. In fact, doesn‘t the ironist 
wish to influence other, futurally contingent ironists? Because of 
his break with his facticity, he is concerned with the progression of 
history: of specific futural agents‘ potential synthesis with his 
vocabulary.  
These remarks show that the ironist is in fact concerned 
with something external: with his position and relationship to the 
evolution of language and therefore historical paradigms. He 
regards his existence as contingent upon his history, and also as his 
self-creation as relational to this history. 
We might ask ourselves now, if an ironist is unconcerned 
with external forces when it comes to self creation, aren‘t we 
affirming a metaphysical transcendent? It seems like in affirming 
the individualization of the self, atomization, we are falling into a 
pitfall where self-hood is no longer questionable. The ironist is a 
deconstructionist on many fronts, he is able to laugh at his own 
final vocabulary and assert its meaningfulness, but at the same 
time he is on a particular side of the metaphysical pole, a side 
which his heroes like Nietzsche and Heidegger are antithetical: the 
subject-object distinction. In a post-metaphysical society, it is 
unclear how Rorty can possibly start with a metaphysical claim: 
the self exists. As this claim is part of a justification of the 
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public/private distinction, and because as an anti-metaphysician the 
ironist can reject this premise, it is hard to see why all ironists 
might adhere to it.  
Another worry about the ironist position is that in adhering 
to a strict privatization of ironists, is one raised by Daniel Conway. 
If we are to privatize the ironists‘ pursuits, we necessarily force 
him into an anti-social hermetic existence. The liberal ironist is one 
whose liberalism comes before his ironism. As such, the ironist 
feels responsible not to influence the final vocabulary of others. 
But if the ironist is afraid of this notion, and he is unsure whether 
his language may or may not change the self describing actions of 
others, he might not have any reasons to perform acts of overt 
kindness. As Conway puts it, the ―liberal ironists thus double 
conserve themselves, sequestering themselves in the private sphere 
and ingesting moral edification that may prevent future 
expenditures of cruelty.‖4  
Rorty perhaps attempts to give us a way out of this. The 
liberal ironist, in his commitment to avert suffering, can attempt to 
understand the ways those who speak with different vocabularies 
might be humiliated. To do this he suggests the ironic liberal to 
study authors such as Nabokov and Orwell, authors who describe 
humiliation.  
Again, we might look at this sort of provision and evaluate 
whether the ironist is the sort of being we wish to encourage. In 
addition to his private self creation, the ironist is also compelled to 
study artistic works. He is committed to not only knowledge of 
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historical paradigms, but of an understanding of different types of 
cruelty. What sort of moral imperative is Rorty giving to the 
ironist? This seems to me to be a direct violation of the ironist‘s 
metaphysical aversion. Even privately the ironist is seen to be 
dominated by his political affiliation with liberalism. The ironist is 
committed to a form of hyper liberal asceticism. 
In his work, Rorty has attempted to give valid grounds for 
the promotion of ironists within our society. However, it seems 
that this characterization is good for neither liberals nor ironists. 
Though Rorty seeks to (furtively) increase the autonomy of the 
ironist, he implicates him in a life without a possibility for 
authentic self creation. The onus is placed upon the ironist himself 
to avert anti-liberal claims, whereas the liberal comes off scot free. 
As such, we would do good not to create a liberal society where a 
strong Rortian public/private distinction is honored.  
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A DEFENSE OF A WITTGENSTEINIAN OUTLOOK ON 
TWO POSTMODERN THEORIES 
 
Sarah Halvorson-Fried 
 
Abstract    The way postmodern thinkers deal with issues of 
language and power has been highly influenced by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein‘s later philosophy of language. Wittgenstein‘s 
conception of language as a collection of ―language-games‖ based 
on agreement in use rather than a direct reflection of objective 
reality is central to these issues. In this paper, I will show how this 
Wittgensteinian conception manifests itself in two important 
contemporary theories: the liberal ironism of Richard Rorty and 
the feminist philosophy of Luce Irigaray. I will show how Rorty‘s 
and Irigaray‘s Wittgenstein-influenced theories both bring 
Wittgenstein‘s philosophy of language into a more social context, 
and argue ultimately that through such theories we can better 
understand social issues in our modern world. 
 
Much of postmodern theory deals with issues of language 
and power. According to many postmodern thinkers, most of the 
relationships between language and power go unnoticed, as the 
public usually sees language as a neutral medium within which we 
can communicate. But language has the power to oppress, the 
power to assign identities, the power to liberate. The way 
postmodern thinkers deal with these issues has been highly 
influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s later philosophy of language. 
In this paper, I will show how this influence manifests itself in two 
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important theories: the liberal ironism of Richard Rorty, a 
―distinctive and controversial [pragmatist]‖1 and the feminist 
philosophy of Luce Irigaray, a prominent name in the French 
school of feminism. I will respond to criticisms of Rorty that call 
his theory misrepresentative, and identify the disparity between 
Rorty‘s and Wittgenstein‘s goals as a vital reason to accept Rorty‘s 
invocation of Wittgenstein. I will identify Wittgensteinian concepts 
in Irigaray‘s feminism and establish a similar disparity in goals. I 
will then use a Wittgensteinian reading of Irigaray to illustrate the 
purpose and value of analyzing postmodern theory under a 
Wittgensteinian lens. Ultimately, I believe that it is through such a 
lens that we can better understand many postmodern approaches to 
the relationship between humans, language and the world. In 
particular, I will show in this paper that his conception of language 
as based on agreement in use is central to both Irigaray‘s feminism 
and Rorty‘s liberal ironism. 
 
I. Rorty’s Use of Wittgenstein 
Rorty refers to Wittgenstein‘s later work in order to argue 
against the prevailing acceptance of universality and representation 
of truth in political and philosophical systems. In Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity, he criticizes the basing of political systems 
on sweeping political theories and ideologies and proposes a new 
―politics of redescription.‖ In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
he criticizes the epistemological tradition of Western philosophy, 
disparaging its perception of the ability to discover truth, and 
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 Bjorn Ramberg, ―Richard Rorty,‖ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/. 
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proposes a turn in philosophy toward a more conversational, less 
argumentative and truth-value-based approach. In both works, 
Rorty uses Wittgensteinian philosophy as a defense for his 
rejection of universalizing systems. 
In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty spells out 
implications of Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, 
identifying Wittgenstein as one important thinker who revealed the 
human-created, shifting nature of ―vocabularies.‖ Rorty‘s 
―vocabularies‖ can be thought of as analogous to Wittgensteinian 
―language-games‖ and refer to specific cultural collections of ways 
of thinking, communicating, and acting (ways of living). Rorty 
argues that if vocabularies are indeed created contingently and in 
constant shift, if they are ―optional and mutable,‖2 then the values 
they express, too, are optional and mutable. He asserts that neither 
the vocabularies nor their values should be imposed on anyone, 
and that political systems should seek to include multiple 
vocabularies. Such systems he terms ―liberal utopias,‖ inhabited by 
―liberal ironists‖ who would recognize their own contingency, 
acknowledging the possibility of shifting truth and shifting 
morality, which continue to change as they are influenced by 
different (contingent) factors. Seeking to provide people with the 
most freedom of expression possible and alleviate the most 
suffering possible (this is the ―liberal‖ part), they would promote 
their causes through redescriptions rather than arguments.
3
 
Like Nietzsche, Freud, and Donald Davidson, Wittgenstein 
is a stepping-stone on the path to Rorty‘s land of liberal utopias, 
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3
 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 9. 
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where we all recognize contingency. According to Rorty, 
Wittgenstein helped us along this path by revealing the 
contingency of language: In positing that language forms an 
objective framework based on agreement rather than adhering or 
corresponding to an (already-existing) objective framework, 
Wittgenstein makes us see language as a product of historical 
contingencies. Here it is useful to explore Rorty‘s use of Donald 
Davidson‘s philosophy of language, another stepping-stone. 
Davidson, like Wittgenstein, asserted that what makes language 
work is understanding between speakers, not expression of truth. 
Davidson‘s notion of ―passing theories‖ from his 1986 paper ―A 
Nice Derangment of Epitaphs‖ states that understanding between 
two linguistic beings occurs when their concepts of a word‘s 
meaning converge. Each person‘s concept of each word‘s meaning 
is in constant shift relative to context, so understanding – and 
meaning – are also in constant shift. This assertion helps us 
recognize the contingency of language by revealing its lack of 
necessity, like Darwin‘s theory of evolution revealed the 
contingency of the biology of species. 
 
Davidson lets us think of the history of 
language, and thus of culture, as Darwin taught 
us to think of the history of a coral reef. . . . Our 
language and our culture are as much a 
contingency, as much as a result of thousands of 
small mutations finding niches (and millions of 
others finding no niches), as are the orchids and 
the anthropoids.
4
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 Ibid., 16. 
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Just as the present state of species has depended on many 
contingent factors, so has our language. Rather than an expression 
of or correspondence to reality, it is somewhat a product of chance: 
Things could easily be otherwise. In addition, they are bound to 
continue to change. For this reason, according to Rorty, no singular 
ideology can be the right one: The circumstances under which 
ideologies and social theories come into being will never be static. 
As situations change, so should the vocabularies we use and the 
values on which our political systems are based. 
Rorty does for philosophy in Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature what he does for politics in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity, presenting this idea of redescription rather than appeal 
to universal truth within the discipline of philosophy. In this book, 
Rorty criticizes the epistemological tradition and details what he 
sees as a necessary shift in Western philosophy. He uses the 
arguments of several philosophers, including Wittgenstein, to 
critique the representational view of knowledge central to 
traditional epistemology. According to Rorty, Wittgenstein, along 
with Sellars, Quine, Kuhn, and Davidson, showed that neither the 
mind nor language is capable of mirroring reality. Subsequently, 
the discipline of philosophy had to change, because epistemology 
ceased to make sense.
5
 As such, the traditional questions of 
philosophy are no longer relevant to our time. They are not, as 
many believe, timeless. The last sentence of his book reads, 
 
The only point on which I would insist is that 
the philosophers‘ moral concern should be with 
                                                 
5
 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979, 169. 
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continuing the conversation of the West, rather 
than with insisting upon a place for the 
traditional problems of modern philosophy 
within that conversation.
6
 
 
We should not ―insist on a place‖ for these traditional problems 
precisely because they will not, as so many philosophers have 
believed, lead us to discovery of universal truths. When we do 
philosophy, according to Rorty, we should neither assume that we 
operate outside the boundaries of contingency nor that we have a 
privileged ability to discover ―truth.‖ Rather than some sort of 
elevated search for truth, he claims that our Western tradition of 
philosophy is just another vocabulary (or language-game). 
Instead, as in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty 
would have us enter a more conversational approach. Once more, 
Wittgenstein‘s influence is clear. Under Rorty‘s ―naturally holistic 
conversational justification,‖ which he favors over the ―reductive 
and atomistic‖ justification of the epistemological tradition, social 
justification of belief creates knowledge. Just as language finds 
objectivity of meaning in social agreement under Wittgenstein, so 
does knowledge find objectivity of truth in social agreement under 
Rorty. Under this view, philosophy as a search for truth is 
nonsensical: We ―have no need to view [knowledge] as accuracy of 
representation‖ since ―we understand knowledge when we 
understand the social justification of belief.‖7 Rorty terms this view 
―epistemological behaviorism‖ and once again attributes his theory 
to Witgensteinian influence. 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 394. 
7
 Ibid., 170. 
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Explaining rationality and epistemic authority 
by reference to what society lets us say, rather 
than the latter by the former, is the essence of 
what I shall call ‗epistemological behaviorism,‘ 
an attitude common to Dewey and 
Wittgenstein.
8
 
 
And for Rorty, if we recognize philosophy‘s inability to discover 
truth in any objective sense, then we should change the discipline. 
Just as in Contingency, Irony, and Soliarity, Rorty would have us 
reject a privileged, contingently created position of philosophy in 
favor of a conversational discipline inclusive of multiple language-
games. 
 A legitimate worry for many critics is that Rorty 
simultaneously makes normative claims while rejecting 
normativity. This may indeed be a problem for Rorty, but for the 
purposes of this paper it is not relevant. My task here is to show 
the validity of Rorty‘s invocation of Wittgenstein. Another worry is 
that in expounding on the created nature of meaning, Rorty is 
rejecting objectivity of meaning in any form; in ordinary words, 
for instance, like ―apple‖ or ―table.‖ Such a rejection would make 
Rorty an anti-realist. I do not think he aims to do this: Rorty‘s 
concern is primarily with the abandonment of essential identities in 
order to allow for shifting notions of selves, cultures, and truths. 
He makes this distinction himself in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity. 
 
We need to make a distinction between the 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 174. 
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claim that the world is out there and the claim 
that the truth is out there. To say that the world 
is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, 
with common sense, that most things in space 
and time are the effects of causes which do not 
include human mental states. To say that the 
truth is not out there is simply to say that where 
there are no sentences there is no truth, that 
sentences are elements of human languages, and 
that human languages are human creations.
9
 
 
Rorty is decidedly not an anti-realist, though he does have a 
pluralist notion of truth: Since truth is not ―out there,‖ since it is 
created by humans, it can be created in many ways. The last worry 
I will explore in the next section: that in fact Rorty may not be able 
to use philosophers like Wittgenstein as he does; that he may be 
misrepresenting them and that his use of Wittgenstein may be 
unfounded. 
 
II. Is Rorty’s Use of Wittgenstein Valid? 
 Rorty makes bold claims when he uses philosophers like 
Wittgenstein to support his politics and philosophy of 
redescription. Is this use valid? We might ask, as some have: How 
can Rorty make the jump from Wittgenstein‘s notion of language 
as use to ―contingency of language‖ in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity? Does Wittgenstein really exhibit language‘s 
contingency? Does Rorty accurately represent Wittgenstein in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, when he cites Wittgenstein 
as one of the philosophers who changed the nature of 
                                                 
9
 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 5. 
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epistemology? Does he interpret Wittgenstein‘s notions of 
language-games and of language as agreement correctly? I argue 
first that he does in fact represent Wittgensteinian concepts of 
language accurately, and second that these questions are somewhat 
inappropriate, because Rorty and Wittgenstein have very different 
goals. Wittgenstein is trying to determine the nature of 
communication. His task is quite an apolitical one: He simply 
wishes to discover the true nature of language, and he discovers it 
to be a practice based on custom. Rorty has a larger goal in mind: 
He wishes both to convince us that all of our practices based on 
custom are not necessarily right, that we cannot justify anything 
with an appeal to ―truth‖ since everything we do and think is not 
necessary but contingent, and to propose new systems – of society 
and of philosophy – based on this recognition. It is because of this 
disparity of purpose that Rorty‘s use of Wittgenstein is not, as 
some critics have proposed, invalid. Rather, Wittgenstein‘s 
philosophy of language, like Darwin‘s theory of evolution, is 
useful to Rorty for purposes of illustration: Wittgenstein serves 
both as a useful comparison and as an important predecessor. In 
appealing to Wittgenstein, Rorty is simply laying out for the reader 
Wittgenstein‘s influence on his own theory. 
 Wolf Rehder is one of these critics. In ―Hermeneutics 
versus Stupidities of All Sorts: A Review-Discussion of R. Rorty‘s 
‗Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,‘‖ Rehder disparages Rorty 
for his use of philosophers like Wittgenstein. 
 
As witnesses for his holistic, antifoundationalist, 
and pragmatist new view of philosophy as 
hermeneutics, Rorty calls, among others, 
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Foucault, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sartre, 
Kierkegaard, Quine, Gadamer, Feyerabend and 
Heidegger, a truly motley group of big names. 
However, he makes only makes a meager case 
against epistemology and traditional philosophy 
with this impressive phalanx of witnesses for 
the prosecution. It is not going too far to say that 
his backing up his case with this echelon of 
genuinely great men does not only not do justice 
to their philosophical work, but even tends to 
demean their work and their role in the history 
of philosophy. This is so, because Rorty‘s 
‗positive‘ case, his hermeneutic turn and 
proposed transcending of truth-oriented inquiry 
is, unfortunately, surprisingly naïve.
10
 
 
It is naïve, according to Rehder, because there cannot be useful 
conversation without conflict, nor can it exist without a common 
language or discourse. In Rehder‘s view, Rorty is proposing the 
opposite: agreement between different languages and discourses. 
―Any fruitful discussion is based on some sort of disagreement.‖11 
This is a commonly held view: To engage in conversation, we must 
share a language-game; and to debate, we must disagree. It seems 
to me, though, that in criticizing Rorty on this point Rehder is 
simply not taking Rorty seriously: Rorty‘s point is that useful 
conversation is possible – better, even – if it considers perspectives 
of multiple vocabularies. To say that useful conversation must 
happen within the same vocabulary is to refuse Rorty‘s proposed 
                                                 
10
 Wulf Rehder, ―Hermeneutics versus Stupidities of All Sorts: A Review-
Discussion of R. Rorty‘s ‗Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,‖ Zeitschrift für 
allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science 
14, no. 1 (1983): 95, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25170640. 
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shift, to disregard his entire point of making the discourse of 
philosophy more inclusive of multiple language-games. Rorty‘s 
usage of all of these philosophers to defend his ―naïve‖ system 
obviously troubles Rehder. After all, he says, ―[It] does not only 
not do justice to their philosophical work, but even tends to 
demean their work and their role in the history of philosophy.‖ It is 
this criticism that I will now address. 
 First, Rorty does seem to accurately represent Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein created a new framework for objectivity based on 
social agreement rather than on truth. This agreement in no way 
determines truth or falsity, but instead forms a new standard of 
objectivity. In response to the invisible interlocutor in section 241, 
―So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false?‖ Wittgenstein offers an alternative: ―It is what 
humans say that is true or false; and they agree in the language 
they use.‖12 Agreement does not determine truth in the world, only 
truth in our agreed-upon shared account of the world – in our 
shared language. It is this agreement that allows us to 
communicate with one another. People are understandable when 
their definitions accord with socially accepted ones. When Rorty 
says that Wittgenstein ―[explains] rationality and epistemic 
authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the 
latter by the former,‖13  he seems to be correct: Wittgenstein‘s 
account of a socially formed objective framework does conform to 
Rorty‘s ―epistemological behaviorism,‖ as it locates objectivity in 
social accordance. 
                                                 
12
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1953), 88. 
13
 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 174. 
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 Second, it is useful to ask why Rorty appeals to ―this 
impressive phalanx of witnesses.‖ Does he aim to represent them? 
Given the difference in Rorty‘s and Wittgenstein‘s goals, strict 
adherence is not necessarily essential. Any apparent disparity 
between Rorty‘s Wittgenstein‘s systems is unimportant, because 
Rorty and Wittgenstein are not making the same kind of claim. 
They are not talking about the same kind of thing. When Rorty 
says, ―the truth is not out there,‖14 he does not mean that we create 
the objective world. Indeed, he explicitly distinguishes between 
―the claim that the truth is not out there and the claim that the 
world is not out there.‖15 He means that our social and cultural 
institutions, our beliefs, our methods of inquiry (like philosophy) 
are created in the same way that language is, in the same way that 
evolution is. Rorty does not really claim to adhere to Wittgenstein, 
so he cannot be criticized for it. In both Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty invokes 
Wittgenstein as an important influence, but not as his only 
influence. Where Wittgenstein‘s goal is to discover and describe, 
Rorty‘s is to reveal, convince, and change. 
 
III. Illumination Through Irigaray 
 Irigaray is Wittgensteinian in many of the same ways as 
Rorty: She holds a pluralist view of truth, rejects normativity, and 
uses Wittgenstein‘s notions of language-games and forms of life. 
But because she does not invoke Wittgenstein‘s name to defend her 
views, as Rorty does, she is never criticized for misrepresentation, 
                                                 
14
 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 5. 
15
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as Rorty is. This fact reveals Rorty‘s immunity to such criticism. 
Her theory also illustrates the effectiveness of applying later 
Wittgensteinian philosophy to postmodern theories. Through an 
exploration of her work, I hope to show this usefulness. 
In To Speak Is Never Neutral, Irigaray questions the 
assumed impartiality of language and calls on us to recognize both 
its sexed nature as ―the language of man‖ (a title of one of her 
chapters) and its unfairly universalizing tendencies. She states in 
her introduction, ―This book is a questioning of the language of 
science, and an investigation into the sexualization of language, 
and the relation between the two.‖16 In ―Linguistic Sexes and 
Genders,‖ she identifies the sexism inherent in language, 
examining particular words in her native French. In ―This Sex 
Which Is Not One,‖ she states that ―female sexuality has always 
been theorized within masculine parameters‖17 and attempts to 
conceptualize it differently, outside these parameters. One of 
Irigaray‘s main concerns throughout her various works is to show 
how the current linguistic system is oppressive to women while 
claiming to be universally neutral, an idea clearly influenced by 
Wittgenstein, as I will show. Another concern is to show how 
change is possible through new feminist language-games, the 
details of which can be confusing and have been debated, but 
which is clarified through a Wittgensteinian reading of her theory. 
Irigaray uses the Wittgensteinian notion of language-games 
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 Luce Irigaray, To Speak Is Never Neutral, trans. Gail Schwab (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 5. 
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 Luce Irigaray, ―This Sex Which Is Not One,‖ trans. Claudia Reeder, in New 
French Feminisms, ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (New York: 
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as well as his conception of objectivity as agreement to describe 
the problem of a universal language that is catered toward men but 
purported to apply to women as well. According to Irigaray, the 
language we accept as universal – the language of politics, of 
science, of philosophy – is actually an oppressive, particular 
language-game.  
 
A sexed subject imposes his imperatives as 
universally valid, and as the only ones capable 
of defining the forms of reason, of thought, of 
meaning, and of exchange. He still, and always, 
comes back to the same logic, the only logic: of 
the One, of the Same. Of the Same of the One.
18
 
 
Just as, in Wittgenstein, we cannot form a private language because 
all words we use are defined by the linguistic community, so, in 
Irigaray, is it nearly impossible to escape from the purportedly 
universal dominating male language-game. In the same vein as 
Rorty, Irigaray questions the value of rationality and criticizes the 
language of traditional philosophy, which is decidedly male and 
which is imposed on women while masking itself as universal to 
all.  
 
From [Irigaray‘s] point of view, the 
philosophers, of whatever persuasion, are 
comfortably installed in the male imaginary, so 
comfortably that they are completely unaware of 
the sexuate character of ‗universal‘ thought.19 
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 Irigaray, To Speak Is Never Neutral, 228. 
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 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), 103. 
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How, then, is feminist theory even possible? The problem is as 
follows: ―Not using logic risks maintaining the other‘s status as 
infans . . . Using logic means abolishing difference and 
resubmitting to the same imperatives.‖20 If we operate outside the 
dominating language-game, we will not be taken seriously, and if 
we operate within it, we are giving in, trying to fit ourselves into 
the oppressive system. 
Irigaray‘s solution, possible under Wittgensteinian 
influence, is to form a new language-game that challenges this 
discourse. Irigaray appeals to the female body in the formation of a 
new language of feminism, under two assumptions: First, that the 
male body is already intrinsic to philosophy – in ethics, for 
instance, where the point is to enhance positive effects on the body 
(e.g., health) and circumvent negative effects (e.g., death). Second, 
that the female body is currently defined by male desire and male 
language.
21
 The body is important both in the symbolic and in its 
realized form for Irigaray. Rather than being forced to conform 
either to the supposedly universal language of men, based on the 
male body, or to form a new language based on the male-created 
female body, ―the female body has to be allowed its own imaginary 
existence in the form of symbolic difference.‖22 This imaginary 
existence can only be realized by privileging female life, female 
sexuality, and the real female body, as they are ―for themselves.‖23 
Irigaray‘s solution is Wittgensteinian because it relies on 
Wittgenstein‘s notions of language-games as flexible, changing 
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and organic and of language as a form of life. Formation of a new 
language-game is possible because language-games are always 
coming into and out of being. The female body itself is an 
important part of the female form of life, and so can be appealed to 
in Irigaray‘s formation of a new feminine language-game. 
Importantly, Irigaray does not declare herself 
Wittgensteinian; but a Wittgensteinian reading of Irigaray both 
makes sense, as I have shown, and clarifies some aspects of her 
solution. Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith show how such a 
Wittgensteinian reading clarifies and does justice to Irigaray in 
―Wittgenstein and Irigaray: Philosophy and Gender in a Language 
(Game) of Difference.‖ Specifically, a Wittgensteinian reading 
solves an interpretative conflict among Irigaray scholars. Critics 
have typically either called Irigaray essentialist, which she 
explicitly claims not to be (her disparagement of universalizing 
language is clearly anti-essentialist) or as speaking in metaphor or 
symbolism when she speaks about the body (since they know she 
is anti-essentialist, they cannot imagine she would invoke the real 
body). Even Margaret Whitford, a prominent Irigaray scholar, 
acknowledges the difficulty of reading Irigaray, in that ―we are not 
quite sure what status is given to Irigaray‘s statements.‖24 She 
wonders whether they are ―empirical descriptions . . . ideal 
descriptions . . . descriptions of the reigning imaginary . . . or 
perhaps simply metaphors again.‖25 Reading Irigaray under a 
Wittgensteinian lens, say Davidson and Smith, ―might provide a 
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third alternative‖26 and solve this conflict: Through Wittgenstein, 
we can come to terms with Irigaray‘s simultaneous rejection of 
essentialism and appeal to the body in formation of a new, 
subversive, feminine language-game. Wittgenstein‘s notion of 
―blurred concepts‖ or ―family resemblances‖ lets us recognize the 
possibility of using something like the female body to create a new 
language-game without essentializing it. 
 
Women‘s anatomy might be understood as a real 
component of the patterns, context, and 
environment that might give rise to a feminine 
language-game. So, while anatomy is not an 
essential referent to which language must be 
fixed, it is a valid and pertinent feature of a 
feminine form of life.
27
 
 
Wittgenstein told us that definitions need not always be fixed, that 
a ―the indistinct [picture] is often exactly what we need.‖28 In the 
same way, female anatomy need not be essentialized to serve as a 
reference point for the creation of a feminine language-game. We 
see, then, that Wittgensteinian philosophy does not only manifest 
itself in Irigaray‘s theory; it can also help clarify it. 
 
IV. A Difference of Goals: Language and Power 
 Like Rorty, Irigaray has a political goal, one that is vastly 
different from Wittgenstein‘s descriptive one. Rorty and Irigaray 
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both assume that language has power: In both of their theories, it is 
language that oppresses and language that has the power to 
liberate. This relationship between language and power was termed 
―discourse‖ by Michel Foucault, and refers to language and other 
shared aspects of culture as a mechanism that perpetuates itself 
through use, never calling itself into question. Central to this idea 
is the Wittgensteinian one that language is based on agreement in 
use, that social agreement in use forms the objective frameworks 
within which we communicate. Wittgenstein was the philosopher 
to assert that there was no ideal language capable of representing 
reality. Maxine Greene says in ―Postmodernism and the Crisis of 
Representation‖ that our postmodern task ―may be a matter of 
recognizing that there is no single-dimensional medium reflective 
of the ‗facts‘ of the world, but a multiplicity of language games, as 
Ludwig Wittgenstein made so clear.‖29 Postmodern thinkers like 
Foucault, Rorty, and Irigaray, as well as Judith Butler, Monique 
Wittig, and Edward Said, among others, have accepted this task, 
drawing out the social and political implications of Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of language. 
 Wittgenstein thus proves to be invaluable to postmodern 
theories of language and power: Though Wittgenstein never 
approaches the social and political ideas that theorists like Rorty 
and Irigaray do, his work is ultimately their basis. For this reason, 
and as we have seen through these two case studies, a 
Wittgensteinian reading of postmodern theories helps us 
understand them. 
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V. Eliminating False Clarity: The Value of Wittgenstein-
Influenced Postmodern Theory 
Both Rorty and Irigaray use Wittgensteinian notions of 
language and social agreement to call into question the universality 
we so often use to solve political, philosophical, and scientific 
problems. Irigaray questions the universality of political, 
philosophical, and scientific language, while Rorty questions the 
ability of universalizing, truth-seeking systems of politics and 
philosophy to provide us with acceptable solutions. I once heard in 
an ecology class that ―our best chance of solving problems is to 
recognize the complexity of the situation rather than appeal to an 
ideology.‖ The professor said such an appeal gives us ―false 
clarity.‖ It seems to me that this is true, that more realistic views do 
not think themselves universal, and that Rorty‘s and Irigaray‘s 
Wittgenstein-influenced theories that seek to reveal the complexity 
of the situation in lieu of the false clarity of universalizing 
political, philosophical, and linguistic systems are ones to consider 
with utmost seriousness and thoughtfulness. 
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THE NARRATIVE SELF-CONSTITUTION VIEW: WHY 
MARYA SCHECHTMAN CANNOT REQUIRE IT FOR 
PERSONHOOD 
 
Andrew S. Lane 
 
Abstract    In her book The Constitution of Selves, Marya 
Schechtman names four features essential for personal existence: 
survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and 
compensation. She rejects reductionists theories of persons, 
specifically that of Derek Parfit, claiming that they cannot support 
the four features. Instead, she proposes a theory of persons which 
she calls the Narrative Self-Constitution View. Because she 
believes this is required to support the four features, she also 
argues that for an individual to be a person they must hold this 
view. Drawing from the work of Derek Parfit and Galen Strawson, 
I will argue that her arguments are inconsistent and do not show 
that reductionist theories cannot support the four features. As a 
result, I conclude that Schechtman is wrong to require the 
Narrative Self-Constitution View for personhood. 
 
 This paper will deal with the theory of personal identity 
proposed by Marya Schechtman in her book, The Constitution of 
Selves.
1
 In this work, Schechtman claims that there are four basic 
features of personal existence: survival, moral responsibility, self-
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interested concern, and compensation.
2
 These she abbreviates as 
the ―four features.‖ Regardless of potential additions or 
emendations to the list, I will not question these features. As far 
back as John Locke, accounting for moral responsibility is a key 
motivation for personal identity theory and this continues with 
more contemporary philosophers like Derek Parfit. Moral 
accountability seems required for a functional society. If a person 
at time T1 does not survive and there is a new person at time T2, 
generally our intuition is that the person existing at time T2 would 
not be responsible for the actions of person existing at time T1. 
Thus, it seems necessary that a person must survive across time to 
some extent, otherwise nobody could be held accountable for past 
actions. The work of Galen Strawson will be useful in considering 
this question of moral accountability. Self-interested concern and 
compensation also seem necessary for ―personal‖ existence, 
though not for ―impersonal‖ existence. It is not of necessity that 
the former is better than the latter, but this essay will set such 
considerations aside. I will take personal survival to be a valid 
target, which is Schechtman's aim, without justifying whether or 
not it is any better than impersonal survival. Schechtman believes 
that Reductionist views, like that of Derek Parfit, cannot capture 
the four features, and thus fail as accounts of personal identity. 
Instead, she advocates what she calls the Narrative Self-
Constitution View, which she feels is required in order to capture 
the four features. 
 The Narrative Self-Constitution View holds that a person 
creates his or her identity by forming an autobiographical 
                                                 
2
 Schechtman, Constitution, 2. 
 102 
 
narrative. According to this view,  
 
the difference between persons and other 
individuals...lies in how they organize their 
experience, and hence their lives. At the core of 
this view is the assertion that individuals 
constitute themselves as persons by coming to 
think of themselves as persisting subjects who 
have had experience in the past and will 
continue to have experience in the future, taking 
certain experiences as theirs. Some, but not all, 
individuals weave stories of their lives, and it is 
their doing so which makes them persons.
3
 
 
Those who do not adhere to this narrative view, those who do not 
think of themselves as persisting subjects and construct narratives, 
are not persons according to Schechtman. I claim, however, that 
the narrative self-constitution view is not the only way to capture 
the four features. As a result, Schechtman is wrong to deny 
personhood to individuals who do not view themselves narratively. 
The motivation for her requirement that an individual view 
themselves narratively is that to account for personal existence, we 
need to capture the four features; thus, if we can capture the four 
features another way, while this does not exclude her narrative 
view as one of the potential ways, which I believe it is, it is not 
required, and thus individuals who are non-narrative should not be 
excluded from personhood. 
 
The Reductionist View of Derek Parfit 
 Before considering the views of Derek Parfit, it will be 
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useful to establish some distinctions concerning identity. First, 
there is the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity. 
For example, take two sheets of printer paper. The two sheets are 
qualitatively identical, for they share the same qualities, but are not 
numerically identical, because they are two different physical 
objects. While the two sheets are not numerically identical with 
each other, each is numerically identical with itself; each is one 
and the same sheet of paper. This is one of the basic principles of 
logic: self-identity. 
 Second, there is strict and non-strict identity. Strict identity 
requires that X1 and X2 be exactly the same in all ways; the 
smallest change of any kind destroys the strict identity of the 
objects. With non-strict identity, however, some change is 
permitted without destroying the non-strict identity of the objects. 
With the paper example, X1 and X2 are not strictly qualitatively 
identical, because if we compare closely enough, the fragments of 
pulp are not arranged in exactly the same configuration. Strict 
identity in this case would require that all the atoms making up the 
paper, and their arrangement, be exactly qualitatively identical. 
However, X1 and X2 may be considered non-strictly identical. For 
most purposes, it would be more useful to a person to consider X1 
and X2 (non-strictly) qualitatively identical, because what matters 
to us about the sheets of paper is not on the level of atoms; for our 
purposes the sheets are qualitatively identical. The criteria for what 
qualifies for non-strict identity will vary depending on the objects 
in question, and this will be dependent on the perspective of who is 
considering the objects and their purposes. The strict/non-strict 
distinction applies to numerical identity as well. With the problem 
of personal identity, the two objects in question will be in different 
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temporal locations. To say that the paper is self-identical in a given 
moment considers space, while the time aspect is constant. When 
considering whether the paper is numerically identical at different 
moments also considers time. Strictly, the paper would not be 
identical at different moments because the atomic makeup will 
have slightly changed, for example from the effects of light. 
However, we may say that they are non-strictly identical if all that 
has changed are the atomic differences from light, because these 
differences are irrelevant to what matters to us about paper. 
 One of Parfit's central concerns is moral accountability. As 
mentioned in the introduction, if a person at time T1 is not the same 
person at time T2, then it seems that the person at time T2 could not 
be held accountable for the actions of the person at time T1, for 
they are not the same person. When we look at an individual across 
time, they are never strictly identical at two different times. Atoms 
have changed and psychological makeup is in constant flux. Thus, 
when speaking of an individual at two different times, they are 
never strictly-identical on a reductionist account. If one holds that 
there is, as Parfit would say, a further fact of identity, then one may 
argue that there can be strict identity across time. If, for example, 
there were an immaterial, eternal substance, perhaps a soul, and 
this substance provides identity, then it may be strict identity. None 
of the philosophers discussed in this essay argue for such a 
substance, and because it is not within the scope of this paper to 
properly argue against it, I will set this possibility aside. The 
person at two different times may, however, be non-strictly 
identical. The question then becomes, what criteria should we use 
to decide whether or not they are (non-strictly) identical? For 
Parfit, the mind is more important than the body and thus seems 
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the natural place to locate this identity. As a result, he articulates 
psychological criteria for identity. 
 For this, Parfit defines three terms: psychological 
connectedness, strong psychological connectedness, and 
psychological continuity. Psychological connectedness is ―the 
holding of particular direct psychological connections.‖4 Parfit 
cites memories, beliefs, desires and intentions as examples of 
individual psychological connections.  For example, if a person at 
age 18 has the memory of running from a dog when they were 
younger, and this person still has this memory when they are 20, 
this would be an example of a direct psychological connection. 
Parfit claims, ―since connectedness is a matter of degree, we 
cannot plausibly define precisely what counts as enough. But we 
can claim that there is enough connectedness if the number of 
direct connections, over any day, is at least half the number that 
hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.‖5 
Strong connectedness means over half of the possible 
psychological connections hold. Strong connectedness is not 
transitive. A person at time T1 may be strongly connected to the 
person at time T2, and the person at time T2 to the person at time 
T3, but it does not follow that the person at time T3 is strongly 
connected to the person at time T1. Psychological continuity is ―the 
holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness.‖ 6 While 
strong connectedness is not a transitive relation, psychological 
continuity is. Thus, the person at time T3 would be psychologically 
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 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford, Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press, 
1984), 206. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
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continuous with the person at time T1, because they are linked 
through time T2 to which they are both strongly connected. A 
person at two different times may be considered (non-strictly) 
identical if and only if they are psychologically continuous. Like 
the Buddhists and David Hume, Parfit claims that there is no Self, 
where the Self would be an unchanging entity or essence that can 
provide identity for an individual across time. That is, there is no 
―further fact‖ of identity; identity simply consists in holding 
psychological continuity. 
 
The Extreme Claim and the Moderate Claim 
 In his book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit claims that 
we are Selfless persons, that there is no Self to provide the further 
fact of identity, instead claiming that our identity simply consists in 
overlapping chains of strong psychological connections, but thinks 
that this is not such a terrible thing. In fact, he feels that adopting 
this view was a positive change in his life. In response to his view, 
however, he sees two possible reactions; one he calls the Extreme 
Claim, the other the Moderate Claim. 
 The Extreme Claim says that ―if the Reductionist view is 
true, we have no reason to be concerned about our own futures.‖7 
If in the future, my future self will not be the same person as my 
current self, then I have no reason to care for this person. It is not 
me. For example, why should I care if smoking damages my body, 
for it will not be me who dies of cancer. The Moderate Claim, 
however, says that psychological continuity with a high degree of 
connectedness gives us a reason to be concerned for our future 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., 307. 
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selves.
8
 Parfit believes that even though it will not be the same 
person in the future by strict criteria, it could be the same person 
on a reductionist account, and the present person may still have 
concern for the future person. He likens this to how we may be 
concerned for our children, even if they are not us. The relations 
that justify this are not a deep separate fact. If these relations give 
us reason to care, then psychological continuity may give us 
reason. 
 However, one may still object that it will not be one in the 
future, so why should one be especially concerned today about 
what one shall care about in the future? Why should a person care 
about either their future selves or other people's future selves? To 
this, Parfit says that he does not have an argument to completely 
refute the extreme claim. Both claims, he thinks, are defensible. 
Though, he believes that we are not forced to accept the extreme 
claim. He wonders,  
 
It may be wrong to compare our concern about 
our own future with our concern for those we 
love. Suppose I learn that someone I love will 
soon suffer great pain. I shall be greatly 
distressed by this news. I might be more 
distressed than I would be if I learnt that I shall 
soon suffer such pain. But this concern has a 
different quality. I do not anticipate the pain that 
will be felt by someone I love.
9
 
 
Thus, because he cannot refute the Extreme Claim, he accepts it as 
a defensible response to his position. However, he maintains that 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 311. 
9
 Ibid., 312. 
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the Moderate Claim is also defensible. Neither claim, he thinks, 
necessarily follows from his theory. Which claim a person holds 
will depend on the feeling of that person. 
  
Schechtman's Argument from the Extreme Claim 
 Schechtman believes that reductionism cannot support the 
Moderate Claim and as a result we are forced to accept the 
Extreme Claim. Because the Extreme Claim cannot support the 
Four Features, Reductionism, she claims, cannot be true. She 
maintains that instead of accepting this as an interesting result of 
Parfit's theory of personal identity, it should be seen as a reductio 
ad absurdum of Parfit's reductionist account, because it cannot 
support the four features.
10
 Her argument has two premises. 
Premise 1 is that ―the four features require numerical identity–
qualitative similarity will not do.‖11 This is because ―self-interested 
concern is an emotion that is appropriately felt only toward my 
own self and not toward someone like me. We all know the 
difference between fearing for our own pain and fearing for the 
pain of someone else.‖12 As Parfit himself recognized, this is a 
difference of kind and not of degree. While we may potentially 
care about another person's pain more than our own, we do not 
―anticipate‖ the pain. Premise 2 claims that ―the psychological 
continuity theory collapses the distinction between someone being 
me and someone being like me–that all identity amounts to on this 
view is psychological similarity between distinct individuals.‖13 
                                                 
10 
Schechtman, Constitution, 63. 
11 
Ibid., 52. 
12 
Ibid. 
13
 Ibid., 53. 
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 Schechtman believes that the extreme claim follows from 
these premises. If there is no difference between being the same 
person, and being like a different person, how can we decide if it is 
the same person, and thus how could we consider them to have 
self-interested concern? If qualitative similarity between distinct 
individuals is insufficient to underlie the four features, then the 
continuity theory fails to account for the importance of identity. 
She believes that to avoid the Extreme Claim, we need a theory 
where one and the same experiencing subject can exist at two 
different times; if person-stages are the only subjects that have 
experience in the theory, and person stages are not of the same 
subject, then this cannot happen.
14
 
 
The Tribal Example 
 Regardless of the Extreme Claim, Parfit insists that, even 
though his rejection of the Non-Reductionist view led him to be 
less concerned about his future, he was still more concerned about 
his own future than that of a mere stranger.
15
 To account for this 
concern, and to counter Schechtman's argument that we are forced 
to accept the Extreme Claim, we need to deal with the problem of 
anticipation. The Narrative Self-Constitution view, I argue, does no 
better than reductionism on this account. We also need to show that 
this concern is of a different character than the concern for others, 
because otherwise she can simply claim that it is not self-interested 
concern and thus does not capture the four features. To approach 
this, let us look to an example that Schechtman herself uses while 
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 Parfit, Reasons, 308. 
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defending her demand for a conventional linear narrative against 
the claim of chauvinism: the ―Tribal‖ example. 
 
At some point, the deviation of an individual's 
self-conception from the range of narratives 
standard in our culture can be so great that 
comprehension of and interaction with such 
individuals becomes difficult. This is the sort of 
divergence that can often be found in cases of 
extreme cultural difference. In such a case the 
narrative self-constitution view might recognize 
that this culture has persons, but also note that 
their concept of persons-and so the persons 
themselves-are quite different from in our 
culture. For instance, a tribal culture might 
assign to an ancestral lineage much of the role 
that the individual person plays in our culture–
responsibility, for instance, may be felt most 
directly for all of the actions of an ancestral line 
rather than for the actions of the individual 
alone, and self-interested and survival concerns 
may also be primarily attached the lineage. 
Presumably the members of this culture would 
also recognize what we call a single person as a 
natural unit, but this unit would play a different 
role in their interactions and practices.
16
 
 
Schechtman would still consider these people, even though they 
have distinct selves spanning multiple bodies across multiple 
lifetimes. The person here, would thus involve the entire lineage, 
which she feels means that their concept of a person is different, 
but that they can still meet her criteria of supporting the four 
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Schechtman, Constitution, 104. 
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features. Schechtman does not deny that Parfit is correct that we 
are distinct selves at different times; rather, she feels that we need 
narrativity to connect these selves as a single subject in order to 
capture the four features. Although Schechtman uses this example 
to defend her theory, it may also be used to illuminate why we are 
not forced to accept the Extreme Claim. 
  
Why We Are Not Forced to Accept the Extreme Claim 
 We may now turn to Galen Strawson. He speaks of people 
as either episodic or diachronic. Someone who is diachronic sees 
themselves as existing across time and feels a deep connection to 
their past, whereas an episodic ―has little or no sense that the self 
that one is was there in the (further) past and will be there in the 
future, although one is perfectly well aware that one has long-term 
continuity considered as a whole human being. Episodics are likely 
to have no particular tendency to see their life in Narrative 
terms.‖17 Further, Galen Strawson thinks that ―the heart of Moral 
responsibility, considered as a psychological phenomenon, is just a 
sort of instinctive responsiveness to things, a responsiveness in the 
present whose strength or weakness in particular individuals has 
nothing to do with how Episodic or Diachronic or Narrative or 
non-Narrative they are.‖18 For Strawson, moral responsibility does 
not depend on whether or not it was the same (transient) self in the 
past. He claims that he, the present self, feels responsibility for past 
                                                 
17
 Galen Strawson, ―Against Narrativity,‖ in Ratio. 17.4 (2004): 428-452. Rpt. in 
The Self? Ed. Galen Strawson, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2005), 65. 
18
 Galen Strawson, ―Episodic Ethics,‖ Philosophy. 82.320 (2007). Cambridge 
University Press. Rpt. in Real Materialism and Other Essays, Galen Strawson, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 220. 
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actions that he, the present self, did not perform. While Strawson 
most identifies with the present self, which he claims is very short 
lived, he also recognizes that as a whole human being he exists 
across time. People may feel a sense of responsibility for the 
actions of their family members, or community, etc, even though 
they did not perform them. This is especially easy to see in the case 
of children. Parents often feel responsibility for the actions of their 
child, even though they are fully aware that the child is a distinct 
person. Strawson claims that in the case of responsibility, there is a 
―phenomenon of natural transmission‖ that does not require 
diachronic self-experience.
19
 For example, when a person dies their 
family members often handle any obligations of the deceased that 
remain open, including debt, regardless of the fact that they are 
distinct persons. A person holds himself responsible when he feels 
this sense of responsibility, even if the present self is not the same 
self that committed the original action. 
 Parfit's theory considers a situation that is similar with his 
Nobel Prize Winner example. He writes, ―Suppose that a man aged 
ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, 
confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a 
policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a serious crime, 
this man may not now deserve to be punished.‖20 When 
considering his accountability, we question his present state, 
whether and in what way he is similar to the person who did the 
action. In the case of the Nobel Prize winner, we look to see if the 
present self is similar in certain ways to the past self, and this is 
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relevant to whether or not we hold him responsible. That they may 
be considered two different people does not preclude us from 
holding the present person responsible for the past person's actions. 
Does the present self, the Nobel Prize winner, still attack police 
officers? Or, does he still have psychological similarities that are 
relevant to this question? Is he peaceful, does he respect the police 
and other people in general, does he have a temper, are all relevant 
questions. Further, these questions affect whether or not he, the 
Nobel Prize winner, will feel responsible for this action. 
 Schechtman, however, maintains that qualitative similarity 
is not enough for responsibility, but this does not seem to be 
universally the case. We find examples where people feel a sense 
of responsibility even if they (the present self) did not perform the 
actions. While Schechtman accepts transference between living 
bodies in the Tribal example, within the life of a single human, this 
is not much different. There are multiple selves within the lifetime 
of one body instead of multiple lifetimes with multiple bodies; if 
anything, this should be easier for Schechtman to accept than the 
situation in the Tribal example. The difference is only one of 
distance and greater known qualitative similarity. In contrast to the 
above example, one may feel a much stronger sense of 
responsibility for an action they committed yesterday than for the 
actions of their ancestors. Here, they know a much greater amount 
of qualitative similarity holds, and feel themselves to be much 
more the same person. Even an episodic person may say this. In 
the case of the Nobel Prize winner, the qualitative similarity may 
be much weaker, and thus he may feel less responsible, for this is 
pushing closer to the situation of someone feeling responsible for 
an ancestor's actions as opposed to feeling responsible for the 
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actions of yesterday. While this is not the same as it would be if it 
were the same self, strictly speaking, feeling the responsibility as 
who did the action, the practical result is not different in a 
meaningful way; the responsibility, as a feeling, does not 
necessarily require that it be the same self as the self who did the 
action. 
 Schechtman allows that these tribal individuals are people, 
just different people. They feel responsibility for their ancestor's 
actions. Schechtman denies that we may feel responsibility for 
what we, the present self, did not do if we accept the reductionist 
view, but she will allow this if the conception of a person ranges 
across multiple bodies, presumably if they are conceptualized in 
the right way, with narrative. This allowance, however, can be 
turned around. If a tribal person is allowed to range across multiple 
bodies and lifetimes, even though Tribal body 1 will not feel the 
pain of their son, Tribal body 2, they may still have concern for it, 
and she must accept this in the tribal society for her theory to be 
coherent. In this case, one may speak of self-interested concern 
without anticipation, which is inconsistent with her argument for 
why we are forced to accept the Extreme Claim. She doesn't argue 
for why her theory allowing the tribal lineages to be people does 
not apply equally in the case of a single individual with multiple 
selves in our own society. She merely rejects this possible 
conception of a person out of hand. Moreover, she gives no 
argument to justify her particular choice for what it means to be a 
person in our own society. Having considered the views of Parfit 
and Strawson, it is clear that there are other options for what it 
means to be a person and these alternative conceptions cannot be 
ruled out just because they are different. It seems like she must 
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actually require that these tribal individuals are not people, for they 
cannot anticipate the actions as their own, or she must expand her 
concept of anticipation so that if the individual conceptualizes 
themselves in such a way that they have concern for future persons 
they take to be themselves (in the non-present self sense), this must 
be as acceptable as the anticipation she believes she establishes 
with her narrative self-constitution view. Otherwise, her example is 
meaningless, and she is open to the charge of chauvinism, for she 
has no good reason to exclude other possible self-conceptions. And 
thus, she is wrong to require her self-conception for personhood. 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AND AI: REFORMULATING THE 
ISSUE 
 
Patrick Holzman 
 
Abstract    In this paper, I explore the ―issue‖ of consciousness in 
artificial intelligences, the problem of whether they can be 
conscious, specifically going for simply asking what consciousness 
involves, instead of more technical aspects of the field. I use 
Robert Kirk's concepts of the "Basic Package" as well as "Direct 
Activity" to outline what being conscious involves, and attempt to 
apply it to artificially designed and constructed beings. I assume 
that artificial conscious intelligences will be constructed, 
eventually; my goal is to suggest a specific and more useful way of 
thinking about consciousness, which will hopefully accelerate the 
inevitable. 
 
The science of artificial intelligence deals with attempts to 
make programs or machines that can function in an intelligent way. 
What "intelligent" means is dependent on our own judgment and 
defined for the most part in terms of our own actions. Humans (and 
animals) act "intelligently," and so when we want to create an 
artificial intelligence, what we want is something that acts like us, 
that at least appears to make complex judgments and choices about 
its environment. Note that I have deliberately phrased this 
description of AI with phrases like "acts intelligently," or "appears 
to make judgments," or "functions in a certain way." That is, I've 
put these goals in terms of what the intelligences do, what their 
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behavior is, without any mention of their internal structure, and in 
doing so l leave open the question of consciousness and the 
"mind."  
From my fairly limited understanding of the perspective of 
those working with AI, this is entirely reasonable. The goal of 
engineers working in AI is to create something that acts 
intelligently. The challenge is the execution, the structure of the 
program, but the goal itself is purely based on behavior. I might 
even be so bold as to say that many researchers in AI assume that 
"consciousness," and rational judgment, whatever these involve, 
will come out in the wash, around when we get things that can 
truly act like a person. However, I feel that consciousness should 
be a goal in itself,
1
 and the path to consciousness will involve the 
amplification of some already existing "bare awareness" or 
"internal life" found in all systems. I will first talk a bit about the 
field of artificial intelligence, then consciousness in general (that 
is, attempt to define what I'm talking about in the first place), then 
introduce Robert Kirk's idea of the "Basic Package" or the 
"decider," and then finally his concept of "direct activity" and the 
"Basic Package Plus" to work out how one could judge whether a 
thing has consciousness or not. Using these, Kirk constructs a 
model of consciousness, or at least the salient aspects of 
consciousness in terms of testing for it. I agree with his views, and 
ultimately I will conclude that the phenomenal aspect of 
consciousness is not as important as the ability to make judgments 
and to actually understand the world. 
                                                 
1
 More precisely, I feel that creating an AI that would qualify as one of Kirk‘s 
―deciders‖ is worthwhile as a goal; I think it will be clear why after I describe 
Kirk‘s concepts.  
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The claim "AI researchers don't care about consciousness" 
is something of a straw man, but I want to dispel even the smallest 
hint of behaviorism. To be blunt, logical behaviorism, the opinion 
that all there is to having a mind is acting in a certain way, seems 
absolutely incomprehensible. In this sort of behaviorism, the 
statement "he believes that it will rain" is identical with the 
statement "he carries an umbrella and otherwise acts in certain 
ways." But this is quite false. Consider a hypothetical table-based 
system, wherein all conceivable inputs are associated with various 
outputs: input A at state J causes output X and state K, input B at 
state M causes output Y and state N, all down a table. Given a long 
enough table, and a fast enough method to access it, you could 
have an AI that perfectly replicated a human.
2
 However, it seems 
rather obvious that this would not possess a rational mind, would 
not analyze the world or make judgments, but instead function 
purely through reaction. 
A behaviorist would say that this is an unfair criticism; 
such a thing would be impossible to execute. If we were to create a 
being that acted like a human, and fully like a human, able to react 
to an indefinite variety of situations, and its hardware was limited 
to something the size of a human head, then it seems reasonable to 
assume that such a thing would likely be acting in a complex, rich 
way, actually having an internal functioning of similar convolution 
to ours, if likely with a different sort of structure. Phrased this way, 
behaviorism is much more about practical judgments about the 
nature of things we could encounter or build. This still misses the 
                                                 
2
 I do mean, though, an extremely long table, with a great many states and inputs. 
Essentially the false human‘s entire life story would count as a single state.  
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point behind asking whether something really possesses a mind or 
is conscious—unless there is something beyond the material, 
possession of a mind must line up with some physical state of 
things. Furthermore, advances in technology may allow us to make 
astonishingly complex AIs that, nonetheless, will have no true 
mind. 
The goal at the moment is to make programs that solve 
problems humans are still not very good at, such as traffic control 
or chess. Generally this is done by formalizing the situation 
mathematically, then writing a program to manipulate this 
formalization and find what best fits a certain criteria. It is not that 
"is efficient" is the criterion, but rather that there is some variable 
in the formalization that the program attempts to minimize or 
maximize. Once the formalization is "translated" back into our 
own understanding of the problem, this variable is identified with 
efficiency, but a significant part of the work when making the 
artificial intelligence is this formalization, in determining how best 
to abstractly represent the problem. Even when researchers attempt 
to create AIs that learn through something like a "neural net," they 
must first create a domain within which the AI will function; the 
problem has changed from solving a certain problem in a certain 
language, to working out the language and what problem is 
involved while still using a certain other language.  
Here I want to begin to use words like "syntax" and 
"semantics," but I think doing so would be dangerous—such words 
have been used many times before and have vague definitions.
3
 It 
                                                 
3
 I also suspect the way I use these words, or at least what I consider important 
about them, is different from many others‘. 
 121 
 
might be best to carefully lay out what I'm talking about. When I 
refer to consciousness, I am to a certain extent going by Nagel's 
idea of having a "what it's like.‖4 My eventual conclusion is, 
however, that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, this feel, is 
not what is valuable. Rather, the value comes in the ability to make 
judgments about the world; whether our perception is immediate or 
has no phenomenological aspect is irrelevant. The distinction I‘m 
trying to focus on is one between "consciousness" and 
"awareness," between "perception" and "sensation." Awareness, 
sensation, is simply having a first-person perspective from which 
certain things are experienced, while consciousness, perception, is 
to have some context, some interpretation of that sensation. 
Perception is sensation with internal context; consciousness is 
awareness with actual meaningful content. This is a very fuzzy 
distinction, one that will be better distinguished when I get to 
Kirk's deciders and the basic package. One possible way to think 
of it is by the concept of "raw feels," which here would just be 
sensation. The "raw feels," the sensations, are the raw bits of 
context-less information that comes into a system, which for some 
things is then interpreted and becomes perception, becomes 
conscious. For those things which are not conscious, sensation 
cause some reflexes to fire, and in this manner they are yet aware. 
 
Terms and Assumptions 
In earlier versions of this paper I freely used 
"consciousness" when what I meant was "a mind," in this sense of 
                                                 
4
 Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical 
Review. 83 (4): 435-450. 
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"rational and analyzing" that I've been stressing. To jump ahead, 
the distinction between an unconscious and a conscious mind is, in 
Kirk's terms, the addition of "direct activity," the fact that for a 
conscious mind perception is irresistible and happens 
automatically. Perception of the world directly affects the mind, 
changing how that being will achieve its goals or what its goals 
are, with no need to reflect on its body of knowledge. This ―direct 
activity‖ is what is entailed by consciousness, the ―what it‘s like.‖ 
The actual rationality should not be properly referred to as 
―consciousness,‖ except in that explicit sense of rationality. That 
is, we are not discussing ―conscious vs. unconscious,‖ but rather 
―conscious vs. reflexive‖ or something along those lines.  
By "system" I really do mean any sort of system. For the 
most part I'm talking about complex life-forms, but computer 
programs, robots, even things like toasters or thermostats count as 
a "system." The "basic package" and "deciders" will be detailed in 
more depth later, but essentially a "decider" is something that 
analyzes information about its environment, forms goals, and then 
executes those goals. I will say that systems that are deciders have 
"minds," and "mind" here means "rational, complex mind." 
"Consciousness" refers to minds or deciders that have direct 
activity, Kirk's "basic package plus." Unfortunately, I do not have 
a simple term for systems that are not deciders that still have direct 
activity. I think they could be called "non-rational sensing 
systems."  
I will go ahead and assume there is nothing beyond our 
physical bodies at work when we speak of the mind. Our brains do 
things, and this activity, from a different perspective, is called 
―mind.‖ Brain activity does not ―produce‖ minds over and above 
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the brain, they is not ―caused‖ by that activity. Rather, the activity 
in the brain somehow is the activity in the mind. You could not 
have a human brain functioning the way it does without also 
having a mind. This is not a contingent fact, but rather a fact about 
the sort of activity that occurs in the brain, that it is also conscious 
mental activity, when viewed from the inside. I take this as a 
matter of faith, and feel no need to defend this. It seems for the 
most part obvious, and, honestly, not that interesting.  
I will also assume that consciousness is an interesting and 
worthy topic of discussion. There is something that it is to be 
conscious; you and I can feel it just by thinking. This needs to be 
acknowledged, and explored. Finally, I will also assume that the 
mind could best be described as "activity within the brain when 
viewed from a different perspective." Searle gives this formulation: 
―Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in 
the brain and are themselves features of the brain.‖5 I would agree, 
with a caveat about the exact use of language. I want to stress that 
the mind is not ―caused‖ by the brain, but is the brain; I think I 
mean the same as Searle, but that I am insisting on a certain 
language. Searle talks about the mind being an emergent property 
of the brain, in the same way that wetness is an emergent property 
of H2O. Now, is wetness ―caused‖ by the H2O? Not exactly, not in 
the same sense that a rock causes a window to shatter. H2O does 
not ―produce‖ wetness, but rather it is wet, in sufficient quantities. 
―Produce‖ and ―cause‖ evoke to me feelings of ―extrude‖ and 
―impart,‖ not ―possess.‖ However, if we are to say that the brain 
―causes‖ the mind in the same way that H2O ―causes‖ wetness, 
                                                 
5
 John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: MIT, 1992, 1.  
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then it‘s quite fine. Indeed, the other half of his formulation is that 
mental phenomena ―are themselves features of the brain.‖ 
Although I've focused on just this example, I think similar sorts of 
situations abound and are what actually make up many of the 
apparent differences among various theories.  
What is tenuous, and interesting, is the use of ―from a 
different perspective,‖ when saying what the mind is. An objection 
can be raised that this physicalist explanation does not account for 
all aspects of the mental, that there is an ―explanatory gap.‖ 
Nagel‘s Bat6 and Jackson‘s Mary7 are paradigmatic thought 
experiments/arguments for this ―internal perspective.‖ The 
explanatory gap implies that knowledge of the physical world will 
not give you the knowledge of ―what it‘s like.‖ However, for now I 
am not focused so much on what it is like to be something, but 
rather whether there is a ―what it‘s like‖ for any specific thing. I 
suspect there is a ―what it‘s like‖ to be a cat, and that there is not a 
―what it‘s like‖ to be a rock, and furthermore that we can tell this 
empirically, and where the line is, just from physical facts. Even if 
physical facts can‘t tell what it is like, they can still tell whether 
there is a ―what it‘s like.‖ It is interesting to pursue whether we can 
tell ―what it‘s like‖ to be something, and I will do so, somewhat, 
but the difficulties we have in doing so do not change our 
knowledge that there is a ―what it‘s like‖ to be something. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” (Philosophical Review, 1974).   
7
 Frank Jackson, “What Mary didn’t know” (Journal of Philosophy, 1986). I’m 
going to assume some familiarity with both of these.  
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Brain/Mind Identity 
Before I get much farther, it may be valuable for me to 
clarify my position, especially towards mind/brain identity. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states ―The identity theory of 
mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to 
states and processes of the brain. [. . .] Consider an experience of 
pain, or of seeing something, or of having a mental image. The 
identity theory of mind is to the effect that these experiences just 
are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes.‖8 
On my view, there are two ways you can interpret this in terms of 
AIs possessing minds. One way is to say that, obviously, an AI 
cannot have a mind, as minds are identical to brains and thus non-
brain possessing AIs will not possess minds. The other way, my 
way, is to say that AIs can quite easily possess minds, just minds 
that are very unlike our own, as their brains are unlike our own, in 
structure. What is the mind in the brain is the brain‘s structure—
the mind is not a non-physical object whose parts can be identified 
with the parts of the physical object of the brain, but rather the 
organizational relations of the mind are identified with the 
relations in the brain. The mind is already nothing more than a set 
of relations; what the mind is identical with in the brain is those 
relations of the parts of the brain.  
The sort of identity theory I agree with is an odd sort of 
token-token identity. A token of some activity in the brain is 
identical with a token of some activity of the mind. Types of 
tokens in the mind are defined in terms of behavior and similar 
                                                 
8
 J. J. C. Smart, ―The Identity Theory of Mind‖ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2008).  
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phenomenological characteristics, and those tokens in the brain 
have similarities as well, but the link of types of mental tokens to 
types of physical tokens are on account of the linkage of the tokens 
themselves. ―Pain is identical to c-fiber firing‖ does not mean that 
a being with no c-fibers cannot feel pain. Rather, individual tokens 
of pain in humans are found to link to tokens of c-fiber firing, but 
the link between pain and c-fiber firing in general is only on 
account of the commonality of the tokens of pain. In a being 
without c-fibers that still feels pain, such as a robot, we could say 
―pain is identical to a red wire firing,‖ or whatever the case is.  
Obviously this leaves the question of whether the pain in 
the robot is the same as the pain in us. I feel it is not, unless we‘ve 
made an effort to make a robot with the same physical and mental 
structure as us, but I still feel that it is reasonable to say it has pain, 
as long as it has connections to its physical body that induce 
unpleasant sensations in it and that serve a similar role as pain in 
us.; ―unpleasant‖ will be dependent on whatever reward 
mechanisms we design it to have. If a robot is has a mind, has a 
way of forming goals, some of which include the preservation of 
itself, has ways of gathering information about damage to its body, 
and has some sort of unavoidable phenomenological sensation that 
carries this information to its mind which encourages it to avoid 
that damage, then it has sensations that can be usefully called 
―pain.‖ It may not be pain like ours, but it is no less pain that ours 
is.  
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Kirk’s Basic Package9 
In order to deal with things like consciousness, or the mind, 
or the idea of an "internal perspective," you need fairly strong 
definitions, or at least reasonably clear guidelines of what will 
constitute such things. Instead of trying to form yet another new 
framework, I've decided to use Robert Kirk's ideas of the "basic 
package," and "deciders,‖ as well as his ―direct activity,‖ because 
the entire system seems to be the most reasonable and acceptable 
one I‘ve read yet. A decider is something that makes judgments 
about the world, analyzes it, and forms goals and what it sees as 
the most appropriate paths to those goals. This is in contrast with 
systems that act purely on reflex, and Kirk uses this contrast 
extensively to lay out what he means by a "decider." An example 
of a general reflex system would be a clam, which shuts its shell 
when exposed to certain sensations. It is important to remember 
the distinction I tried to make between consciousness and a 
"mind"—a conscious mind is a mind with this direct activity, but a 
system does not need to have a full rational mind to have direct 
activity. A clam still has sensation, and an internal perspective, 
despite not having the full, rich consciousness it would possess 
with the basic package. What Kirk focuses on is ―perception,‖ 
which refers to sensation in a system that can learn, and which is 
an integrated part of a conscious mind. Fully conscious systems are 
partially defined by perceiving their environment and learning 
                                                 
9
 Kirk uses the concept of the “basic package” extensively. It is developed 
through chapter 6, and put forward on p. 89-96, and throughout the rest. The  
concepts of various sorts of reflex systems, and deciders, are developed first, 
through p. 77-89. The discussion of sensation and consciousness is from p. 58-
61, as well as p. 92-94.  
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from their perceptions; similarly, perception is only perception in 
the sense that the system can do something consciously with the 
information, instead of having the sensation just cause a reflex.   
By Kirk's view, there is a succession of increasingly rich 
reflex systems. Initially, there is the ―pure reflex system,‖ such as a 
clam. These are systems with hardwired responses to stimuli, 
which are genetic (for biological systems) and cannot be altered by 
the system itself, nor are they designed to be altered by the external 
world. The ―road to the decider‖ is not simply a matter of 
increasing complexity—a complex organism like an oyster is just 
as much a pure reflex system as a protozoon, although biological 
organisms with greater complexity are generally partially that way 
to allow for more complex responses. There are then ―pure reflex 
systems with acquired stimuli,‖ where there is a slight amount of 
room for new responses to develop, and ―built in triggered reflex 
systems,‖ wherein certain stimuli open up subsections of the list of 
responses, which themselves otherwise stay inactive. Finally, just 
before we cross the threshold into the deciders, are ―triggered 
reflex systems with acquired conditions.‖ Kirk‘s example is the 
dragonfly, which learns to have a specific nest, but for whom that 
learning process is automatically set up to happen. That is, the 
dragonfly does not decide ―this is where I‘ll set my perch,‖ but 
rather certain conditions cause the variable ―perch‖ to get 
permanently filled in, which then gets plugged into the triggered 
reflex system.  
The threshold between this and the decider is the capacity 
of ―monitoring and controlling the responses,‖ and is the important 
part Kirk as emphasizes:  
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We have reached a highly significant watershed. 
For a system to monitor and modify its own 
behaviour involves a major break with the reflex 
pattern. Monitoring and modifying must involve 
not only the organism‘s being able to perceive 
its own behaviour, or at least the effects of its 
behaviour on its environment, but also to adjust 
its behaviour in ways appropriate to its goals. 
That requires it to be able to control its own 
behaviour on the basis of its information, in a 
way that none of the types of systems so far 
considered is capable of. [. . .] It seems probable 
that what we can conveniently refer to as 
‗monitoring‘, modifying‘, and ‗controlling‘ are 
highly complex processes, capable of being 
realized to a greater or lesser degree, at different 
levels of organization in the system as a whole, 
and in an indefinitely wide range of possible 
internal structural patterns.
10
 
 
He further says that what is important is the integration of all 
these processes. There is no requirement of how these processes 
must be executed, just that there are capabilities. To be a decider, 
to have the ―basic package,‖ is for something to be able to— 
(i)  Initiate and control its own behavior on the basis of 
incoming and retained information: information that it can 
use; 
(ii)  Acquire and retain information about its environment;  
(iii)  Interpret information;  
(iv)  Assess its situation;  
(v)  Choose between alternative courses of action on the basis 
                                                 
10
 Robert Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness (New York: Oxford, 2005), 87.  
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of retained and incoming information (equivalently, it can 
decide on a particular course of action); and 
(vi)  Have goals. 
Moreover, all of these must be unified and integrated.  
It‘s possible that a thing could have faculties similar to 
some of these, but to have these fully they must be all present and 
interrelated. Put another way, it makes no sense to talk of ―goals‖ 
without something being able to acquire and interpret information, 
or to choose between various actions, nor does it make sense to 
talk about controlling behavior unless a thing has goals, or 
interpreting or assessing information unless it‘s going to be put to a 
use, to a choice. A thing can ―sort of‖ interpret information, a 
thermometer for example, but it will not be doing so for itself. This 
again has a great deal to do with perception, which is just sensation 
that conveys information, that a decider can then act upon. Sheer 
sensation, experience, can be found in the simple reflex systems, 
without there being any understanding or perception, despite there 
often being some apparently intelligent reaction. This relates back 
to Kirk‘s definition of perception—sensation that conveys 
information, that a decider can then act upon. Sheer sensation, 
experience, can be found in the simple reflex systems, without 
there being any understanding or perception, despite there being 
reaction, often seemingly intelligent reaction.  
Bringing this back to the subject of artificial intelligence, 
what we deal with when we have seemingly intelligent systems is 
instead this very bare pure reflex system. Kirk will freely admit 
that he does not know enough of the subject of animal neurology to 
give clear examples of each sort of reflex system. Similarly, I will 
say that I am not sufficiently familiar with the programming of AI 
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to say what sort of system any one example is. However, by my 
earlier outline of an AI, what we currently have is often still a very 
simple sort of reflex system. Even the "learning systems" are likely 
only so-called "triggered reflex systems with acquired conditions," 
where certain approaches to learning are acquired, but are still 
within the reflexive framework set up beforehand by the 
programmer. It is entirely possible, though, that I am wrong here, 
and that what is causing me to hesitate is something else. 
 
Direct Activity
11
 
In Kirk‘s view, the basic package is not sufficient for 
phenomenal consciousness. What is also needed is ―direct 
activity,‖ or the direct action of sensation on the creature‘s 
decision-making process. We all experience direct activity, when 
any sort of sensation comes our way, because we cannot help but 
sense it. Initially it‘s difficult to even understand what Kirk means 
by direct activity, because it‘s unclear what the alternative would 
be. The simplest example of information gained indirectly is 
subliminal information—when we do sense something, and file it 
away somehow, but do not notice it and actually perceive it at the 
time. The information has been acquired, and can be used to alter 
our goals or our methods, but in order to do so we must indirectly 
access them after the fact. Kirk stresses instantaneity and priority 
in direct activity. The perceptual information is instantly available 
to an organism, and it also holds priority, immediately changing 
our goals and choices about the world.  
                                                 
11
 Another important concept, direct activity is detailed in Chapter 9 of Zombies, 
pp. 140-163.  
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He uses what he calls a ―rabbitoid‖ as an example,12 stating 
that a ―rabbitoid‖ is like a rabbit in all ways, except that sensory 
information does not act on it directly, but through some other 
method. It is difficult to imagine how this would work, but a 
possibility would be that the rabbitoid constantly queries its store 
of knowledge. When a fox comes up from behind a hill, the 
rabbitoid notices a second later during its regular ―scan‖ of its 
knowledge base, and then bounds away, relying on its stored 
model of the environment to navigate. A conscious rabbit has an 
advantage over a non-conscious rabbitoid in that it will 
automatically notice changes in its environment, and will be able 
to alter its immediate goals accordingly, while the rabbitoid would 
always have some sort of delay in action. The very best that a 
rabbitoid could do, would be to constantly re-scan its knowledge 
multiple times per second. This distinction still holds if you 
assume that rabbits do not possess full rational minds; the reflex 
system possessed by a rabbitoid would still function better if 
information about the environment directly affected its system 
instead of it needing to constantly retrieve stored information about 
the world. 
 
The Red Herring of Thought 
I want to interject a bit about conscious thought, and then 
about bats, before returning to consciousness. Thought is often 
considered a very important aspect of being human, and seems 
conflated with consciousness itself. But what happens when we 
think? One might say, we become aware of what‘s going on in our 
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 Ibid. pp. 142. 
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mind, that we ―look inside.‖ I think there‘s a problem with this, 
that our everyday sensation of thought and introspection is too 
naïve, and problematic. Imagine this extremely simplified and kind 
of silly picture of the mind, gained (of course) from introspection: 
there is a sort of ―black box,‖ in which all mental activity occurs. 
This box takes certain 
inputs, many of which are 
―conscious,‖ although 
some are not, and 
produces various outputs. 
These outputs include 
motion, activity, and 
speech, but (here is the 
point) also include 
―thought,‖ which is 
nothing more than aborted 
speech and self-produced 
sensation, re-routed back into the box. On only part of the ―edge of 
the box‖ is the ―membrane of consciousness.‖ In terms of this 
metaphor, things are conscious only as a result of passing through 
this membrane. Our knowledge of our mental activity is known 
only so far as we produce thoughts that are then reintroduced into 
consciousness. The activity within the black box is completely 
unknowable, and can only be inferred from the thoughts produced.  
This is a very flawed picture. Consciousness is not a 
membrane, there is not a line when things ―become conscious‖ in 
the brain. However, the salient point is that introspection is not 
directly accessing or monitoring our mental processes. Instead, 
thought is output that is reintroduced back into the system. This is 
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also flawed in that the reintroduction likely does not happen all at 
the same level—it would be better to imagine the circular arrows 
happening within the box, making loops of various sizes. But 
again, the point is that thought is activity re-routed, not the brain 
actively looking at itself.  
This seems like it would be efficient, more than growing 
some specialized "introspection" capability. If the brain has taken 
the time to create systems dedicated to processing, say, language, it 
makes sense that when we think in terms of language we simply 
route the output of our thoughts, as if we were speaking, back into 
the language processing bits, using the same hardware we‘d use if 
we were hearing, instead of developing a new system to ―monitor‖ 
our thoughts. Similarly, at earlier stages, our ability to remember 
and imagine things significantly overlaps with our capacity to 
sense things, and so it seems reasonable that instead of developing 
a new ―imagination‖ capacity, we rather develop the ability to 
stimulate those systems dedicated to dealing with perception. This 
also explains the sensation of thought, why it actually has a 
―sound,‖ instead of just being abstract activity. 
 
So, What is it Like to be a Bat?  
I assume a bat has sensation, and also consciousness. What 
I mean is, there is something it is ―like‖ to be a bat. Perhaps it 
doesn‘t have active thought, but it makes decisions, and its actions 
are complex and nuanced, reasoned. Nagel asked what it is like to 
be a bat; he, and others, concluded that we cannot know, that the 
life of a bat is fundamentally alien to us.  
But at least attempt to imagine what being a bat is like. The 
problem, initially, and as Nagel stresses, seems to be echolocation, 
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something we have no real analogue for. But this doesn‘t seem 
entirely impossible, merely very difficult. Try this:  
 
Close your eyes (perhaps read the instructions first, or, 
imagine closing your eyes). You can still hear, can you not? With 
your eyes closed, drop something like a book to your desk, and 
notice how you intuit its position from your impression of the 
sound. If you were to reach out, you could grasp it with some 
difficulty. If it were to make noise constantly, you could grasp it 
with near ease. A sharp sound to your left will give you an 
impression of “something” there. With your eyes closed, a man 
walking around a room, or a floor above with a thin ceiling, will 
give you an impression of motion, of presence. Focus on that 
impression of presence, separating it from the sensation of the 
sound itself.  
Now, with your eyes closed, feel out your surroundings. You 
can tell that this is a box, or that is a sphere. You can feel the 
dimensions of your desk, and you have an almost visual 
experience of this the size and shape of things. These sensations 
can be deceptive (how large are your teeth, when sensed with 
your tongue, and then when felt with your fingers?), but that is not 
surprising.  
Imagine the sensation you experience when a noise is heard, 
the sense of location and position. Isolate the feeling of position, 
the feeling of “a presence,” from the sensation of the noise itself, 
that it is a noise. Focus on the feeling of position and presence. 
Now, imagine the sensation of feeling the shape of an object, and 
isolate the impression of the form and size from the feeling of 
touch itself. Merge those feelings of position, as if you were 
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experiencing a thing’s form through a constant torrent of sound, 
where the sensation of any individual sound was drowned out by 
the ubiquity of the torrent, leaving only the feeling of position, 
form, size, and distance. What is there is not the sound, but the 
almost eerie sense of “something there,” the odd itching at your 
back, like the feeling of being watched without experiencing the 
watcher.  
Pretend you were blind, and had to live off of touch and 
sound to navigate, but then were able to somehow merge the 
impression of presence you get from sound, having the sounds 
themselves fade into the background, and then were to combine 
this with the feeling of form and shape gained through touch, 
having the feeling of touch itself be replaced with that background 
noise, extended to the range of your hearing. You would reach out 
constantly, as if touching through sound.  
Nagel would say that this is what it would be like for a 
human to be a bat (and even then, only barely), and would press 
the point, asking what is it like for a bat to be a bat. A human has 
its own beliefs, desires, goals, and so on, and to imagine what a 
bat's internal life is like is impossible since these will always 
interfere with our attempts. However, I feel that you can run into 
the same sorts of problems with asking a question as apparently 
simple as ―what is it like to be yourself?‖ 
First ask, what was it like to be yourself? Imagine yourself 
ten years ago, or even a day ago. How do you do this? Well, you 
extrapolate. I myself at this moment a day ago was bumbling 
about, taking a shower, not really interested in anything, assuming 
I‘d wake up a little in an hour or so and figure out what to do then. 
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Right now I‘m coming off of a long, caffeine-fueled writing 
session. Ten years ago I would be napping on an hour-long bus 
ride; if I was awake at this moment ten years ago, I‘d have been 
just woken up for some reason. Certainly, both of these involve 
being fairly groggy and sleepy, and to that extent I can imagine 
what it would have been like. However, the phenomenal quality of 
each experience is very different. The sleepiness I feel now is very 
different from ten years ago, and it is difficult to evoke that feeling 
in myself because to do so I would need to overwrite my current 
feeling. I cannot remember what it feels like, I can only 
extrapolate, evoke the feeling. 
But is this only because sleepiness is a muddled, vague 
feeling? Consider pains. When I was younger, I stubbed my toe. 
I‘ve done so many times over the years, in fact. And yet can I 
accurately remember what it felt like? No, only that there was an 
accompanying feeling of suffering. If anything, what I remember is 
the suffering, not the pain itself, and even that suffering is 
extrapolated. How I related to pain then is much different than how 
I relate to it now. What I feel when I imagine that pain is not what 
it was like for past me to feel pain, but what it would be like for 
present me to feel past me‘s pain, and only poorly. How different 
is this from trying to think what it‘s like to be a bat? Not 
impossibly so—and it is not a matter of kind, but of degree. It is 
much easier to imagine what it was like to be me feeling pain than 
what it‘s like to be a bat; but neither is perfect.  
What if I asked, what is it like to be you, a second ago? No 
no no, that‘s silly, surely. But pinch yourself. Ow. What was it 
like? Well… it hurt, yes, but can you evoke that sensation again? 
Not really. You can recall the suffering, and what the pain was sort 
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of like, and how it still hurts a little now, but none of that is what it 
was like to be you a second ago, feeling that pain. So what is it like 
to be you, right now? Anytime you try to focus on that, you can 
only evoke the feelings a second later. What it is like to be you is 
constantly slipping away. You can only experience ―what it‘s like‖ 
to be anything, namely you, as it is experienced. To actually feel 
what it‘s like, you need to have the feeling at the moment. This 
also somewhat makes sense evolutionarily—why would we go 
through incredible effort and cost to repeat pleasurable actions if 
we could merely evoke the pleasure in our minds on command?  
That we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat is not so 
surprising when we cannot even imagine what it is like to be 
ourselves. And yet this does not tell us that there was nothing that 
it was like to be ourselves, and it does not tell us that there is 
nothing that it is like to be a bat, and this says nothing about telling 
whether there is a ―what it‘s like‖ for any entity through physical 
observation.
13
 Our memories are not just ―not as vivid,‖ but 
entirely false, constructed. We cannot know the past ―what it‘s 
like,‖ or others‘ ―what it‘s like‖-s, just as we cannot know the 
―what it‘s like‖ for a bat—but we would not deny consciousness to 
our past selves, or to other people.  
 
What is it Like to be a Thermostat? 
To ascribe emotions, desires, or beliefs to a thermostat is 
silly. When I say that a thermostat has experience or sensation, I do 
not mean anything approaching our own experience. As Kirk 
                                                 
13
 A significant amount of this is paraphrased from Kirk (2005), ch. 5, especially 
p. 61-68. 
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would say, we are deciders, we interpret information and make 
decisions based on that information according to goals. A 
thermostat whose setting aligns with the ambient temperature does 
not ―feel content.‖ A thermostat set to a higher temperature does 
not ―desire to make things hotter.‖ A thermostat does not ―believe 
maintaining the temperature is good.‖ A thermostat does not 
perceive, because it does not interpret its sensations, does not work 
with information. Emotions, desires, and beliefs are fantastically 
complex and important aspects of our experience. Some day we 
will make a machine that does experience emotion and desire, and 
have beliefs, but it will be no time soon
14
. This is a reasonable and 
worthy goal, but it is important to realize how difficult it will be. 
So if we cannot say that a thermostat ―desires to make things 
hotter,‖ in what sense does it have an internal experience?  
When I ask ―what is it like to be a thermostat,‖ I‘m 
speaking of something that it is very, very difficult to imagine. It is 
hard enough to imagine what being a dog is like; harder still to 
imagine the life of a slug, and of a bacterium; so when we get 
down to something as bare and simple as a thermostat, we are truly 
a long ways away from our own experience. It is not even enough 
to try to sense things thoughtlessly, as the sensation of a thermostat 
is nothing like ours in any way. A thermostat is simpler even than 
an individual neuron.  
All I mean is that the thermostat ―senses.‖ It senses the 
temperature the same way a protozoon senses light levels and 
moves accordingly, or the same way a bacterium senses a certain 
                                                 
14
 No, I don’t have support for this, but I consider it the same sort of statement as 
“someday we will colonize other planets.” Barring something horrible 
happening, or the discovery of some extreme limiting factor, it seems so.  
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chemical in its environment and stops dividing
15—really it must be 
far more simple than that, but it is the same sort of ―basic reflex‖ 
as a clam closing its shell in response to certain stimuli, or a slug 
retracting a feeler when it touches something rough. In the same 
way that animals have moved from those basic reactions to our 
own, we should attempt a similar project to move from the 
thermostat (well maybe something else) to a conscious being like 
us. What this requires is a move from the ―reflex system with 
acquired conditions‖ to the actual ―decider.‖  
 
Conclusion: Does “Consciousness” Matter When Thinking of 
Artificial Intelligence?  
It depends on what the connotations of ―consciousness‖ are, 
which brings us back to Kirk‘s direct activity. If the difference is 
between having direct activity or not, between being a rabbit or a 
rabbitoid, it seems in fact that consciousness is of no importance, 
and the focus on ―what it‘s like‖ is missing the point. If, instead, 
―consciousness‖ is taken to deal with the difference between 
sensation and perception, between acting on reflex, or making 
judgments, having goals, and so on, then it is obviously of high 
value. A system that can actually analyze the world and make 
judgments will have an advantage over something that acts on 
predefined rules, assuming it is meant to deal with the sorts of 
                                                 
15
 Certain protozoa sense light, and then move their flagella to move toward it, 
but only when it is fairly mild; bright, constant light has no effect. Colonies of 
certain bacteria maintain a size by having each bacterium secrete a chemical, 
and then stop division when the chemical reaches a certain concentration, which 
lines up with a certain population.  
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complex and variable situations that humans and other animals can 
handle.  
In other words, we should not be asking whether computers 
will be conscious; that is a matter of how they relate to 
information. What matters is how they process it, and the 
incidental aspects of consciousness (the instantaneity, the priority) 
should not be taken as essential to having a mind.  
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COULD CONSCIOUSNESS EMERGE FROM A MACHINE 
LANGUAGE? 
 
Genevieve H. Kaess 
Abstract    Behaviorists believe the following: if the output of 
artificial intelligence could pass for human behavior, AI must be 
treated as if it produces consciousness.  I will argue that this is not 
necessarily so.  Behaviorism might be useful in the short term, 
since we do not know what causes consciousness, but in the long 
term it embodies an unnecessary hopelessness.  I will attempt to 
establish in this essay that certain empirical knowledge of 
consciousness is within the realm of possibility.  I will then use my 
own definition of certain knowledge to shed light on ways in 
which computer programming falls short of producing human-like 
consciousness. 
 
I. Introduction 
―The best reason for believing that robots might someday 
become conscious is that we human beings are conscious, and we 
are a sort of robot ourselves.‖1  Daniel Dennett‘s offhand 
introduction to his essay ―Consciousness in Human and Robot 
Minds‖ serves more generally as a summary of popular 
contemporary philosophical thought regarding artificial 
intelligence: it is possible, in theory, because human intelligence is 
                                                 
1Daniel C. Dennett, ―Consciousness in human and robot minds,‖ in Cognition, 
Computation & Consciousness, ed. Masao Io, Yasushi Miyashitatt and Edmund 
T. Rolls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 17. 
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possible.  Human life, and consciousness with it, is no more than 
the machinery of nature.  What remains unclear is to what degree 
(if at all) and in what ways the mechanisms that produce human 
consciousness must be imitated in order to create artificial 
consciousness, and whether knowledge of the creation of artificial 
consciousness can ever be certain.   
In this paper, I will argue that syntactical computer 
modeling is not sufficient for artificial consciousness.  I will 
approach this point by first examining views of philosophers 
(specifically Alan Turing and Hilary Putnam) who have suggested 
behaviorism as the standard by which to judge consciousness in 
artificial life.  I will suggest that although behaviorism provides an 
immediate solution to the problem of other minds, the adoption of 
behaviorism as a long-term solution embodies an unnecessary 
hopelessness regarding certain knowledge of consciousness.  
Applying the same standards for certain knowledge that we do for 
other phenomena, we can come to certain empirical knowledge of 
the causation of consciousness.  The rejection of this claim, I will 
argue, is dualistic.  Finally, using the standards that have 
traditionally been sufficient for certain knowledge, I will explain 
why one specific example (which I will discuss in section V) casts 
doubt on the claim that AI can be achieved through computer 
programming. 
 
II. Definitions 
For simplicity‘s sake, the term ―artificial intelligence‖ (AI) 
will refer, in this paper, to artificial consciousness.  Traditionally, 
consciousness has been deemed an unnecessary (or at least not 
necessarily necessary) condition for artificial intelligence.  On the 
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contrary, I believe intelligence and consciousness to be 
inextricably linked.  Intelligence, by definition, is the capacity to 
learn and understand
2
; understanding is a feature of consciousness.  
Information processing, then, can only be qualified as intelligence 
if it has conscious manifestation.  Consciousness will be 
understood (in this paper) as thoughts and emotions such as 
humans experience them.  I exclude non-human animal 
consciousness from my definition because the goal of AI scientists 
is to produce human-like intelligence (which, by my definition, 
entails human-like consciousness).  By limiting the scope of the 
definition of AI in this way, a more comprehensible argument will 
emerge; current knowledge of the nature of consciousness in other 
organisms is imperfect, and any discussion of it would be based on 
conjecture.   
The science of AI depends on the truth of one basic 
assumption: consciousness is a natural physical process.  There is 
no spiritual realm of thought that exists separately from nature; 
therefore, provided limitless resources and a thorough 
understanding of the mind, we would be able to reproduce it 
artificially.  Computational AI depends on the possibility that this 
can be realized using computer programming.  In this paper, I will 
assume that AI is possible, but I will provide evidence that 
computational AI is not.  Henceforth, ―AI‖ will refer to 
computational artificial consciousness, and ―computational 
                                                 
2
This definitiveness of this definition is disputable.  However, there is no doubt 
that this is one commonly used definition of ―intelligence.‖  Since I am merely 
using it to justify my choice to define AI in the way that I do, and not as a 
premise to any of my arguments, the definitiveness of my chosen definition is of 
little consequence. 
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functionalism‖ will be understood as the philosophical position 
that such AI is obtainable. 
To say that the creation of artificial intelligence can be fully 
realized through computer programming is tantamount to saying 
one of two things: (1) the human mind is itself nothing more than a 
computer
3
 – an information processing tool – or (2) computer 
programming and the mind can produce equivalent cognition 
without holding any additional features in common.  I will discuss 
the second possibility in section VI.  For the most part, 
computational functionalists hold that the first is true: information 
processing is the necessary feature of the mind.  Certainly it is true 
that the human brain has a biological medium distinct from that of 
a computer, but that is all it is: a medium that realizes and supports 
the brain‘s intrinsic informational processing.  Human 
consciousness, they believe, is a feature of the processes, not of the 
medium. 
Computer programming, at its most basic level, is a series 
of 0s and 1s, which answer the question of whether or not various 
features exist.  I will refer to these 0s and 1s as ―computer syntax.‖  
Computer syntax is itself a mechanical feature of the computer, 
which is programmed in by humans.  When prompted, it sets in 
motion a series of mechanical events within the computer that lead 
to the visible output on the screen or, in the case of AI, the 
observable actions of a robot.  The 1s and 0s can be combined in 
very complex ways to produce impressive outcomes.  In the 
1950‘s, the research of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon suggested 
                                                 
3
John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1992). 
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that ―a computer‘s strings of bits could be made to stand for 
anything, including features of the real world, and that its programs 
could be used as rules for relating these features.‖4 
The idea for AI was not born solely of the impressive 
capabilities of computers.  It emerged also from the notion that 
computer programming is the best model for the workings of the 
brain.  Most neurons give and receive signals in short blasts.  They 
operate under an all or nothing principle - either they‘re firing or 
they‘re not.  This is similar to the 1/0 duality of binary code.  AI 
scientists posited that these neuronal impulses could be modeled 
by computer programming to the same effect: intelligence. 
 
III. The Problem of Other Minds 
But how would we know if that happened?  Current 
scientific knowledge does not account for consciousness.  This is 
called the ―problem of other minds,‖ and it is the foundation, as 
well as the limiting factor, for philosophical arguments regarding 
AI: we do not know what exactly consciousness is, and therefore 
we cannot test for it in others.  One can only be certain of one‘s 
own consciousness.  For some philosophers, this is grounds for 
suggesting the adoption of a behavioral standard by which we 
might judge what constitutes intelligence and what does not. 
In his article ―Computing Machinery and Intelligence,‖ 
Alan Turing described his most lasting contribution to philosophy 
– the ―Turing test.‖  Turing devised a game in which two people (a 
man – ―A‖ – and a woman – ―B‖) sit in separate rooms as an 
                                                 
4
 Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial 
Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), x. 
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interrogator questions them.  All identifying features are hidden 
from the interrogator.  His goal is to determine which is the man 
and which the woman; the goal of one of the two competitors is to 
confuse the interrogator and the goal of the other is to help him.  
Turing then posed the question: ―What will happen when a 
machine takes the part of A in this game?‖5  The interrogator now 
must determine which of the two is the machine.  Turing asserted 
that if a machine could win this game as frequently as the typical 
human, it would be unfair to deny that it had consciousness.  After 
all, we do not require proof of consciousness in one another.  Until 
consciousness is de-mystified, Turing believed, we must adopt this 
principle of equity. 
Although the Turing test is not a definitive test for 
consciousness, many have accepted it as the standard.  We do not 
have the knowledge to recognize consciousness in others; therefore 
we are engaging in cognitive chauvinism if we suggest that a 
machine with humanlike cognitive capabilities (insofar as they are 
measurable) lacks consciousness.   Turing‘s solution is pragmatic: 
to avoid prejudice, we must judge consciousness in non-humans in 
the same way we do in humans – behaviorally.6  The strength of 
his position is that it is safe; it makes no conclusive claim about 
what constitutes consciousness, but instead suggests the adoption 
                                                 
5
 A.M. Turing, ―Computing Machinery and Intelligence,‖ Mind 59, no. 236 
(1950): 434. 
6
 I would argue that we do not always usually use behavioral characteristics to 
determine whether other humans are conscious.  Instead, we assume that they 
are conscious (because of their biological status as humans) regardless of 
whether or not they could pass the Turing test.  However, I will grant Turing this 
point, since it is probably true that the reason we assume humans have 
consciousness, even if they cannot pass a Turing test, is because as a general 
rule, humans behave as if they are conscious. 
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of a standard.  
Hilary Putnam expressed slightly stronger opinions in his 
essay, ―Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life‖: we cannot 
expect to gain complete understanding of psychological states by 
studying brain physiology.  ―Psychological laws are only statistical 
… to say that a man and a robot have the same ‗psychology‘ … is 
to say that the behavior of the two species is most simply and 
revealingly analyzed at the psychological level (in abstraction from 
the details of the internal physical structure), in terms of the same 
‗psychological states‘ and the same hypothetical parameters.‖7 For 
example, anger is defined by one‘s claims and actions, not physical 
brain states.  It is identified by behavioral features, not biological 
ones.  This being the case, Putnam contended that ―it is … 
necessary … that one be prepared to accept first-person statements 
by other members of one‘s linguistic community involving these 
predicates, at least when there is no special reason to distrust 
them.‖8 
Putnam constructed the following scenario to illustrate his 
point: suppose that sometime in the future the robots we have 
invented build robots of their own (Putnam calls these 
―ROBOTS‖).  The philosopher robots then sit around debating 
whether or not ROBOTS have consciousness.  This is akin to our 
current actions.  Since we do not understand consciousness, we 
have no less duty to ascribe consciousness to robots than we do to 
one another.  The question of consciousness, Putnam concludes, 
cannot currently be solved.  Whether robots should be treated as if 
                                                 
7
 Hilary Putnam, ―Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life,‖ The Journal 
of Philosophy 61, no. 21 (1964): 677. 
8
 Putnam, Robots, 684. 
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they have consciousness, then, ―calls for a decision and not for a 
discovery.  If we are to make a decision, it seems preferable … to 
extend our concept so that robots are conscious – for 
‗discrimination‘ based on the ‗softness‘ or ‗hardness‘ of the body 
parts of a synthetic ‗organism‘ seems as silly as discriminatory 
treatment of humans on the basis of skin color.‖9 
 The acceptance of a behavioral standard may be the most 
appropriate immediate solution, but Turing and Putnam seem to 
have been content to let it go at that.  Turing declared the concept 
of consciousness ―too meaningless to deserve discussion.‖10  They 
adopted a perplexing stance for philosophers – agnosticism – and 
many contemporary philosophers are happy to follow suit; debate 
over consciousness is not just meaningless, they believe, but 
impossible to resolve.  The turn to behaviorism came not from 
conviction of its worth, but from the lack of a better option.  I will 
argue that such a position of hopelessness is unnecessary; 
consciousness can be known empirically. 
The problem of other minds rests on the assumption that 
consciousness is accessible only through first-hand experience.  
But this is dualistic.  If each person‘s consciousness exists only in a 
special bubble that has no physical manifestation, then it is not 
physical.  To say that consciousness is both material in nature and 
fundamentally undetectable is to make a claim that is dramatically 
inconsistent with contemporary scientific thought.  Substance is 
thought to break down into particles that have both charge and 
extension; if consciousness is material (an assumption required for 
                                                 
9
 Putnam, Robots, 691. 
10
Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence,  442. 
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any form of artificial intelligence), it must be detectable at some 
level if the detector knows where to look for it.  But that is the 
problem: how do we figure out what to look for when we don‘t 
know what to look for?  How do we make the connection between 
objectively viewed matter and that which we experience as 
consciousness? 
 Those who find the problem of other minds unsolvable 
might answer that we need proof, and that proof is impossible.  
First-hand experience cannot provide conclusive evidence 
regarding the nature of consciousness.  Self-reporting is not 
sufficient for understanding of consciousness, because we are 
unaware of the causal mechanisms within our own brains.  
However, it seems to me that if we could thoroughly observe an 
individual‘s brain in conjunction with honest reporting of his 
mental states, we would discover much about the nature of 
consciousness, and perhaps even its causation.  Honesty cannot be 
ensured for any given individual, but given numerous repetitions of 
the experiment and the assumption that most people are honest, 
useful data would emerge.  For example, consider the following: 
the materialist understanding of consciousness requires that it must 
be possible, in theory, to replicate minds. This would be done, 
perhaps, by tweaking one person‘s neurons in various ways until 
the person had the personality, memories, etc. of another; the 
purpose of this exercise would be to learn which changes in the 
features of the brain are necessary for changes in consciousness.
11
  
Depending on how we tweaked the neurons and to what effect, we 
                                                 
11
 Obviously, there are ethical and practical barriers that would prevent the 
manifestation of this scenario, but I intend it only as a hypothetical situation to 
help illustrate my later point. 
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could draw links between brain states and conscious experience, 
from which we could conclusively accept or reject computational 
functionalism. 
One objection might be that hypothetical scenarios like this 
one spawn sticky questions regarding personal identity.
 
  If my 
consciousness changes entirely to that of another person, or even if 
it just changes a little bit, do I really still exist or has my body just 
taken on a new identity?  If I cease to exist, then clearly I cannot 
testify regarding certain knowledge of the change in my 
consciousness, in which case the success of the experiment 
(drawing links between consciousness and brain state) will depend 
on correct behavioral analysis.  If I claim to have experienced a 
change from one personhood to another, in fact it suggests that I 
have not experienced such a change; upon becoming the second 
person, I would lose memory of the first.  Even slight changes 
might be impervious to awareness.  If I lose a memory, for 
example, and all memories of that memory, I cannot know that I 
have lost it.  Self-reporting, even combined with brain observation, 
therefore becomes an inadequate method for the discovery of 
mental causation and third-person reporting of consciousness is not 
definitive.  Furthermore, even if we do establish, using inductive 
reasoning, that a certain change in the brain produces a certain 
change in the nature of consciousness, it still does not speak to 
whether that feature of the brain caused that moment of 
consciousness itself.  The brain might be an intermediate link in 
the consciousness-producing causal chain.  For some philosophers, 
the lack of the plausibility of certain knowledge regarding the 
causation of consciousness is reason enough to dismiss the entire 
question. 
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Those who get caught up on the problem of other minds are 
forgetting one of life‘s early lessons: knowledge of causation in the 
physical world is never certain.  Young children often are 
preoccupied by the question, ―Why?‖ Adults who are grilled by 
these children are usually eventually reduced to the answer, 
―Because that‘s just the way it is.‖  We can superficially 
understand causation, but when we examine our understanding, it 
becomes clear that all we actually do is recognize patterns.  For 
instance, we think we understand why a ball rolls (it was pushed) 
and we think we understand why the push causes the ball to roll 
(the transference of energy).  For many of us, the understanding 
ends there, but an expert in physics might be able to answer the 
question ―why?‖ a few more times.  Even our physics expert, 
however, is eventually forced to concede a lack of understanding.  
You do not wholly understand a cause if you do not understand the 
cause of the cause.  Furthermore, all of these alleged causal 
understandings are actually theories based on induction.  We 
believe that if the ball is pushed (under certain conditions), it will 
roll.  But that belief is based on our repeated observation of this 
phenomenon.  We have merely recognized a pattern, and 
concluded from it a causal relationship.  Humans are only capable 
of identifying correlation.  Causation is supposed, never known.
12
 
Furthermore, we assume similarity in internal structure in 
entities that display similar characteristics.  If a rat is born of a rat, 
looks like a rat and acts like a rat, we feel certain that it has internal 
organs much like those of other rats and we will come to 
                                                 
12
 David Hume, ―An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,‖ in Modern 
Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources, Second Edition, ed. Roger Ariew 
and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009). 
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conclusions based on this assumption.  We believe in those 
conclusions with such absolute certainty that we bet our lives on 
them; rats are often used to test products to determine their safety 
for humans.  If we truly believed extreme variation in the physical 
nature of rats possible, such tests would be worthless.  Induction is 
by its nature uncertain, but humans trust it. 
If we adopt a standard for consciousness in the name of 
objectivity, but refuse to accept that the causation of consciousness 
can be understood empirically, we have, in fact, failed to view the 
situation objectively.  As the example of the rolling ball 
demonstrated, inductive correlative reasoning is good enough to 
use to identify other causal physical relationships.  In the case of 
the rolling ball, we have come to the inductive conclusion that 
pushing the ball causes it to roll.  If we repeatedly observe that a 
certain brain state corresponds to a certain mental characteristic, it 
is fair to assume causation, just as we assume that it is the push 
that causes a ball to roll, not that the push was an intermediate link 
in the causal chain
13
.  Correlative evidence can demonstrate a link 
(or lack thereof) between brain physiology and consciousness.  
This evidence can be used to make conclusive claims about the 
nature and causation of consciousness. 
Of course, the problem is that we have not yet accumulated 
enough correlative evidence to make conclusive claims about the 
causation of consciousness.  But the situation is not hopeless.  By 
adopting a position of behaviorism, one approaches this problem 
                                                 
13
 Additionally, if brain states are intermediate links in the causality of 
consciousness, then it is unlikely that syntactical modeling would produce 
consciousness, since it models a feature of brain states and would therefore be 
modeling an intermediate step. 
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from the wrong angle.  If you turn to robots for the answer to the 
question of consciousness, you are looking in the wrong place.  
Clearly, one cannot look into a robot to determine whether or not it 
has consciousness.  That would be like trying to determine whether 
something plays music without any knowledge or understanding of 
the nature of music.  A more practical course of action is to look 
for the root of consciousness, and to do that, it is far wiser to look 
where we assume it does exist (in humans) than where we are 
trying to create it (robots). 
 
IV. On Correlation 
 Correlation can be used in two ways.  First, as I have 
suggested, positive correlation can lead to valid causal claims.  If a 
light turns on every time I flip a functioning light switch, I might 
make the inductive claim that flipping a functional light switch 
causes a light to turn on.  Induction is useful, but not a logically 
strong form of reasoning.  It might be, for example, that one cause 
has two effects, and I correlate the two effects to each other rather 
than to their mutual cause.  For example, a faulty light switch 
might produce a spark immediately after I flip it, just before the 
light turns on.  I might induce that the spark causes the light to turn 
on.  This would have the same inductive validity as the claim that 
flipping the switch turns on the light, but it would not be correct. 
 Negative correlation, however, is logically conclusive.  
Only one instance of the correlation of A and B is required to 
disprove the conditional statement, ―If A, then not B.‖  For 
example, the belief that no dogs bite humans can be disproved by 
the single instance of a dog biting a human.  If use of computer 
programming to produce AI tends to have human-like results in 
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behavior, the behaviorist might inductively conclude that the two 
are equivalent and computational functionalism correct.  However, 
it takes only one demonstration that the brain and the computer, 
given equivalent structural changes, produce different results to 
show that, at the very least, our current programming provides a 
flawed model of the brain. 
 
V. Implications for Artificial Intelligence 
In Section III, it was established that the search for the root 
of consciousness need not be futile so long as one is looking in the 
right place: the human brain.  When we pose the question of 
whether AI might produce consciousness, it is important to recall 
that most of the initial hope for AI stemmed from its similarity to 
brain processes.  Neurons send signals to one another with short 
blasts of energy, which is in some ways similar to how computers 
process binary code.  However, it is important to note that this is 
not strictly true.  Not all neurons fire in short bursts; some send 
longer signals not accounted for by computer syntax.  Additionally, 
neurons exist in a net, whereas binary programming is linear.  In 
his book What Computers Still Can‘t Do, Hubert Dreyfus 
described the problem of ―know-how.‖  When a person becomes an 
expert at a task, he no longer needs to think through all the steps of 
the task, but rather the proper course of action is immediately 
obvious.  For example, a master chess player does not have to 
think through the rules of the game before making a move, but 
rather sees the position of the pieces on the board and knows 
instantly what to do.  By contrast, the more data the computer 
chess player has about the game of chess, the more information it 
will have to analyze before making a move.  Although, in general, 
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consciousness alone is a poor means for understanding underlying 
mental causation, in this case it was indicative of an underlying 
mechanism.  Neuroscientists have explained the ―know-how‖ 
phenomenon by the fact that when two neurons are simultaneously 
excited, the connection between them is strengthened.
14
  Newer 
models of AI (―connectionist‖ models) have incorporated links like 
these into programming, but they are poor models for neural nets.  
Ultimately, even connectionist programming boils down to binary 
code. 
For the sake of argument, however, let us grant that 
neuronal impulses are the source of consciousness and that binary 
code is a decent model for them.  The question now is whether 
being a model is good enough to produce consciousness, or if there 
is some further biological feature necessary.  For binary code to 
model neuronal information processing, one must be able to 
imagine that at any given moment, the neurons of the brain can be 
mapped syntactically.  The alteration of patterns in binary code 
must produce output to the alteration of neuronal patterns.  A 
recent study led by Mriganka Sur casts doubt on the causal nature 
of brain structure.  Sur and his colleagues performed surgery on 
newborn ferrets,
15
 so that each had one eye that sprouted 
connections into the part of the brain that is generally dedicated to 
hearing (rather than into the visual thalamus and visual cortex).  
                                                 
14
 Dreyfus, Hubert L. What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial 
Reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. 
15
 Granted, I stated at the beginning of this paper that I was not going to tackle 
the notion of animal consciousness.  However, the scientific community often 
extrapolates findings concerning animal physiology to humans, and I am 
assuming that this study is accurate in suggesting that there would be similar 
findings if we were to perform this study in humans. 
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There was no resulting change in the ferrets; they continued to see 
with the affected eyes, using the auditory portions of their brains.
16
  
An immediate change in neuronal patterns (and in our imaginary 
syntax which we have mapped onto the brain) produces no change 
in consciousness.  This suggests plasticity of consciousness that is 
not observed in the output of AI.  By comparison, it is difficult to 
believe that significant change in syntax would not produce 
observable change in computer function.  In other words, in the 
case of computer syntax, there is a conditional relationship: if there 
is considerable change in syntax, there will be change in output.
17
  
For neurons, we have seen the equivalent conditional statement 
disproved.  Here we have established lack of correlation between 
the result of neuronal behavior and that of syntactical 
programming; at the very least, we must conclude that current 
efforts to use computer syntax to model brain functions are 
fundamentally flawed.  Just as a fundamental change in a recipe 
would not necessarily produce an observable change in outcome, 
but would very likely do so, this does not prove that syntax does 
not produce consciousness, but it suggests as much. 
 
VI. Discussion 
We have established that if neuronal impulses and 
syntactical programming each produce consciousness, they must 
                                                 
16
 Alva Noe, Out of our Heads: Why You are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons 
from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009),  53-54. 
17
 One possible response to my argument would be a rejection of this claim.  I 
am not a computer scientist, so I cannot say with absolute certainty that such a 
response would be unfounded.  However, I think it is undisputable that if the 
syntax experienced the same degree of change as the neuronal impulses in this 
example, there would be noticeable change. 
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do it in different ways.  Stalwart defenders of AI might claim that 
this is possible: that AI and the brain are fundamentally different 
from one another, yet produce equally valid consciousness.  To 
defend themselves, they would likely revert to the problem of other 
minds.  However, as I have already claimed, the problem of other 
minds should be dismissed as subjective.  The claim that 
consciousness could be formed in two completely different ways 
is, first and foremost, unrealistic.  It stems, I believe, from the 
belief that consciousness is spiritual – that it rises above and 
inhabits the physical world.  If we instead accept consciousness for 
what it is – a biological phenomenon – it seems no more likely that 
computer programming (having proved dissimilar to the brain in 
every important way) could produce it than any other biological 
phenomenon (e.g. photosynthesis).  Furthermore, if we reject the 
spiritual view of consciousness, yet accept that consciousness 
could be produced in a way that does not model the workings of 
the brain, we have no basis to judge what is conscious and what is 
not.   The notion of consciousness becomes meaningless. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that there is good reason to 
believe that syntax based AI does not produce consciousness. 
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SPATIAL INFORMATION AND DIAGRAMS 
 
Meghan Ertl-Bendickson 
 
[This paper received the 2011 Jakob Laub Prize in Philosophy.] 
 
Introduction 
In recent times, it has become undesirable to use diagrams 
in logical proofs. Logical proofs, even in geometry, are ideally 
purely formal representations. Recent experiments by David 
Kirshner and David Landy, however, have shown that the way in 
which we physically arrange symbols on a page when we write a 
formula affects whether or not we compute it correctly. 
Specifically, we normally place multiplied (or divided) terms 
closer together than added (or subtracted) terms – following the 
order of operations. The operations which are supposed to be 
performed first are placed physically closer together than those 
which are done later (I shall refer to this as the ―Rule of Spacing‖). 
When formula are written inconsistent with this rule, people make 
more computational errors. Landy claims that this implies, through 
his ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis and his ―syntax‖ hypothesis, that 
there are diagrammatic elements to our formal representations. I 
argue that even if these spatial relations are diagrammatic, it is not 
a problem for logic the way using a conventional diagram would 
be. However, while I agree that these results are very important 
and need to be discussed, I argue that these spatial relationships are 
not actually diagrammatic. 
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Why Diagrams are Problematic for Logic and Math 
Before we can examine Kirshner and Landy's results, we 
need to understand some background information about diagrams 
and why, exactly, it is no longer considered acceptable to use them 
in logical proofs. Diagrams were originally developed, in the times 
of Ancient Greece, for use in cartography and to find ways to 
accurately measure spaces and distances. This means that the first 
diagrams were meant to describe contingent, extensional properties 
of the real world. ―Geometry as a discipline originated in the need 
to solve problems concerned with distances and areas in surveying 
and cartography. Its subject matter was therefore the physical 
features of the world, and the logical relationship its conclusions 
bore to these features was therefore contingent, akin to that of any 
physical theory.‖ 1 They were used to deal with specific instances 
in space and time, for instance mapping a real landscape in a 
particular area. Geometry developed out of these issues.  
However, it has since become something quite different. A 
critical change came when Descartes presented to us a way to 
describe geometric diagrams algebraically, allowing us to convert 
diagrams into formal representations.
2
 This was beneficial to the 
study of geometry in a number of ways. It allowed geometry to 
directly profit from advances made in the rest of mathematics, so 
that if a new discovery were made elsewhere it could be applied to 
geometry, as well. It also solved the issue, which had been 
recognized for many, many years, that relying too completely on a 
diagram can cause error solely because the actual diagrams we 
                                                 
1
 Greaves, Mark. 2002. The philosophical status of diagrams. (Stanford, Calif: 
CSLI Publications), 77 
2
 Ibid., 78 
 165 
 
draw are fallible. No drawing of a triangle is ever going to be a 
perfect triangle, so basing your calculations on a specific drawing 
of a triangle can cause mistakes. Working instead with the algebra 
allows us to talk about ―perfect‖ geometric shapes, without having 
to worry about whether our diagrams are accurate. Finally, though, 
Descartes allowed us to begin to discuss things that are not 
visualizable or intuitable. Geometry was no longer restricted to the 
domain of things that humans are capable of visualizing. We can 
talk, now, of 5-dimensional objects, or shapes with more sides than 
we can picture, etc. This final point makes it clear that geometry 
had begun to move away from its original purpose – the study of 
the real world and extensional, contingent spaces.
3
  
Another shift came with the discovery of Non-Euclidean 
geometry. ―After this discovery, it was unclear whether the 
theorems of geometry could even be considered to be true of 
objects of the world, let alone descriptive of their necessary 
properties, because of the uncertainty about the world's actual 
geometry.‖ 4 Now there were actual aspects of geometry that 
specifically did not relate to our experience of the world. In fact, 
we were now left a little uneasy about the exact nature of our 
world – what kind of geometry do we actually have? We had 
assumed that there was only this one type of geometry based on 
rules which govern the real world. But now we could see that there 
were others, which follow different rules, leaving us unsure as to 
which one we actually live in. And for those types of geometry that 
do not represent our world, no diagram could now be of use to us. 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 78 
4
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Diagrams had at one point been essential to the study of geometry, 
but since then the development of geometry itself has tended in a 
direction in which diagrams can no longer be of substantive use.  
Greaves discusses a number of the fundamental reasons 
diagrams cannot serve a real purpose in logical proofs. The first 
involves the ―requirement of indeterminacy of interpretation.‖5 
Basically, diagrams inherently impose one interpretation on a 
problem, but there may be others. Using solely formal 
representations keeps us from becoming biased towards one 
particular interpretation. The second reason is slightly more subtle 
and more pertinent to our present discussion. Logicians, 
mathematicians, etc have wanted very much to keep psychological 
processes out of our rules of reasoning. ―...the consensus among 
nineteenth-century mathematicians that proofs in any sort of 
mathematics be free of any dependency on facts unique to our 
particular psychology...‖6 Logic is meant to be objectively true, 
independent of particular human cognition. If the rules of logic are 
based on a particular human psychological process, then it 
functions only for human beings, not for the objective world. 
Further, if a rule of logic is based on a quirk of human cognition, 
we cannot be entirely sure it is true. We want to describe the world 
as it objectively is, not the world as we subjectively experience it.  
The most fundamental problem for diagrams, however, has 
to do with a very basic assumption of logic. A logical proof is 
meant to be as broad as possible. A proof is not valid if it works 
only for one particular instance on one particular day, or if it 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 80 
6
 Ibid., 80 
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functions only for one discipline but not others. ―A single 
fundamental principle has been at the center of the way that 
logicians from Aristotle to Frege have structured their accounts – 
namely, that the scope of a legitimate logical theory should be as 
broad and general as possible...logic should not be artificially 
limited in its domain of applicability, and thus it should attempt to 
model whatever is common about reasoning broadly conceived, 
however small that common fraction may be.‖ 7 We do not want 
one system of logic for biology, one for chemistry, and another for 
philosophy. Logic is meant to be a tool applied across all 
disciplines to make sure that all disciplines are consistent with the 
real world, not just with our own thoughts. Greaves calls this the 
principle of maximal scope. Diagrams, we have seen, were 
developed for a purpose in direct opposition to this. Diagrams were 
meant to describe specific, contingent instances, not broad 
axiomatic laws. This makes diagrams fundamentally at odds with 
the aim of logic.  
 
Visual Elements in Formal Representations 
So, we can see now why it has seemed so important to 
remove all aspects of diagram from our formal representations. 
Diagrams are contingent, so any diagrammatic element of a formal 
representation is a potential weakness to the proof. It is a point at 
which we cannot be sure the proof is following the principle of 
maximal scope or that it is detached from our psychological 
processes. Kirshner and Landy's experiments, however, highlight 
the possibility of just such an element. When we write a formula 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., 194 
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on the page, certainly that is a visual object. We may call it 
'writing' instead of 'drawing', but we must admit that both are 
visually processed and involve spatial relationships on the page. So 
we need to clearly distinguish what makes something a formal 
representation on a page, and what makes it a diagram.  
Landy describes two distinctions that have been made. The 
first is the concept of the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic 
representations. Diagrams are intrinsic representations, because the 
truth I am trying to show with my diagram is intrinsic to the 
diagram itself. I can draw a diagram illustrating that line A is 
longer than line B by drawing one line longer than the other – the 
difference in lengths of the lines is inherent to the drawing. In a 
formula, however, all of the symbols involved are arbitrary. The 
truth I am trying to show is extrinsic to the symbols I make – when 
I say 1+1=2, nothing about any of those squiggles on the page is 
inherently related to the numbers involved or the process of 
addition. The drawing of the lines, on the other hand, is not 
arbitrary.
8
  
Another way of getting at this difference is to say that 
diagrams are direct representations, whereas formal representations 
are indirect. The formula 1+1=2 is indirect because I arrive at the 
truth of the statement only through knowledge of outside laws 
(what the symbol '1' means, what the rule of addition is, etc). But 
in the diagram of the lines, the truth directly shown to me through 
the symbols involved. I need no outside knowledge (besides 
knowing the definition of 'longer') to understand what is being 
                                                 
8
 Landy, David, and Robert L. Goldstone. 2007. "Formal notations are diagrams: 
Evidence from a production task". Memory & Cognition. 35 (8): 2033. 
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stated.
9
 What both of these theories are getting at is the idea of 
arbitrariness. Formal representations are arbitrary, diagrams are 
not. So in order to decide whether something is diagrammatic or 
formal using these definitions, we have to ask whether it is 
arbitrary, direct, and intrinsic.  
Landy aims to show that there are diagrammatic elements 
to formal representations by showing how the spatial relationships 
between our arbitrary symbols on the page reflect the processes 
going on in our calculations and also how making those 
relationships differ from our norm causes us to make errors. ―…the 
rule system that governs the interpretation of formal systems carry 
functional spatial information – in other words, they are 
diagrammatic.‖ 10 Before Landy published his papers, Kirshner11  
published a paper examining the curious fact that when people 
write out formulas, they place operands closer together or farther 
apart in reflection of the order of operations. So, 1+2x3=7 tends to 
be written 1 + 2x3 = 7, with the multiplied terms placed spatially 
closer together on the page than the added terms. He wished to see 
if this spatial grouping affected the way we compute, or in other 
words, if these spatial relationships inform the steps we take to 
solve an equation.
12
  
To do this, Kirshner made a system called a Nonce 
Notation, which is a system of arithmetic completely divorced 
from any of the symbols we currently use. This Nonce Notation 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 2033 
10
 Ibid., 2038 
11
 Kirshner, David. 1989. "The Visual Syntax of Algebra". Journal for Research 
in Mathematics Education. 20 (3): 274-287. 
12
 Ibid., 287 
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had two difference versions. The first was ―unspaced‖, the second 
was ―spaced‖. The unspaced version had nothing in common with 
our current notation, the spaced version was exactly the same as 
unspaced, except following this Rule of Spacing we apparently 
use. So the two systems were thus: 
 
Current Unspaced Spaced 
a+b aAb a  A  b 
a-b aSb a  S  b 
axb aMb a M b 
a/b aDb a D b 
a^b aEb aEb 
b aRb aRb 
 
In the spaced version, the operations which are supposed to be 
performed first are placed closer together than those which should 
be performed last, just like what we tend to do when writing in our 
own notational system.
13
  
Kirshner took a group of highschool students and first 
tested them on how well they understood math in our current 
notational system. Those who made minimal errors on the test then 
went on to take the same type of test, except using the Nonce 
Notation. The first test was unspaced, the second was spaced. 
These were students who understood the laws of math and the 
order of operations, so any mistakes they made would mostly be 
due to having trouble with the new notation. He compared the 
scores of the first, unspaced test to the scores of the spaced test and 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 277 
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found that indeed, students did much better when the notation was 
spaced. Since the only difference between the two was the spacing, 
it had to be the spacing itself which made their scores go up.
14
 This 
spacing, which is reflective of the order of operations, does seem 
to inform our calculations. It is not irrelevant.  
David Landy did a series of experiments to follow through 
on these findings. In his first experiment, he tested how well 
people could judge the truth of a statement when the spacing of it 
was inconsistent (meaning, when the statement did not follow the 
Rule of Spacing). So he asked people (in his case, college 
students), whether a series of statements were true or false. Some 
were consistent (i.e., does  ―axb  +  cxd‖ necessarily equal ―cxd  +  
axb‖? For which the answer is yes), and some were inconsistent 
(i.e., does ―a+b  x  c+d‖ necessarily equal ―c+d  x  a+b‖? For 
which the answer is no). He found that people made six times as 
many errors when the spacing was inconsistent.
15
 Inconsistent 
spacing apparently interferes with people‘s ability to judge the 
truth of a statement. 
Next, Landy tested whether people really do consistently 
add these spacings to statements when they write or type them out. 
First he wrote out formulas in words (so, ―one plus one equals 
two‖) and asked his participants to write the same formula out in 
symbols (―1+1=2‖). He found that people did indeed place 
multiplied items closer together than added items.
16
 Thinking 
perhaps this was a quirk of handwriting having something to do 
with the length of time it takes a person to think about the formula 
                                                 
14
 Ibid., 282 
15
 Landy, Formal Notations as Diagrams, 2034 
16
 Ibid., 2034 
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(meaning perhaps the gaps were due to a pause in thought), he 
tested whether the same would happen when typing on a computer. 
This time, participants were asked to convert English sentences 
into logical symbols (―if Jack is happy, then Jill is happy‖ would 
then become ―A → B‖). Again, however, people left spaces 
between groups reflective of the order of operations. So the 
spacing was present whether the formal sentences were 
handwritten or typed.
17
  
Lastly, Landy tested how spacing affects people's ability to 
correctly solve formulae.  First he had them solve simple 
expressions with just one operator – so, 1+1, or 2x3. Again, these 
were either consistently or inconsistently spaced. He found that the 
spacing mattered mainly for addition. For formulae where addition 
was the operator, when the spacing was wider than normal 
participants tended to overestimate, but when the spacing was 
narrow, they tended to underestimate (Proximity, 13). The last 
experiment involved compound computations, with more than one 
operator (i.e. 1+2x3=7). He found that inconsistent spacing led to 
errors in selecting the correct operation – operands placed closer 
together tended to be multiplied and operands placed farther apart 
tended to be added regardless of what the operator actually was.
18
  
Landy proposed hypotheses to explain these phenomena 
beyond simply ascribing it to reflecting the order of operations. He 
wanted to say that this is not just a representation of the rule itself, 
but rather a spatial reflection of the cognitive processes that we use 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., 2036 
18
 Landy D., and Goldstone R.L. 2010. "Proximity and Precedence in 
Arithmetic". Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 63 (10): 1953-
1968, 18 
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to follow the rule. For the simple expressions, he proposed what he 
called the ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis. He speculated that we all 
have a ―mental number line‖ in our heads and when we do addition 
(but not multiplication), we start at the first number and ―move‖ 
ourselves along the line the required number of steps and then see 
where we end up.
19
 So for 1+1=2, I would start at one on my 
mental number line and then take one step forward. I see that I 
landed at two, and therefore know that the answer is two. But when 
spacing is abnormally wide or narrow, it influences my perception 
of the question so that I overestimate or underestimate the correct 
response, respectively. Thus the spacing of the formula on the page 
is a visual representation of the act of walking along my mental 
number line. 
For the compound expressions, Landy offers a somewhat 
more subtle explanation. He claims that when terms are grouped 
closer together, it is a spatial representation of how syntactically 
bound together they are (I shall call this the ―syntax‖ hypothesis). 
―...if, as we suggest, understanding formal symbol structures 
typically involves spatial resources, then symbolic productions 
might be expected to reflect syntactic structure: The less tightly 
two adjacent terms are bound syntactically, the farther apart they 
should be placed physically.‖ 20 In the expression 1+2x3, 2 and 3 
are more tightly syntactically bound than 2 and 1, so I place 2 
closer to 3 than to 1 as a visual representation of that tightness.  
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 Ibid., 10 
20
 Landy, Formal Notations as Diagrams, 2034 
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The Rule of Spacing and the Principle of Maximal Scope 
If these are in fact diagrammatic elements in our formal 
representation, we have to ask what this shows. We have striven to 
remove diagrams from our computations and proofs because 
historically, diagrams were meant to represent contingent objects, 
relations, etc. Because they are contingent, they cannot follow the 
principle of maximal scope, which means whenever possible we 
should avoid them in order to keep our math and logic as broad as 
is possible. The other problem with the Rule of Spacing is that they 
seem to represent, according to Landy's hypotheses, our cognitive 
processes. We have tried hard to remove any psychological factors 
from math and logic, because, again, we do not want math or logic 
to be contingent on the human mind. Theoretically, another species 
ought to be able to use logic exactly the way we do. It ought not to 
work only for human beings.  
However, we cannot just reject the Rule of Spacing solely 
because it is diagrammatic. We need to ask whether this is indeed a 
weakness, whether it does fall prey to the above problems. I argue 
that if these tendencies are diagrammatic, they do in fact still 
follow the principle of maximal scope exactly the same way that 
any arbitrary, formal representation would, and thus are not in fact 
a problem we ought to eliminate. These diagrams are of a different 
sort than, say, a drawing of a triangle. Yes, they are a reflection of 
the cognitive processes we use to solve equations, but so is the plus 
sign or the equals sign. These things are symbolic ways of 
communicating the steps we take to solve an equation, and if they 
are standardized, the way the equals sign is, we eliminate most the 
problems psychological interference might cause. They are not 
representations of contingent, extensional objects or relations in 
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the material world like our diagrams in cartography were. So while 
we have diagrammatic elements in our formal representations, it is 
not problematic in the same way. 
 
Why the Rule of Spacing Does Not Yield Diagrams 
I do not, however, fully support the idea that these are 
diagrammatic elements – specifically because of the differences 
between them and conventional diagrams mentioned above. 
Certainly they are visual and imagistic. But not all images are 
necessarily diagrams – all of our arbitrary symbols we use in 
formal notations are also imagistic in that they communicate their 
information visually. The distinction we have made is that 
diagrams are direct and intrinsic. For the ―longer is larger‖ 
hypothesis, there could be ways to directly represent that. If we do 
perform addition by walking a ―mental number line‖, a direct 
representation of this would involve making the spaces between 
symbols bigger for formulas in which the numbers involved are 
bigger; so we might have 1+1=2, and 3    +    5    =    8. This is a 
direct representation of our mental number line: we have to go 
further down it to get to 8 than we do to get to 2, so the formula 
directly represents this by spacing the numbers farther apart.  
But this is not what Landy shown. In fact, what he has 
shown is the exact opposite. He proved that there is a common 
distance we put between the symbols, and that when that distance 
is inconsistent, it throws us off and we come up with the wrong 
answer. This may be proof that we are walking a mental number 
line and that that is how we do addition, but it is not proof that the 
Rule of Spacing is diagrammatic. We have a consistent distance, 
and any deviation from that distance is problematic. So while the 
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spatial relations of the symbols on the page are important, they are 
not any sort of direct representation, and thus are not 
diagrammatic.  
For the ―syntax‖ hypothesis, there is more of a sense in 
which the spatial relationships Landy found are direct. We are 
saying that two terms are closer together syntactically, and so we 
place them physically closer together on the page. This seems like 
a direct representation, or at least, it certainly does not seem 
arbitrary. However, the idea of two things being ―more tightly 
syntactically bound‖21 is not a reference to a spatial relationship in 
the first place. The word ―close‖ is misleading – we are referring 
here to a different kind of closeness. Saying two things are closer 
syntactically is different than saying Minneapolis is closer to 
Chicago than to Paris. There is no real physical distance involved 
in syntax, and there never could be, because syntax is not a 
physical object to begin with.  
What do we mean by ―syntactic closeness‖, then? We may 
say that being ―more tightly bound‖ is referring to temporal 
distance, in that the terms are more tightly bound because they are 
dealt with first and are therefore temporally closer together 
(―tighter‖), but then we are right back to referring directly to the 
order of operations. They are only temporally closer together 
because the rule of the order of operations says they should be, and 
if these spacings are only reflective of our rule, then they are most 
certainly not diagrammatic, unless we want to say that parentheses 
(which are also only reflective of the order of operations) are also 
diagrammatic. The spacing would then only be an arbitrary symbol 
                                                 
21
 Ibid., 2034 
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of the rule, the same way that addition and multiplication symbols 
are arbitrary symbols of their own respective rules. If we think 
about the order of operations and what it actually says, there is 
nothing about physical closeness that directly implies it the way 
saying a diagram represents that line A is shorter than line B 
because I have physically drawn line A shorter than line B. The 
Rule of Spacing, as a representation of the order of operations, is 
intuitively helpful, but not intrinsic. Again, for these spacings to be 
diagrammatic and not merely imagistic, they have to represent 
something in a direct way, and for these reasons if they are only 
representative of the order of operations, they do not.  
Taking a step back, we have to further note that Landy has 
not in fact proved either the ―longer is larger‖ hypothesis or the 
―syntax‖ hypothesis. He has shown that the spatial relationships 
between the symbols on the page affect the way we compute 
formulae. He has not shown why this is the case – that would 
require a whole different type of experiment. These two 
hypotheses might be plausible explanations, but they have not yet 
been proven or even strongly supported. Perhaps the Rule of 
Spacing is only a symbol of the order of operations, and thus 
arbitrary. Perhaps it is not indicative of some deeper cognitive 
process. Again, we use parentheses in algebra to help us follow the 
order of operations, and we do not consider those to be 
diagrammatic, even though they (like any other symbol, even the 
numbers) are visual.  
The underlying point here is that just because something is 
visual does not mean it is diagrammatic. The requirement for 
something to be diagrammatic, by Landy's own standards, is that it 
is direct and intrinsic. In order for him to support his claim that 
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there are diagrammatic elements to formal representations, he 
needs not only to prove that the way symbols are arranged on the 
page affects the way we think, but also that the spatial relations 
involved are direct representations and not merely arbitrary 
symbols. Without this second step, all he has shown is that 
formulae are imagistic and that there is an aspect of that trait that 
affects the way we compute that we have not yet acknowledged. 
 
The Import of the Data 
I am not, however, dismissing the findings of Kirshner and 
Landy as insignificant. I believe it is still highly important to 
examine what their results mean. The issue I see for the disciplines 
of mathematics and logic is not that we have diagrams in our 
formal representations, but rather that we have implicit rules at 
play. It seems that an undiscussed rule has developed and been 
passed from teacher to student, and that it is powerful enough to 
cause people to make computational errors when it is disobeyed. 
Why the rule developed in the first place, which is what Landy is 
discussing with his two hypotheses, is an important and interesting 
question, but not necessarily relevant to mathematicians, logicians 
or philosophers. For those disciplines, the fact that the rule exists is 
the crux of the issue.  
There are two ways we may address the Rule of Spacing: 
We may either actively suppress it, which requires explicit 
discussion of its existence and then for teachers to make certain 
they are not subconsciously passing it on to their students; or it 
needs to be defined and standardized, the same as the rule of 
addition or the order of operations. Without doing either of these, 
our psychological processes are interfering with our computations 
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in exactly the way we fear. The math or logic we do is being 
influenced by subconscious mental processes, and there may be 
differences in this from person to person. Perhaps what is ―close 
together‖ or ―far apart‖ for one person is different for another, and 
so when that first person writes out a formula in what they think is 
consistent with the Rule of Spacing, it is inconsistent for the 
second person, causing them to make a computational error. But if 
we make the rule explicit, perhaps standardize the distances 
between operands and particular operators, then this would 
hopefully minimize the interference of our own subjective 
psychologies.  
There are, as Landy points out
22
, a number of benefits to 
this rule, such that perhaps we ought not to bemoan its presence. 
The fact of the matter is that we are not purely linguistic beings. 
We also necessarily process information through our senses, since 
that is how we acquire it. This is unavoidable. For the purposes of 
written logic and mathematics, this means we process the 
information visually as well as linguistically. So incorporating 
visual elements into our rules might make it easier for us to process 
the information we are trying to convey. Particularly, when we first 
teach a student arithmetic, making the order of operations a spatial 
as well as a syntactic rule might make it easier to remember and 
follow. This would minimize the number of mistakes we make 
when computing formulae and help us learn faster.  
In fact, the rule could be helpful for teachers as well as 
students.
23
 If we had such a visual rule representing the steps we 
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took to compute a formula, a teacher could more easily see why a 
student got the wrong answer on a test or assignment. If a student 
writes 2  x  2+3=10, it is most likely that he or she did not follow 
the order of operations correctly and thus the teacher can much 
more easily correct and instruct him or her. On the other hand, if 
the student writes 2x2  +  3=10, it is of course still possible that he 
or she does not understand the rule of operations, but it is also 
more possible that there is some other error responsible. Basically, 
this visual rule is a way of representing the steps we took to solve 
an equation, the same way we use parentheses. So, it can 
communicate more efficiently to a teacher whether a student 
correctly understands the rule.  
 
Conclusion 
For many years, logicians and mathematicians have worked 
to remove diagrams from logical proofs and formulae for the 
reason that diagrams, due to the nature of their origins, do not 
follow the principle of maximal scope. We have drawn a strict 
distinction between diagrams, which are intrinsic and direct, and 
formal representations, which are extrinsic and indirect, or 
arbitrary. Kirshner and Landy, among others, have rather 
convincingly shown, however, that there are relevant spatial 
relationships to our formal representations – mainly, we tend to 
spatially represent the order of operations by placing physically 
closer together those operations which ought to be performed first. 
Landy explains these tendencies using what he calls the ―longer is 
larger‖ hypothesis in simple expressions, and what I have called 
the ―syntax‖ hypothesis in compound expressions. Because these 
spatial relationships so strongly affect the way we compute, Landy 
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claims they are diagrammatic.  
I argue that if this were so, these diagrammatic elements 
would in fact follow the principle of maximal scope and therefore 
not be a problem the way a diagram of a triangle, for instance, is. I 
further argue, however, that even though the Rule of Spacing is 
visual and imagistic, it is not diagrammatic because the way it 
represents the information it is conveying is not direct or intrinsic. 
Regardless, the Rule of Spacing is currently an unacknowledged 
rule affecting the way we compute, which is problematic and needs 
to be addressed.   
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EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
COMPUTER PROOF 
 
Drew Van Denover 
 
Abstract     Some mathematical theorems can be proven only with 
the help of computer programs. Does this reliance on computers 
introduce empirics into math, and thereby change the nature of 
proof? I argue no. We must distinguish between the warrant the 
proof gives for its conclusion, and our knowledge of that warrant. 
A proof is a priori if and only if the conclusion follows deductively 
from the premises without empirical justification. I start by 
defending this definition, and proceed to demonstrate that 
computer-generated proofs meet its criterion.  
 
For more than one hundred years, mathematicians tried and 
failed to produce a valid mathematical proof of the ―Four Color 
Theorem‖, or 4TC. First proposed in 1852, the 4TC conjecture 
remained unproven until Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken 
published their solution in 1976. Debate immediately erupted 
about the legitimacy of their methods. Unlike every previous 
proof, Appel and Haken‘s work made ineliminable use of a 
computer program. Their knowledge of the 4TC depended on the 
operations of a physical machine—apparently introducing 
empirical elements into mathematics, the purest a priori science. 
Thomas Tymoczko soon emerged as a chief critic of the possibility 
of a ―computer-assisted proof.‖ These CAPs, he alleged, 
incorporate contingent facts about the world, whereas 
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mathematical proofs require a priori certainty. On his account, we 
should reject the 4TC as a true ―theorem‖ lest we fundamentally 
alter the nature of mathematical truth. He writes: 
 
[The] use of computers, as in the 4CT, 
introduces empirical experiments into 
mathematics. Whether or not we choose to 
regard the 4CT as proved, we must admit that 
the current proof is no traditional proof, no a 
priori deduction of a statement from premises 
…. I will suggest that, if we accept the 4CT as a 
theorem, we are committed to changing the 
sense of ―theorem‖, or, more to the point, to 
changing the sense of the underlying concept of 
―proof.‖1 
 
I disagree with Tymoczko; CAPs can be a priori in the requisite 
sense. Something is a priori if it has a non-empirical justification—
regardless of whether humans have a priori knowledge of that 
justification. We must distinguish between the warrant the proof 
gives for its conclusion and our knowledge of that warrant. I 
contend CAPs provide excellent, a posteriori reasons for thinking 
that Appel‘s proof has an a priori justification.  
Most of the debate turns on what we mean by ―a priori 
proof.‖ I begin by discussing competing definitions, and then offer 
an account of how computer-generated proofs satisfy the best one. 
I conclude that we need not choose between CAPs‘ legitimacy and 
the aprioricity of mathematics. 
 
                                                 
1
 Tymoczko, Thomas. 1979. "The Four-Color Problem and Its Philosophical 
Significance". The Journal of Philosophy. 76 (2): 58 
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Assumptions 
I want to make explicit some of the background 
assumptions underlying my thesis. First, I assume that normal 
mathematical reasoning, such as we find in ordinary human-
produced proofs, counts as a priori. Following Frege, this is not to 
say that we discover arithmetic truths without reference to sense 
experience, but rather that their ultimate justification makes no use 
of it. Contemporary philosophers of mathematics seem largely to 
accept this thesis, and anyone denying it would see no epistemic 
difference between computer-derived proofs and the more natural 
kind. For the purposes of this paper, we shall therefore bracket 
objections to the aprioricity of mathematics in general. 
 Second, we need to outline our general conception of 
―proof.‖ I agree with Rota that a mathematical proof is 
fundamentally an argument—a ―sequence of steps which leads to 
the desired conclusion.‖2 Like any other argument, proofs proceed 
from a set of premises to a conclusion, which we call a 
mathematical theorem. I see at least two necessary conditions for 
proof-hood (although more may exist). An argument is a 
mathematical proof only if (1) the argument is deductively valid 
and (2) it is in some sense a priori. These are distinct criteria. 
Heuristic arguments are increasingly common in the field, and 
indeed they can provide legitimate a priori mathematical 
knowledge—however, ―The proposition was true for all of the 106 
cases we tested‖ does not amount to a proof of that proposition. 
Observe that Goldbach‘s Conjecture, for all its inductive support, 
                                                 
2 Rota, Gian Carlo. 1997. "The Phenomenology of Mathematical Proof". 
Synthese. 111 (2): 183 
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has yet to achieve the status of ―theorem.‖ Similarly, many 
arguments deductively entail their conclusions, but because their 
premises are fundamentally empirical claims, they do not enjoy a 
priori status. Tymoczko‘s argument denies the second condition 
that CAPs are a priori, but we will seek to reaffirm it. 
 
Defining “A Priori Proof” 
We must clarify what we mean by ―a priori.‖ In this section 
I reject the definition Tymoczko uses, which requires proofs 
necessarily to generate a priori knowledge. Instead, I offer my own 
definition which does not refer to any particular individual‘s 
knowledge at all. 
Recall that aprioricity is an epistemological concept. It 
primarily concerns knowledge—that is, justified true beliefs.3 
Specifically, it concerns the ―justified‖ part of knowledge. A given 
belief is a priori when its justification does not depend on sense 
experience. I agree with Kripke that, strictly speaking, the 
predicate ―… is a priori‖ applies to knowledge and belief 
exclusively, for they are the only bearers of justification.
4
 We know 
something a priori when we know it on the basis of strictly non-
empirical evidence.  
 As such, calling a proof ―a priori‖ involves a little sleight of 
hand. Proofs are neither beliefs nor knowledge. They are 
arguments—abstract mathematical constructions consisting of a set 
of premises, a conclusion, and the inferential relations between 
them. An argument is a proof whether or not any particular person 
                                                 
3
 Where the justification and the belief are related in the right way, of course.  
4
 Kripke, Saul A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press.), 35 
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knows it is a proof, and whether or not anyone believes it is a 
proof. We need to stipulate what ―a priori‖ means when applied to 
mathematical arguments.  
 Before presenting my own definition, I want to discuss 
what I take to be the received definition of ―a priori proof‖: 
 
(1) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if and only if it is 
capable of providing a priori knowledge of its conclusion to 
people with sufficient mathematical ability and knowledge 
of the involved concepts. 
 
Intuitively, I find this view highly plausible. As mathematical 
apriorists by assumption, we think that all mathematical truth can 
be known without sense experience. Naturally, proofs should 
provide exactly that knowledge. This definition paints the 
following picture: When a mathematician reads the proof of a 
theorem, he mentally internalizes each proceeding step. He holds 
the entire proof in his mind, and can see why it is true. Because he 
knows the workings of the proof, he believes the theorem it 
underpins. If asked, he can rely on his understanding alone to 
justify that belief without recourse to experiential propositions. His 
knowledge of the theorem is completely a priori.  
 On definition (1), CAPs are not a priori because they are 
not surveyable. Since no one mathematician can read the proof in 
its entirety, no one person can truly know it. Appel presumably 
understands the concepts involved in his proof of 4CT, but when 
he justifies the results step by step, he must refer to empirical work 
done by computers. For this reason, Tymoczko denies that CAPs 
are truly ―proofs‖—they cannot actually provide a priori 
 188 
 
knowledge: 
 
The mathematician surveys the proof in its 
entirety, and thereby comes to know the 
conclusion …. The proof relates the 
mathematical known to the mathematical 
knower, and the surveyability of the proof 
enables it to be comprehended by the pure 
power of the intellect—surveyed by the mind‘s 
eye, as it were. Because of surveyability, 
mathematical theorems are credited by some 
philosophers with a kind of certainty 
unobtainable in the other sciences. 
Mathematical theorems are known a priori.
5
 
 
I agree with Tymoczko that CAPs are not surveyable in the sense 
he requires, and if we accept (1), CAPs are not truly proofs. 
However, I think we have good reason to reject (1) as the criterion 
for a priori proofs: requiring that proofs be capable of generating a 
priori knowledge indexes what counts as ―proof‖ to particular, 
individual minds. On (1), whether a given argument is a proof 
depends on facts about the person attempting to understand it. 
 Because knowledge is a species of belief, it belongs to 
individuals. When Jones and Smith witness the same event, they 
form their own separate beliefs about it, which then count as 
knowledge if and only if they are true. So ―Jones‘ knowledge‖ and 
―Smith‘s knowledge‖ are distinct entities. Further, what is 
sufficient to provide Jones with ―knowledge of x‖ may not be 
sufficient to provide Smith with ―knowledge of x.‖ What actually 
will generate knowledge in a person depends on facts about that 
                                                 
5
 Tymoczko, The Four-Color Problem, 60. 
 189 
 
person‘s perception and reasoning processes, and such 
contingencies are unacceptable for a good definition of proof.  
Imagine an argument that requires hundreds of billions of 
pages to write down on paper (for example, suppose we somehow 
printed the results from every computation performed during 
Appel‘s the proof of the 4CT). That argument would be 
unsurveyable in a very real way. The time required to read and 
absorb it would exceed the human lifespan several times over. By 
(1), the argument is not a proof. But suppose now that modern 
technology increases human life expectancy tenfold, and cognitive 
enhancements permit us to read quickly enough to digest the 
argument and know its contents. The same definition dictates that 
now, the argument is a proof. Its proof-status changed because of 
strictly empirical facts which had nothing to do with the argument 
itself! Suppose further that an environmental disaster destroys the 
technology, but leaves record of the argument intact. Has it now 
ceased being a proof? 
Mathematicians and philosophers often assert that ―false 
proof‖ is a contradiction in terms.6 Proofs are certain and timeless. 
If Euclid proved a proposition in 300 B.C., that same proof 
remains equally valid today. Definition (1) does not capture this 
character of mathematical proofs. We do not want our criteria for 
proof-hood to depend on any one person‘s a priori knowledge, 
because what is a priori knowable in practice will always be 
contingent. We need a different concept of ―a priori proof.‖ 
A better definition of ―a priori proof‖ will determine the 
argument‘s epistemic status using only features of the argument 
                                                 
6
 Rota, The Phenomenology of Mathematical Proof, 183. 
 190 
 
itself—not features of the entities reading it. Remember, to call 
something a priori is to say that its ultimate justification does not 
depend on empirical propositions; whether any one person‘s 
knowledge of that justification is also a priori is irrelevant. Hence, 
I offer a counter-definition: 
 
(2) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if and only if: 
(a) none of its premises depend on empirical evidence for 
justification; and 
(b) the conclusion follows from the premises using only 
rules of inference with non-empirical justification. 
 
Unlike (1), (2) does not depend upon contingent facts unrelated to 
the argument itself. The argument will be a priori or not regardless 
of whom or what is reading it. Moreover, (2) best captures the 
spirit of a priori as a feature of justifications, rather than genesis. 
(1) seems dependent on the ―context of discovery‖—it asks, ―How, 
in practice, did some mathematician come to know the theorem in 
question?‖ (2) cares only about how we might, in principle, justify 
that theorem. If we can do so independently of sense experience, 
our theorem has achieved a priori status. On (2), ―a priori proofs‖ 
are arguments guaranteed to generate a priori justifications, which 
is precisely what proofs ought to do.  
 Given our assumption that ―normal‖ mathematical 
knowledge is a priori, we can derive the following: 
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(2*) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if:  
(a) all its premises are mathematical axioms or theorems; 
and 
(b) the conclusion follows from the premises using only 
rules of logic. 
 
Deciding whether computer-assisted proofs are legitimately a 
priori requires only determining whether they meet our two 
sufficient conditions. Do the computers assisting us employ only 
mathematically warranted inferences? We have excellent reason 
for believing they do.  
 
Do CAPs Meet Our Definition? 
 Consider Appel and Haken‘s proof of the 4CT, for example. 
Exactly what role did computers play? We should remember that 
one hundred percent of the conceptual work for the proof was 
developed by humans. Stated roughly,
7
 Appel and Hanken 
developed an algorithm—a mechanical procedure for applying a 
finite number of mathematical operations to some input, 
terminating in some output. The algorithm—like any valid 
algorithm—involves only mathematically warranted steps. The 
mathematicians proved, using tried-and-true human-generated 
methods, that when the algorithm takes a graph as input, a certain 
output results if and only if the graph has the property of being 
                                                 
7
 The description that follows oversimplifies a complicated and technical 
mathematical process, but I believe it accurately portrays the philosophical 
elements involved. 
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―reducible‖.8 They further proved that if every one of a particular 
set of graphs is reducible, the 4CT must necessarily be correct. No 
suspect ―computer-proof‖ has been invoked thus far.  
 Applying the algorithm by hand, however, is simply 
impracticable. The procedure requires ―analysis of about ten 
thousand neighborhoods of vertices‖ for each of about fifteen 
hundred graphs.
9
 Given the computational nature of an algorithm, 
the only reasonable way forward involves outsourcing these 
calculations to a machine. To do so, they wrote a machine-
language program—another series of mechanical instructions that, 
in theory, cause the machine to run through the algorithm precisely 
as Appel and Hanken described it, storing its data in bits of RAM. 
On the hypothesis that the computer functions properly, it executes 
the algorithm using only inferences with a priori justification.  
 Three things in this process are of note. First, the work 
done by computer in CAPs remains purely combinatorial—
different in scope, but not kind, from the role that calculators and 
even abaci serve in ―normal‖ mathematics. That role comes 
nowhere near the creative artificial intelligence Tymoczko 
imagines: 
 
Suppose that advances in computer science lead 
to the following circumstances. We can program 
a computer to initiate a search through various 
proof procedures, with subprograms to modify 
                                                 
8
 I will not discuss here what ―reducibility‖ means as a property of graphs. For 
details of the proof, see Appel and Hanken, 2002. 
9
 Appel, Kenneth and Wolfgang Haken. ―The Four Color Problem,‖ in 
Philosophy of Mathematics: An Anthology, ed. Dale Jacquette (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 207 
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and combine procedures in appropriate 
circumstances, until it finds a proof of statement 
A. After a long time, the computer reports a 
proof of A, although we can‘t reconstruct the 
general shape of the proof beyond the bare 
minimum…. [T]he question is whether 
mathematicians would have sufficient faith in 
the reliability of computers to accept this 
result.
10
 
 
The kind of method Tymoczko describes goes far beyond a 
computer-assisted proof—it represents a computer-generated 
proof. Specifically, Tymoczko hypothesizes a scenario in which a 
computer creates a ―proof‖ of Peano arithmetic‘s inconsistency. 
Surely, he says, logicians would find this result ―hard to swallow.‖ 
I agree; we should be very skeptical of such a hypothetical proof—
but that hesitation does not indicate that mathematicians lack 
confidence in the basic calculations computers perform. Again, 
CAPs require only this latter kind of combinatorial computation. 
 Second, we see that computers might introduce error into 
proof results in two ways: through flaws in their programming (a 
software bug), or malfunctions in the physical processes 
underlying their data storage systems (a hardware bug). Both are 
real possibilities, but neither differs substantially from the errors 
commonly found in flawed attempts at proof by humans. We 
misuse notation and make similar syntactical mistakes with 
regularity, and our calculations are exponentially more error-prone 
than those of machines. If I ask a mathematician for even a 
(relatively) simple combinatorial result—say, the rational 
                                                 
10
 Tymoczko, The Four-Color Problem, 74. 
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representation of 
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587i13
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i1
737
 , he will immediately 
reach for a calculator or (even more likely thirty years after 
Tymoczko published his paper) a computer. Why? Because 
empirically, computers are simply more reliable than humans. 
Appel, in his philosophical defense of his work, observes: 
 
When proofs are long and highly computational, 
it may be argued that even when hand checking 
is possible, the probability of human error is 
considerably higher than that of machine error; 
moreover, if the computations are sufficiently 
routine, the validity of programs themselves is 
easier to verify than the correctness of hand 
computations.
11
 
 
His last comment raises the final, most important point of how 
computer-derivations function in practice: they are subject to easy 
and repeated verification. Certainly, it is possible for a single 
processor or a single program to malfunction in some way and 
thereby produce a false result. But CAPs like that of the 4TC have 
been reproduced on hundreds of individual computers, and their 
results agreed upon by numerous independently-coded programs. 
In fact, new implementations for deriving the 4CT proof continue 
to appear even in the 21
st
 century. Granted, these results should not 
give us complete, absolute confidence in its validity (as 
philosophers, we regard very few things as certain beyond a 
doubt). But given the rigor and frequency of their verification, we 
can be just about as confident that Appel and Haken‘s algorithm 
                                                 
11
 Appel, The Four Color Problem, 207. 
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indeed generates the desired output as we can be about any 
empirical fact. 
 I say ―empirical‖ without concern, though Tymoczko and 
his sympathizers would balk at such an admission. They grant that 
computers are almost always reliable, but argue that when 
assessing their capacity to prove theorems, we are exclusively 
concerned with a priori evidence. Tymoczko says as much: 
 
[T]here is a great deal of accumulated evidence 
for the reliability of computers in [CAP] 
operations, and the work of the original 
computers was checked by other 
computers....The reliability of the 4CT, 
however, is not of the same degree as that 
guaranteed by traditional proofs, for this 
reliability rests on the assessment of a complex 
set of empirical factors.
12
 
 
In my estimation, this common argument misses the crucial 
distinction between the proof‘s a priori justification for its 
conclusion, and our knowledge of that justification. As per our 
definition, proof-hood requires that arguments begin from a priori 
premises, and proceed along a priori methods; our belief that it 
does so needn‘t be similarly a priori. We have overwhelming a 
posteriori evidence that the computer‘s methodology follows strict 
a priori guidelines, and therefore meets our criteria for an ―a priori 
proof.‖ 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Tymoczko, The Four-Color Problem, 74. 
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Conclusion 
 Tymoczko and I start from fundamentally different 
conceptions of what ―a priori‖ means in the context of 
mathematical results. He roots his entire project in the idea that 
that ―mathematical theorems are known a priori.‖13 Are they 
always? Remember that knowledge is proprietary to individuals. 
One person can have a priori knowledge of a fact another person 
knows only empirically, and this principle does not change when 
applied to mathematical knowledge. Much (dare I say, most) 
mathematical knowledge exists on an a posteriori basis. For 
example, I have no graduate training in mathematics, but when a 
Fields medalist informs me she has proven an extremely high-level 
theorem, I believe her. Is my belief justified? I say yes. This 
woman is likely the most knowledgeable expert on the planet. She 
has nothing to gain from lying, but everything to lose if caught. If I 
cannot trust her opinion, I can trust no one‘s. Is my belief true? If 
she really has proven the theorem, it must be. In such a case, my 
belief constitutes a posteriori knowledge of a mathematical 
theorem. I expect that most undergraduates accept their professors‘ 
word about theorems prima facie, and thereby create knowledge of 
a similar kind. Asserting that theorems are necessarily known a 
priori seems simply unrealistic.  
 We better capture the aprioricity of theorems with reference 
not to how particular individuals actually know them, but how 
those theorems are justified. For this, we must look to the proofs‘ 
methods. As per (2*), mathematical arguments follow a priori 
methods when neither their premises nor inferences depend upon 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 60 
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sense experience for justification. This certainly seems to be the 
case for Appel and Haken‘s proof of the 4TC, and for other CAPs 
like it.  
 Tymoczko rightly asserts that mathematicians’ knowledge 
of CAPs is necessarily empirical. That fact is difficult to deny. 
However, it does not speak to the internal operations of the proof, 
which (in my estimation) are the sole determinants of the proof‘s a 
priori status. As long the proof offers an a priori justification for its 
conclusion, it does not matter whether humans know of that 
justification in an a priori way. In essence: we need not know a 
priori that the proof’s warrant is a priori. Insofar as we trust our 
belief that hundreds of tests run on hundreds of thousands of 
combinations of software and hardware platforms cannot all be 
completely mistaken, we should trust our belief that CAPs justify 
their conclusion without reliance on empirics. Anyone suggesting 
that CAPs are not sufficient ―proofs‖ for lack of a priori 
justification cannot ignore this result.  
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